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 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis focuses on US-Italian relations and cultural diplomacy in the early Cold 
War.  Particular attention is devoted to the scholarship on the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom, an organization of left-wing anti-Communist intellectuals established in 
1950 and financed by the CIA. Instead of looking at this organization from a 
transnational perspective, this work has as the starting point the local dimension of it. 
In particular, the Italian branch of the CCF: Associazione Italiana per la Libertà della 
Cultura and the journal Tempo Presente. Differently from other European context, the 
Italian cultural experiment failed in promoting a transnational anti-Communist culture 
due to domestic factors such as: the political establishment, non-governmental groups 
with a socialising function and the political culture of the country. This analysis fosters 
a process of rethinking of US-Italian relations arguing against the theory of 
Washington as the pivotal actor. Instead, this work analyse the domestic structure of 
the country with its own political establishment, its political culture and its set of 
values and norms that represented the determinant factors for resisting, modifying and 
adapting the deployment of US Soft Power in the country.  A lack of understanding of 
the complexity of the context led the US to plan controversial and ineffective 
interventions in the early Cold War. Despite Washington’s short-term success, long-
term initiatives to transform the Italian political culture and Americanize the public 
opinion proved ineffective. This is a contribution taking further the investigation of 
the Cold War by emphasizing the importance of going “local” for a thorough 
understanding of transnational relations.
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To My Grandpa. 
 
5 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, W. S. 
Lucas, for his continuous support and his precious suggestions. His immense knowledge, 
and motivation have truly inspired me. Undoubtedly, without him I would not have made 
it.  
I am also grateful to the Department of American and Canadian Studies at the University 
of Birmingham for the opportunity I was given.  
Special thanks to my parents for their constant support and immense love; I owe you 
everything. Thanks to my dear sisters for encouraging me. Thanks to my friends and 
colleagues, all of them. Thanks to Ilaria, Camille and Manfredi for believing in me, it 
means a lot.  
And thanks to Will for making every day the most incredible day of my life.  
 
6 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION.                          9 
 
 -CH. I- THE CULTURAL COLD WAR: TRANSNATIONAL VERSUS NATIONAL 
DIMENSION.          18 
 
The Cultural Cold War: A New Historical Perspective. 22 
US Cultural Diplomacy and the State Private Network. 29 
Cultural Cold War Studies and the Congress for Cultural Freedom. 34 
The Problematic Aspects of Cultural Transmission and Hegemony. 43 
The Italian Political Culture and Context. 50 
Conclusion. 54 
 
-CH. II- THE ITALIAN DOMESTIC STRUCTURE.                    57 
 
The Political Reconstruction of the Country. 60 
Transition towards Democracy and the Challenge of the State-Society Relation. 65 
Anti-Fascism and the Politics of Memory. 71 
Consensus Building and the Demise of Anti-Fascism. 78 
7 
 
The Illusion of the “Ethical” and the Political Establishment. 81 
Conclusion. 86 
 
 -CH. III- ITALIAN SUB-NATIONAL NETWORKS.         88 
 
The Italian Power Structure and the Socializing Agencies. 90 
The Catholic Church and Its Socialising Function. 93 
The Catholic Networks. 98 
The PCI and its Socialising Actors 102 
The Intellectuals and the Post-War Engagement. 108 
The Intellectuals and the Italian Political System. 115 
Conclusion. 123 
 
 -CH IV- RETHINKING US-ITALIAN RELATIONS AND THE ECONOMIC 
RECONSTRUCTION.        125 
 
The Economic Question in the Early Post-War. 129 
The United States and the Christian Democracy Party in the Early Cold War. 139 
The Evolution of US-Italian Relations in the post-1947. 146 
Conclusion. 151 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
-CH. V-THE US SOFT POWER AND THE ITALIAN POLITICAL CULTURE.  155 
 
Selling the American Way of Life in Italy. 158 
US Cultural Diplomacy and the Challenges of the Italian Way of Life. 167 
The April 1948 Election and the US Short-Term Intervention. 173 
The US and the Italian Working Class After the 1948 Election. 181 
Conclusion. 188 
 
 -CH. VI-THE ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA PER LA LIBERTÀ DELLA 
CULTURA AND TEMPO PRESENTE.                      192 
 
The Transnational Cultural Intervention and the Anti-systemic Italian Intellectuals. 196 
     Ignazio Silone                200 
The Congress for Cultural Freedom 204 
     The Associazione Italiana per la Libertà della Cultura           209 
Tempo Presente and the Challenges of Transnational anti-Communism. 213 
    The Italian Anti-systemic Intellectuals and America. 219 
    The End of Tempo Presente              225 
Conclusion. 230 
 
CONCLUSION.          233 
BIBLIOGRAPHY.          239 
9 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
My doctoral research was initially conceived as a thorough investigation of the US 
deployment of Soft Power techniques in Italy in the early Cold War. In particular, the 
core interest of my analysis was on the Associazione Italiana per la Libertà della 
Cultura (AILC), the Italian branch of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), and the 
journal Tempo Presente as part of a broad US strategy of cultural warfare. The CCF was 
created in 1950 as a transnational organization of left-wing anti-Communist intellectuals 
covertly funded by the CIA via a series of philanthropic organizations. From 1950 to 
1967 it established branches in thirty-five countries and its global reach was impressive. 
Part of its activities consisted in organizing cultural events, international conferences, 
and publishing important journals in those areas the Americans liked to refer to as the 
Free World. The primary aim of this organization was to detach the neutralist 
intelligentsia from the appeal of Communism through the promotion of an alternative 
that better reconciled with the American Way of Life. Experts of the CCF have defined 
it as one of the most effective CIA’s psychological operations that, together with other 
covert-overt interventions, successfully led to the establishment of a transnational anti-
Communist cultural hegemony in the West. 
Even though since the cultural turn of Cold War studies in the late 1990s the CCF and 
its national affiliates have become a field of research of increasing interest among 
scholars, the Italian branch has not received adequate attention. To fill this academic 
gap, I decided to further the investigation of this organization by specifically looking at 
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the Italian case. As my research was progressing, however, I began questioning the 
largely accepted theory of the CCF as a successful organization. Undoubtedly, it had the 
merit of creating a transnational space for a cultural debate fostered by a network of 
interconnection among influential personalities beyond national boundaries. However, 
on the local front, the peculiar outcome of the Italian organization seemed to contradict 
the theory of an achieved success. The Italian project struggled to fit within the 
framework of the Cold War. In the end, it did not bring forth an alternative cultural 
hegemony and these intellectuals remained at the margin of the national cultural 
landscape.  
This led me to question the real nature of the CCF not simply as a transnational 
organization but also as a national product with its local characterization and limits. First 
of all, I sought to understand on which basis previous scholars have argued in favour of 
a CCF’s hegemonic position. I soon realized how, in most of the cases, scholars have 
the tendency to look at this organization simply from a mere transnational perspective. 
This, unfortunately, leads to underestimate the importance of the local and the series of 
complex negotiations taking place within the nation itself.  
Furthermore, the concept of a transnational cultural hegemony, which seems to be a 
central theme of many books and academic articles, is often presented as an ambiguous 
and vague concept. No explanations whatsoever have been offered to explain what kind 
of hegemony the CCF was able to create. Even though the CCF was created as a 
transnational project, it was in the local context that the abstraction of a transatlantic 
anti-Communist culture found its concrete dimension.  
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The more my research was progressing, the more I realized that both the AILC and 
Tempo Presente could not be conceived as mere micro-reproductions of ideological 
conflicts on the macro level. Therefore, I decided to investigate what factors could 
determine the success or failure of transnational relations in a specific country. I was 
finally convinced that the reasons why this cultural project had a different impact in 
Italy was mainly linked to domestic variants. In particular, the political culture of the 
country, its political and social system and the forms of collective identities represented 
determinant factors for the final outcome of this transnational intervention.  
Saying that, to understand the complexity of the Italian project and the dynamics of US-
Italian relations as a mere transatlantic approach to the Cold War is not enough. It is 
therefore indispensable to fully engage with those national dynamics that despite 
intersecting with Cold War dynamics went beyond them. The starting point of this 
research is a thorough investigation of the national structure and the ways in which 
specific cultural environment can resist, modify or accept the deployment of Soft Power. 
While external actors could intervene and promote a change within the country, they 
could only do it through a process of mediations and negotiations with local actors but 
also if the domestic structure allowed them to achieve their specific objectives.  
This analysis also opened up to a re-interrogation of the dynamics of power in the 
relations between states. There is a tendency among scholars to describe US-Italian 
relations as an unbalanced interaction in which the US is largely described as the pivotal 
actor that could determine all the terms of this relationship. As my research seeks to 
prove, it was not Washington that had a predominant role but it was De Gasperi and the 
network of socialising agencies he managed to attract that played a central role in the 
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early Cold War US-Italian negotiations. Interesting dynamics revealed how Italy was 
capable to co-opt the effort and exploit the US Anti-communist paranoia for national 
reasons, eventually creating its own local cold war.  
Since the complex negotiations that took place within the country could not be simply 
read from a transnational perspective, the main focus will be on Italian constant attempts 
to safeguard national interests and priorities, depicting its long-lasting tendency to adapt 
to external pressure through a series of stratagems and negotiations. It was not a matter 
of loose guidance or of benevolent concessions from the outside that shaped the Italian 
post-war, but it was the result of national efforts and negotiations in moving beyond the 
strict boundaries of the Cold War. The peculiar responses of cultural and political actors, 
their choices and individual efforts revealed the limitation of previous scholarship. It is 
therefore beneficial to abandon that narrative that look at Italian post-war choices as a 
natural response to the US-Soviet confrontation, and to examine them in their national 
essence as a starting point of a new Cold War narrative. My first objective, therefore, is 
to ‘localize’ the history of the Cold War in order to ‘internationalize’ the Italian one. 
This work is divided in six thematic chapters. In the first chapter I will focus on the 
notion of psychological warfare and the manifestation of the conflict through culture. 
Attention is also given to the new scholarship of Cold War studies reviewing relevant 
works in this field. In particular, I will focus on the scholarship dealing with the CCF. 
Starting from the assumption that culture represents an incredible form of power and a 
fundamental political tool, this research aims to offer a modest contribution taking 
further the investigation of the Cold War by emphasising the importance of ‘going local’ 
for a thorough understanding of international/transnational dynamics. By looking at 
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culture as a two-way process, US cultural diplomacy needs to be understood as an on-
going process of interaction between transnational and national cultural structures. This 
contribution, therefore, will not merely look at culture as a political tool, but also as a 
determining factor for the exercise of power in different contexts. The main objective is 
to investigate how local cultures, in this case the Italian one, can set limits to the use of 
power in specific frameworks. To do so, it is necessary to rethink the Cold War and its 
culture from a bottom-up, inside-out perspective that has the “local” at its core.  
Furthermore, attention will be paid to the notion of Cultural Hegemony. Considerations 
will be made over the tensions emerging between transnational and national attempts to 
construct a “Common Sense”. When studying the CCF and its Italian branch it is crucial 
to investigate on how effective the promotion of a transnational ideology and an 
“imagined” Atlantic community were in shaping Italian politics during the Cold War. 
Besides looking at the Cold War as an abstract framework, the attempt is also to move 
beyond the myths of an undefined Euro-Atlantic identity and of a construction of a 
transnational hegemony as a self-proclaimed U.S. success. Therefore, this represents an 
attempt to underline the limits of a mainstream narrative that tends to look at the cultural 
Cold War simply from a transnational perspective.  
In the second chapter attention would be on the domestic structure and Italian political 
culture. The starting point for understanding US-Italian relations in politics and culture 
is not American foreign policy or the “trans-Atlantic” dimension of the Cold War; it is 
instead the local context and the negotiations of power within the country. Despite the 
fact that, with the beginning of the global conflict transnational and international actors 
would eventually step in to take part to the Italian Reconstruction, a contest of power 
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within the state was already taking place. Since the Armistice declaration in September 
1943, Italian political leaders set as their primary objective the reconstruction of the 
country and its transition towards democracy. The weak state-society relation and a lack 
of a national identity could hamper the democratization of the country and lead to a lack 
of legitimacy of the new state. Anti-fascism became the unifying ideology for a renewal 
of the country and for creating a rhetorical consensus around the political establishment. 
However, parties’ interests in securing their authority within the Italian society led them 
to initiate a competing quest for hegemony by exploiting Italian political culture of 
antagonism and familism that, instead of uniting the country, led to the creation of two 
opposing social groups: Catholics and Communists.  
The third chapter expands this antagonizing dimension of post-war Italy by looking at 
political parties’ reliance on socializing agencies. Due to the weak state-society relations 
these party could not directly establish their authority on the Italian populace. They had 
instead to rely on those social actors that over a long period had succeeded in becoming 
a point of reference within the society. In particular the Catholic Church, the CGIL and, 
eventually, the intellectuals played a pivotal role in the mobilization of the Italian 
populace by conveying votes to one political party or the other. Their reliance on an 
antagonizing rhetoric led to further social and economic divisions within society with 
the creation of sub-national networks. Despite scholars tend to look at this dynamics 
through Cold War lenses, these instabilities were not the response to international 
divisions but they were the result of a national clash for the promotion of a new 
collective identity built on values such as Catholicism or social justice. The consequence 
for parties’ reliance on the antagonising rhetoric of these socialising groups led to a lack 
of improvement of the state-society relation with the creation of a climate of fear and 
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distrust that would make the US intervention and the construction of conditional 
alliances with both political and non-governmental actors easier.  
The fourth chapter, instead, look at the evolution of US-Italian relations and the 
economic reconstruction of the country. Up until 1947, the US approach towards Italian 
reconstruction was based on a strategy of indirect control. By relying on non-
governmental networks and their ties with the Italian government and economic groups, 
the US offered advices and suggestion for reconstructing the country. Before the Cold 
War, stability and reformation of the economic and political system were the key 
elements of US foreign policy towards Italy. When the international climate began to 
deteriorate and anti-Communist became the main priority, Washington shifted from an 
indirect approach to a more direct one by opening up a dialogue with the only anti-
Communist political party that could effectively halt the PCI’s increasing electoral 
success: the DC. Differently from the mainstream narrative of the Cold War and US-
Italian relations, one of the objectives of this thesis is to prove that it was not Truman 
the pivotal actor to set the terms of this relationship, but De Gasperi who, by successfully 
presenting himself and his party as the only reliable and viable anti-Communist ally the 
US could rely on, obtained leverage in the negotiation process. If the US wanted to keep 
Italy as an anti-Communist ally, Washington needed to adapt its objectives and 
strategies to the Italian context and its political culture.  
The fifth chapter focuses on the US deployment of Soft Power techniques in Italy in the 
attempt to change the political culture of the country. Disappointed by the DC’s search 
for autonomy and its unwillingness to follow the US guidance for the reconstruction of 
the country, psychological warfare experts began to increasingly target the Italian public 
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opinion in the attempt to Americanise the local population as well as by promoting trans-
national anti-Communism as a new form of national identity. The strategy of selling the 
American way of life through the promotion of cultural products and values is analysed 
in this chapter and the focus is on the local challenges to transform Italians’ ideas and 
beliefs. Despite American goods and cultural products dominated the Italian market 
scholars tend not to address the question of why Italians chose those products. In many 
cases, American products were the only available due to the paralysis of the Italian 
industry as a consequence of the war. But as soon as the cultural industry was back on 
its feet, Italians went back to their national products.  
Furthermore, following the June 1948 election and the US intervention to secure the 
conservative party access to power and the electoral defeat of the Italian Communist 
party and the Socialist party, Washington faced new challenges. While contributing to 
the DC’ success, the intervention secure the party’s authority within the political 
establishment with the result that the US lost the already weak control on the Italian 
political forces. Even more so, the American intervention facilitated the establishment 
of sub-national groups in particular the Catholic networks that, instead of leading to an 
acceptance of the American way of life or of a transnational anti-communism as a form 
of identity, allowed Catholicism to become a new form of collective identity and 
paradoxically strengthen the Communist party’s authority among the anti-clerical forces.  
The US disappointment towards its Italian allies and the increasing anti-Americanism 
among the Italian intellectual community led Washington to rethink its strategy towards 
the country. In the last chapter the focus is on the AILC and the review Tempo Presente. 
As I sought to demonstrate the Italian case contradicts the theory of a hegemonic success 
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of the CCF. The failure to establish a transnational anti-Communist identity in the Italian 
intellectual community was linked first of all to the political culture of the Italian 
intellectuals and their interpretation of the CCF as an opportunity to bring along a 
transformation of the Italian culture not from a transnational perspective but from a 
national one. The attempts to bring forward a new cultural alternative to the one 
promoted by the PCI and DC led the Italian branch to concentrate on local issues, rather 
than merely on the Cold War. The political culture of these intellectuals led to a series 
of controversies with the CCF’s headquarters. In particular, their anti-clericalism 
represented a major concern for the leaders of the organization who wanted to promote 
a united and wide anti-Communist network that included also the catholic world.  
Even though Italian negotiations made this cultural project peculiar, the domestic 
structure limited the success of this organization on the local front. The readers’ 
response was tepid and sales remained limited. The editors decided to halt publication 
of Tempo Presente in 1968. Seeking to maintain some sort of intellectual autonomy, 
these intellectuals never linked themselves organically to the political establishment. 
Their refusal to follow any dogma and their unwillingness to compromise with political 
parties led to their marginalization within the Italian cultural environment. Despite the 
Cold War gave them an international reputation and influence, in the Italian context 
their arguments felt on deaf ears. The US’ attempt to establish a new cultural hegemony  
proved unsuccessful.      
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- CH. I- 
THE CULTURAL COLD WAR: TRANSNATIONAL VERSUS NATIONAL 
DIMENSION. 
 
The analysis of the Cold War has long been a source of heated controversy amongst 
historians. Different schools of thought have disputed at length about the origin, the 
course, and the inevitability of the conflict, as well as who was to blame for the 
deterioration of the relations between the USA and the USSR. While scholars have 
devoted considerable efforts to the interpretation, or reinterpretation, of the Cold War 
concentrating on the military, economic, and political aspects of the conflict, the 
ideological dimension of it has long been underestimated. Because of its apparent 
harmlessness, there has been a general tendency to disregard culture or relegate it to 
an accessory category to the use of Hard Power. Over the past decades, however, 
scholarship has shifted toward new approaches and fields of research particularly 
focusing on the role ideology, culture, and propaganda played during this conflict, thus 
coming to a better understanding of what the Cold War was about.  
The traditional approach to the American strategy and operations, focusing on 
economic and political interpretations, has been challenged by academics such as 
Christian G. Appy, David Caute, Mario Del Pero, John Fousek, Scott Lucas, Richard 
Pells, Federico Romero, Giles Scott-Smith, Frances Stonor Saunders and Hugh 
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Wilford1, who re-interpreted older framings of the early Cold War by noting that the 
conflict was far more than a political and military contest: it was a “total conflict” of 
cultures and ideological systems. The long-lasting interpretation of it as a mere 
geopolitical struggle for spheres of influence opened up to new reinterpretations of the 
bipolar confrontation that led scholars to define it as a psychological conflict, too, in 
which ideas and values went hand in hand with the so-called “traditional weapons”.  
Even though the interpretation of the Cold War as a psychological war and ideological 
struggle for the maintenance of spheres of influence has been around since the 
beginning of the conflict itself, the narrative of a mobilization of the conflict through 
culture is relatively new. By emphasising the political dimension of culture (and not 
simply the cultural dimension of politics) this ground-breaking scholarship has 
deepened our understanding of international politics and how policymaking works.  
Besides its pioneering recognition, the new historiography of the Cold War is 
essentially suffering on one front of analysis. While concentrating on both Super 
                                                             
1 A partial listing of works on Cultural diplomacy and organizations includes: F S Saunders, 
Who Paid the Piper?: The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (Granta Books, 2000); H Wilford, The 
CIA, the British Left, and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?, Cass Series / Studies in Intelligence 
(F. Cass, 2003); G Scott-Smith, The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural 
Freedom, the CIA, and Post-War American Hegemony, Routledge / Psa Political Studies Series 
(Routledge, 2002),; G Scott-Smith, H Krabbendam, and Roosevelt Study Center, The Cultural 
Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960, Cass Series--Studies in Intelligence (F. Cass, 2003); S 
Lucas, Freedom’s War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union, 1945-56 (Manchester 
University Press, 1999); W. Scott Lucas, “Mobilizing Culture: The State-Private Network and 
the CIA in the Early Cold War,” in War and Cold War in American Foreign Policy 1942–62 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002), 83–107; C. Appy, ed., Cold War Constructions: The 
Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966 (The University of Massachusetts 
Press, 2000); M Del Pero, “The United States and ‘Psychological Warfare’ in Italy, 1948-
1955.,” Journal of American History (Bloomington, Ind.) 87, no. 4 (2000): 1304–34; F Romero, 
“Indivisibilità Della Guerra Fredda. La Guerra Totale Simbolica,” Studi Storici 38, no. 4 
(1997): 935–50; J Fousek, To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural 
Roots of the Cold War (University of North Carolina Press, 2000); D Caute, The Dancer Defects, 
The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
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Powers’ attempts to mobilize culture and construct their own hegemony, this 
scholarship leaves open the question of the local response to the dissemination of ideas 
and values. It also pays little attention to the way in which a specific social/cultural 
structure managed to determine the use of power in those contexts in which cultural 
interventions occurred. Cultural Cold War historians often focus either on US attempts 
to shape the European response to the Cold War or on the relationship between 
American power and European autonomy. This leads to underestimate the relevance 
of “local cold wars”. By looking at the events merely through Cold War lenses, they 
miss the chance to portray a much more complex and ambivalent relationship between 
the US and its European allies shaped by national negotiations, interests, and strategy. 
Even in cases where scholars have approached this conflict from a national perspective, 
the “local” is most of the time considered only as the playground to expand the notion 
of the Cold War. Thorough investigations of national structures and the ways in which 
specific local “environments” can resist, modify, accept, or determine the use of Soft 
Power proved to be scarce.  
This chapter is constructed around three main areas. First, I will focus on the notion of 
psychological warfare and the manifestation of the Cold War through culture. 
Attention will be given to the new scholarship of Cold War studies, reviewing relevant 
works in the field. In consideration of the complexity in defining what is culture and 
what is not, and trying to avoid the risk of working on a far too vast terrain, this work 
will essentially introduce the scholarship dealing with “high culture”, in particular 
those works in regards to a specific organization: the Congress for Cultural Freedom.  
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Second, I seek to introduce new perspectives of analysis. Starting from the assumption 
that culture represents an incredible form of power and a fundamental political tool, 
this research aims to offer a modest contribution taking further the investigation of the 
Cold War by emphasising the importance of “going local” for a thorough 
understanding of international/transnational dynamics. When looking at culture as a 
two-way process, US cultural diplomacy needs to be understood as an ongoing process 
of interaction between transnational and national cultural structures. This contribution, 
therefore, will not merely look at culture as a political tool, but also as a determining 
factor for the exercise of power in different contexts. The main objective is to 
investigate how local cultures, in this case the Italian one, can set limits to the use of 
power in specific frameworks. To do so, it is necessary to rethink the Cold War and its 
culture from a bottom-up, inside-out perspective that has the “local” at its core.  
Third, the focus will be on the notion of Cultural Hegemony. Considerations will be 
made over the tensions emerging between transnational and national attempts to 
construct a “Common Sense”. When studying the CCF and its Italian branch, it is 
crucial to investigate on how effective the promotion of a transnational ideology and 
an “imagined” Atlantic community were in shaping Italian politics during the Cold 
War. Besides looking at the Cold War as an abstract framework, the attempt is also to 
move beyond the myths of an undefined Euro-Atlantic identity and of a construction 
of a transnational hegemony as a self-proclaimed US success. Therefore, this 
represents an attempt to underline the limits of a mainstream narrative that tends to 
look at the cultural Cold War simply from a transnational perspective. The focus on 
the peculiarity of the Italian case study, which will be analysed in details in the last 
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chapter, would dismiss the interpretation of it as a micro-reproduction of the 
ideological conflict on the macro level. 
 
The Cultural Cold War: A New Historical Perspective.  
 
The Cold War historiography that had been produced prior to the late 20th Century 
was essentially focusing on traditional subjects, such as nation-state diplomacy, 
economics, and international politics, and military factors. In the aftermath of the 
conflict, however, these perspectives seemed inadequate to explain the complexity of 
the war. Since the collapse of the USSR and the opening up of both powers’ archives, 
scholars have been granted access to new available sources and have begun 
questioning the true nature of the conflict and the role of culture.  
Central to this new narrative is the concept of Soft Power. This concept was initially 
developed by the American political scientist and former State Department official 
Joseph Samuel Nye in 1991 in his book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of 
American Power where he reflects on the evolution of the concept of power and how 
it “is becoming less fungible, less coercive and less tangible” 2. Years later, in the 
preface of his book Soft Power : The Means to Success in World Politics, Nye defines 
Soft Power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion”. 
According to Nye, besides the use of hard power successful states need to attract 
supporters and shape their long-term attitudes through the promotion of ideals, values 
                                                             
2 See J S Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, (Basic Books, 1991) 
188. 
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and culture. As he claims, Soft Power “arises from the attractiveness of a country’s 
culture, political ideals and policies. When you can get others to admire your ideals 
and do want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to 
move them in your direction. Seduction is always more effective that coercion, and 
many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply 
seductive.”3 The seductive aspect of US foreign policy is the central theme of this new 
Cold War scholarship.  
This new historiographical perspective has broadened our understanding of the bipolar 
confrontation by placing culture, ideology, and propaganda at the core of their analyses. 
While the focus of previous research was merely on the economic and psychological 
implications of culture by emphasizing the cultural dimension of politics, it is not until 
the 1990s that scholars began to move beyond a simple analysis of the Cold War 
rhetoric and brought forth a real interrogation of a cultural conflict. In addition to being 
a political and economic war, scholars have begun to talk about a cultural Cold War. 
The central theme of this new scholarship is an in-depth investigation on the crucial 
role culture played during the Cold War. Culture, which was previously seen as an 
additional element of historiographical analyses, became a central descriptive tool4 
fundamental for broadening the understanding of the conflict and how international 
relations work. 
The process of rethinking the Cold War in terms of a clash between ideologies and 
culture was made possible by previous investigations on the notion of culture. In 
                                                             
3 J S Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (Public Affairs, 2004), X. 
4 M Hochgeschwender, “The Cultural Front of the Cold War: The Congress for Cultural 
Freedom as an Experiment in Transnational Warfare,” Ricerche Di Storia Politica, no. 1 
(2003): 5. 
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particular, with the cultural turn of the mid-19th Century, scholars began to look at the 
nature of culture and its relation with power. Despite the plethora of published works 
dealing with it, defining this concept is not an easy task. In its broad and ambiguous 
conceptuality, scholars have encountered many difficulties in giving a neat and widely 
accepted definition of it. One of the most commonly accepted definitions belongs to 
the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz. In 1973, Geertz published a book titled 
The Interpretation of Cultures. As stated, “Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an 
animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be 
those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search 
of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning.”5 By this, Geertz argued for a 
semiotic approach to culture in which the underlying webs of meanings need to be first 
isolated and interpreted in order to understand culture in its manifested form.  
Years later, the social psychologist Geert Hofstede made the important claim that 
although certain aspects of culture are physically visible, their meaning is invisible 
and, “lies precisely and only in the way these practices are interpreted by the insiders.”6 
Culture, therefore, does not merely represent visible artefacts but it also includes the 
underlying assumptions generated in the pre-conscious level. The local traditions, the 
values and the history of a country work together towards the production of cultural 
products. Understanding these meanings is necessary to comprehend why people 
around the world behave differently and have different ideas and values.  
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Since culture is not static but is rather dynamic, there are always actors trying to 
intervene and modify it. Starting from this definition of culture, scholars sought to 
understand what cultural relations mean and how they work. As Akira Iriye put it, 
“Cultural relations may be defined as interactions, both direct and indirect, among two 
or more cultures. Direct interactions include physical encounters with the people and 
objects of another culture. Indirect relations are more subtle, involving such things as 
a person’s ideas and prejudices about another people, or cross-national influences in 
philosophy, literature, music, art, and fashion.”7 By arguing this, Iriye highlights the 
complexity of cultural encounters among nations and the manifestation of cultural 
diplomacy as the result of both its direct and indirect approaches.   
Taking up these notions of culture as a starting point, Cold War historians expanded 
and reinterpreted the understanding of it according to the specificity of the Cold War8. 
As Christian Appy observes in his book Cold War Constructions, this new 
interpretation of the Cold War is constructed around the ideas that “culture is 
inherently political (and that is embedded in, and expresses, relations of power)” and 
that “all political struggles are culturally constructed (embedded in systems of value 
and meaning)”9. This re-interpretation represented a significant turn in Cold War 
studies. As Appy claimed, historians now tend to agree that “policy making, 
intelligence gathering, war-making, and mainstream politics might be profoundly 
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shaped by a social and cultural world beyond the conference table and the battlefield”10. 
According to R. B. J. Walker :  
“[The] significance of the concept of culture in the analysis of 
international relations is not that it offers a convenient category of 
socio-scientific explanation, or a convincing account of human 
nature, or a helpful classification of the different kinds of human 
practices there have been. Rather it hints at all the uncertainties of 
modernity, and at a multitude of struggles- on the grounds of 
tradition or postmodernity, of gender, race, religion and ethnicity, or 
socialism and capitalism, of the Other, of the future, of the local 
community, or the state and of the planet – to reconstitute the 
conditions of human existence in the face of tremendous structural 
transformations.”11  
 
This new scholarship offers a multidisciplinary approach to the Cold War with a focus 
on the roles of ideas, ideologies, and culture by emphasising how Soft Power played a 
greater role than previously acknowledged. Thanks to this new historical approach, 
international and diplomatic history has been enriched with scholars coming from 
different disciplines such sociology, literature, anthropology, history, communication 
studies, gender studies, and musicology. New issues have also been introduced to 
expand the understanding of the Cold War. Attention has been given, for instance, to 
the role of linguistics and visual symbols; popular and high culture; mass products; to 
the role of individuals and transnational organizations as part of a state-private network 
strategy. Aspects like nationalism, national identity, race, class, and gender have also 
                                                             
10 Ibidem. 
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been integrated in these analyses. Despite their initial reluctance, some diplomatic 
historians too have expressed the necessity to move beyond the traditional inter-
governmental diplomacy and look at the interaction between the state and private 
sectors of society. 
The perception that this war represented, as Del Pero put it, “a total and absolute 
conflict between two antagonistic, but equally universalistic, models”12  led to the 
awareness that this war could not be fought on the traditional battleground. Because 
of its absolute nature, this was a “war for unconditional surrender”13, a war that had 
the annihilation of the antagonist and its model of social development as the ultimate 
goal. The defeat of the enemy, however, could not be achieved with military means. 
The technological and scientific developments of mass-destruction armaments reached 
a level of frightening intensity that led both Super Powers to find alternative ways to 
win this war. The impossibility of defeating the enemy through normal warfare made 
the psychological effort to conquer the “minds and hearts” a necessity for both sides14. 
Both Powers chose to opt for an ideological intervention meant to either glorify their 
own modus vivendi on political, social, and economic terms or to undermine the appeal 
of the rival system.  
The Cold War became the symbolic framework where the struggle between values and 
ideas took place. By revealing the centrality of ideologies and culture in this conflict, 
previous interpretations alone seem now inadequate to define its complexity. The new 
scholarship holds out against the “national security” thesis. In Freedom’s War, for 
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instance, Scott Lucas rejects the idea, supported by others historians, that the US, 
through the façade of “national security”, was merely defending itself and the Free 
World against “the evil empire” 15 . From Stalin to Truman and passing through 
Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and Kennedy, all Cold War leaders were motivated as much 
by ideological beliefs as by concerns about national security. Previous historiographies 
simply failed to recognize the ideological dimension of the conflict, as if scholars read 
all the documents and assumed all events as, “unmediated, objective realities rather 
than dynamic historical construction” 16 . Because of its apparent harmlessness, 
previous analyses on the Cold War tended to disregard culture or treat it as a mere 
accessory to the use of Hard Power. As Lucas observes in regard to previous works 
dealing with the Cold War and its culture, the limits of those works lay in the absence 
of the state from the historical account leading to a superficial interrogation of ‘culture’ 
as separated from the total political environment.17  
Initially conceived as a non-political asset meant to foster mutual understanding 
among countries, the Cold War made evident that Soft Power18 could not be treated as 
secondary to political and economic diplomacy. As Vladimir Pechatnov observes, the 
mobilization of ideologies and culture for political aims: 
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 “[…] made the Cold War more intense, global, and dangerous. More 
global -because both sides believed in the universal nature of their 
principles and wanted to spread them to the whole world. More 
intense -because each side believed it had a monopoly on truth and 
was determined to win. More dangerous -because ideological 
hostility led to exaggerated suspicious and fears, which in turn push 
both sides to overkill in providing for security.”19 
 
According to Federico Romero this was “a colossal operation of preparation for a war 
that would never be fought and, simultaneously, a war effectively waged but without 
a military clash”20. Therefore, it is evident how culture ended up playing a central role 
in Cold War international relations not only as an appendix of US diplomacy but as 
the battleground for a total war.  
 
US Cultural Diplomacy and the State Private Network. 
 
Differentiating themselves from previous narratives, scholars have shifted their 
attention toward the complexity of the psychological warfare and how cultural 
diplomacy had been orchestrated. Apart from the reliance on “negative” propaganda 
meant to dehumanize and delegitimised the Soviet enemy, it became indispensable for 
US foreign policy to foster a friendly world environment where the American system 
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could flourish. To do so, on one hand Washington conveyed its effort and economic 
resources to the recovery of Western Europe hoping to create a stable Euro-Atlantic 
alliance, while on the other hand it became fundamental to sell the American Way of 
Life abroad in the attempt to promote a better understanding of the US. American 
psychological experts planned a Cultural Diplomacy strategy, “...based on the 
assumption, dubious at best, that if other people understood us, they would like us, and 
if they liked us, they would do the things we wanted them to do.”21  
The conditions under which international relations had been conducted underwent a 
great change during the Cold War. The end of the Second World War resulted in a 
mutation of the global power structure with the rise of two Super Powers and their 
consequent struggle for hegemony. The competition for spheres of influence led to an 
increase of global interdependence and the engagement with psychological warfare 
through transnational networks. This was primarily due to the fact that technological 
and scientific developments of mass-destruction armaments reached a level of 
threatening intensity that made governments’ reliance on Hard Power practically 
unfeasible. If this conflict could not be fought on the traditional battleground, both the 
US and the USSR had to find alternative ways to compete and win this war. The 
perception that the Cold War represented a conflict between two opposing ways of life 
led the two Super Powers to opt for an ideological intervention meant to either glorify 
their own modus vivendi on political, social, and economic terms or to undermine the 
appeal of the rival system.  
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In a world divided in two, the conquest of the international consensus became the 
prerogative of both sides. Despite systematic differences, both Super Powers had 
“collective dream projects” and wanted to spread their own ‘way of life’ globally in 
order to create their own “dream communities”22. They both constructed their agendas 
around the universality of their principles in constant conflict with each other. Because 
it was a ‘war for unconditional surrender’, neither the US nor the USSR were willing 
to negotiate or compromise and they strove “to out-educate, out-perform, out-write, 
out-produce, out-argue, and outshine the other.”23 While the USSR relied on classical 
orchestras, ballet companies, and socialist realism in the arts to enhance its influence 
across the world, the US responded with abstract expressionism, performing arts, and 
jazz music. For both the USSR and US, the unconventional actors were writers, poets, 
ballet dancers, musicians, songwriters, painters, movie stars, radio speakers and 
intellectuals. As David Caute claimed, never before, “had empires felt so compelling 
a need to prove their virtue, to demonstrate their spiritual superiority, to claim the high 
ground of ‘progress’, to win public support and admiration by gaining ascendency in 
each and every event of what might be styled the Cultural Olympics.”24  
The first theatre of intervention for US cultural diplomacy was in Western Europe. As 
Osgood claims:  
“[…]the untold story of America’s cold war of words did not lie in 
the tale of psychological operations to foment unrest behind the Iron 
Curtain, as I first supposed. Rather, it was in the broader effort to 
win the hearts and minds of people on the other side of that curtain, 
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in the areas of the world that were non-communist, neutral, or tied 
to the United States through formal alliances- the area that 
Americans liked to call the ‘free world’”25 
 
The major target of Osgood’s concept of psychological warfare was the general 
population. As Ellul observed in his work Propaganda: the Formation of Men’s 
Attitudes, “the individual is of no interest to the propagandist” since he might present 
too much resistance to external action. To be effective, “propaganda cannot be 
concerned with detail”. Creating certain convictions in an isolated individual 
represents an extremely difficult and complex process. For this reason, Ellul explains, 
“modern propaganda reaches individuals enclosed in the mass and as participants in 
that mass, yet it also aims at a crowd, but only as a body composed of individuals.”26 
Facilitated by the communication revolution beginning in the late nineteenth century, 
the constantly evolving modern instruments and techniques of communication allowed 
opinion makers to reach large sectors of society. 
Central to this new reinterpretation of the Cold War is the notion of the “State-private 
network”. In the attempt to move beyond the interpretation of the Cold War that focus 
either on the traditional state diplomacy or government officials and corporate interests, 
scholars that have been working for the last decade on the Cold War in terms of a 
psychological warfare brought forth the concept of “networks” and transnational 
relations.  
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In order to penetrate different societies, the US planned a broad strategy of direct and 
indirect intervention that involved national governments and the collaboration between 
the Government and private individuals and organizations. As reported by Liam 
Kennedy and Scott Lucas, the term “state-private network” referred to the “extensive, 
unprecedented collaboration between ‘official’ US agencies and “private” groups and 
individuals in the development and implementation of political, economic, and cultural 
propaganda in support of US foreign policy from the early cold war period to today.”27 
Because the idea of intellectual freedom was at the core of American cultural 
diplomacy, intervention could only take place outside the formal state structure. In 
order to do so, the US government had to rely on transnational networks and non-
governmental organizations with the cooperation between different non-state actors. 
Psychological warfare experts developed what Kenneth Osgood defined as a 
“camouflage approach to propaganda” that relied on “independent news media, non-
governmental organizations, and private individuals as surrogate communicators for 
conveying propaganda messages.” 28  This connection between public and private 
spheres was, according to Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford, an “ideological 
construction […] drawing upon specifically American ideologies of freedom and 
voluntarism”29.  
The importance of the state-private network, Scott Lucas emphasizes, allowed the US 
to wage this psychological crusade against the Soviet Union while reinforcing US 
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triumphalism30. It also allowed the inclusion of society and culture as spheres of 
interests moving beyond a traditional historiography that was predominantly 
constructed around the role of the State and the use of Hard Power. In this total conflict, 
every sector of society—religious group, media, labor unions, businesses, intellectuals, 
students, athletes, actors—became involved in the fight. The CIA, which was created 
in 1947, played a unique role in this. It established networks of cooperation with 
leading intellectuals, art galleries, students’ organisation, influential publishers, 
women’s groups, newspapers, and television networks, and universities in the so-
called Free World that had the purpose of creating a transatlantic cultural community.  
 
Cultural Cold War Studies and the Congress for Cultural Freedom. 
 
The Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) was part of a broad cultural diplomacy 
strategy aiming at detaching the European intelligentsia from the appeal of Marxism 
and Communism by offering a way that better reconciled with the American Way of 
Life. Its political and cultural origin dated back to June 1950 when a group of 
intellectuals gathered together in Berlin to take part to a conference whose declared 
aim was the promotion of intellectual freedom and the opposition to any totalitarian 
system. Covertly funded by the CIA, which subsidized the CCF with nearly $800.000 
a year31, from 1950 to 1967 the CCF established branches in thirty-five countries of 
the world. Part of its activities consisted in organising international conferences and 
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cultural events, publishing important cultural and political journals, offering economic 
subsidies and support to intellectuals behind the Iron Curtain as well as books, travel 
grants, and cultural exchanges to its own members. One of the most remarkable 
initiatives promoted by the organisation was the publication of over twenty journals. 
Among others, its principal and well-known journal reviews of the Congress for 
Cultural Freedom were Encounter in UK, Preuves in France, Tempo Presente in Italy, 
Der Monat in Germany, and Cuadernos in Latin America. 
The CCF was conceived as a transnational project that, through a network of 
interconnections among educational, cultural, and political leaders, could operate 
beyond national boundaries. 32  It gave intellectuals a platform to bring forth a 
transnational intellectual debate. The global reach of this organization was impressive; 
it included among its members philosophers, economists, political scientists, novelists, 
musicians, poets, and academics. Among them, Benedetto Croce, Ignazio Silone, 
Raymond Aron, Karl Jaspers, John Dewey, Arthur Koestler, Melvin Lasky, Nicolas 
Nabokov represented the leading cultural elite of the CCF. Broadly labelled as the 
“liberal intellectuals”, or the Non-Communist Left, the members of the CCF lacked an 
overarching political homogeneity among those intellectuals. Most important, anti-
Communism was their shared interest. 
Like many other cultural operations promoted by the US in the early Cold War, the 
CCF was part of a broad strategy of securing the American hegemony abroad. In order 
to remove the risk of the US government of being exposed to infringe upon other 
countries sovereignty, the CCF operated on a state-private base in which non-
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governmental actors became the major forces for the promotion of specific US foreign 
policy agendas. While the CIA—via philanthropic organizations such as Ford 
Foundation, the Fleishmann Foundation and the Rockefeller foundation—was 
instrumental in funding the organization, the reliance on local actors made the whole 
cultural campaign appeared as a voluntary mobilization of individuals against the 
Soviet system and in support of the American Way of Life.  
Beside the most obvious anti-Communist intent, this cultural experiment was seen as 
instrumental to the creation of a transnational cultural environment friendly to the US. 
The American objective was to propose liberal democracy as the only possible 
alternative to Soviet ideology. America’s reliance on the so-called opinion makers was 
part of a broader strategy to tackle the spread of anti-Americanism within educated 
and left-wing circles. Influenced by the beginning of Korean War and the 
intensification of covert actions and psychological operations, a feeling of distrust and 
hostility toward the US spread among Western countries. Winning over specific 
segments of society that had expressed some criticism toward the US and its 
hegemonic plans became not only important but also indispensable for the United 
States to win the Cold War. In particular, psywar experts sought to obtain the support 
from:  
“the uncertain ‘neutralists’ or the geopolitical ‘realists’ who are 
already partially attracted through Marxism to communism but who 
are still susceptible to intellectual challenges […] These neutralists 
and crypto-communists would not be stimulated by propaganda, but 
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they could be fascinated by intelligent argument which appeared to 
be objective, penetrating and forward-looking.”33  
 
Scholars have devoted considerable attention to the understanding of the Congress for 
Cultural Freedom and its attempts to promote a transnational intellectual community 
meant to foster a better understanding of the US and its outcomes. A widespread 
tendency among scholars of the CCF is the production of books and journal articles 
that linger on dichotomous concepts such as “coercion” and “submission” or 
“hegemony” and “autonomy”, minimizing, therefore, the voluntary nature of many 
intellectuals’ contributions and the complex negotiations that took place within the 
organization. In her book Who Paid the Piper (1999), which represents a valuable 
work that allowed for a renewed debate on the Cold War amongst scholars of different 
fields, Frances Stonor Saunders exaggerates the CIA’s influence within the CCF 
without really questioning individual willingness to participate to this struggle. She 
mainly focuses on the creation of this massive apparatus of US cultural propaganda by 
offering a painstaking analysis of the ways in which the CIA covertly ran cultural 
congresses, publications, exhibition, and concerts through its front groups and 
philanthropic organizations. The author depicts the intellectuals as passive or mere 
instruments of the Agency, suggesting that because the CIA was playing the piper, it 
was also calling the tune. By focusing almost exclusively on the CIA’s control of 
cultural activities, Stonor Saunders misses the opportunity to portray a much more 
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complex relationship in which individuals within the CCF were negotiating their own 
cultural space within the transnational network.  
This intellectual approach to the CCF is part of a broader framework of analysis of the 
Cold War that is constructed around the idea of Cultural Imperialism. This concept, 
together with Westernization and Globalization, is largely used to criticise the US 
psychological intervention during the Cold War and the US imperialist tendency. It is 
constructed around the idea that America—through the dissemination of cultural 
products, commercial goods, and ideas—ended up imposing its own will over other 
“less powerful” societies by determining their cultural values and the standardization 
of national identity. This theory, however, addresses Cultural Diplomacy only from a 
unidirectional perspective: the North American one. Scholars tend to examine how 
America’s hegemonic and imperial tendencies were at the time, but they do not 
scrutinize the locals’ responses to this challenge. Some academics began questioning 
the concept of an American empire by presenting a much more complex reality, 
emphasising the voluntary embracing of American culture abroad. Geir Lundestad, for 
instance, argues that: “if this American expansion created what we could call an 
American Empire, this was to a larger extent an empire by invitation”34. Even though 
the role of the “recipient” is now presented in less passive terms, this perspective does 
not fully consider the series of negotiations that took place on a local dimension and 
how values were transformed and adapted according to the cultural structure of the 
specific country.  
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The CIA-control theory has, however, also been criticised by other historians of the 
CCF. Some scholars argue against Saunders’ interpretation of the CCF, claiming that 
the complexity of the cultural organization cannot be reduced to the simple 
interpretation of coercion. The CIA’s role in financially supporting the CCF requires 
an outlook that goes beyond the autonomy-control dichotomy. Among others, Scott 
Lucas, Giles Scott-Smith, and Hugh Wilford propose a different analysis of the 
Congress by placing the individual members of the CCF at the centre of this cultural 
diplomacy. As scholars have repeatedly argued, when approaching the study of the 
Cultural Cold War the voluntary nature of many intellectuals’ contributions must be 
recognized. In Freedom’s War, for instance, Scott Lucas claims that despite the CIA 
provided most of the subsidies, “the impetus was coming from individuals with no 
Government position, individuals with their own interests in ensuring the triumph of 
freedom.”35  
Another work that challenges the idea of a top-down, controlled organization is Hugh 
Wilford’s book, Calling the Tune? The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War, 1945-
1950. The author, while trying to answer the question of whether the CIA was really 
“calling the tune”, examines the CCF from a British perspective that further challenges 
Saunders’ argument. He rejected the idea that the British intellectuals, in this specific 
case study, were mere instruments of the US psychological warfare. As he claims in 
the conclusion of his book, “it might well have been the case that the CIA tried to call 
                                                             
35 Lucas, Freedom’s War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union, 1945-56, 2. 
40 
 
a particular tune; but the piper did not always play it, nor the audience dance to it.” 36 
According to his findings, the British case demonstrates a greater degree of autonomy. 
Similarly, Scott-Smith in The Politics of Apolitical Culture moves attention away from 
the Agency by focusing on the individuals within the CCF, emphasising how their 
anti-totalitarian ideology consequently made them get closer to the CCF37. As he 
claims, the anti-communist intellectual network, despite with less financial resources, 
was already in operation even before the WWII broke out; it was a precursor of the 
actual Cold War cultural struggle. The core of his work is the transition of influential 
European intellectuals of the 1930s and 1940s from anti-fascism to anti-communism 
positions. By emphasising the nature of these influential intellectuals’ anti-totalitarian 
opposition, Scott-Smith wants to go beyond a simplistic dichotomous narrative of 
autonomy versus control by presenting the intellectual struggle as an independent 
engagement. As he states: “the clarion calls of freedom and truth that would be 
expressed consistently from the late 1940s onwards may well have been enhanced by 
the Cold War, but they certainly were not created by that conflict.”38 Shifting the focus 
away from the Agency exposes and by emphasising the complexity of negotiations 
that took place, the limits of a top-down argument constructed around the theory of 
“control” have become more evident. 
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Despite the importance of placing the individuals and their negotiations at the core of 
these analyses, this scholarship has not fully addressed the specificity of national case 
studies39 and the “local” gets easily lost in the “transnational” dimension of the Cold 
War. The excessive look to the CCF and the actors involved from a transnational 
perspective ignores the role that internal structures played in shaping the dynamics of 
a Cultural intervention.  
One of the historians who examine the CCF from a national perspective is Hugh 
Wilford. In Calling the Tune?, he explains the complexity of US cultural diplomacy 
and the limits of previous works on the CCF by studying the specific British context. 
Through his work, he seeks to demonstrate that simply looking at individuals and their 
negotiations is not enough for understanding the CCF. Through his analytical approach 
to trade unions, cultural movements, and also politics from the British system out, and 
in particular from the Non-Communist Left out, he seeks to offer a new perspective of 
analysis for Cold War studies. 
Despite those premises, Wilford shies away from presenting a thorough analysis of the 
local case. Without expanding the notion of the local, he is merely using the British 
case as a playground to expand the notion of the Cold War. The main issue with his 
work is that he does not sufficiently explain the importance of “going local” when 
studying this cultural intervention. There is no thorough investigation about the the 
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nature of British peculiarity, and he tries to neither explain whether his analysis is 
unique to that specific context or whether it is also applicable to other national cases. 
This lack of explanations is mainly caused by the fact that he does not go deeper 
enough into the British context missing the chance to explain if the CIA’s success was 
only the result of the alleged special relationship and of closer cultural ties between 
the US and UK. This book is another example of the tendency among scholars to look 
at national case studies from a unidirectional perspective with the emphasis always on 
the Americans and their strategies.  
The problem is that when a specific national case study becomes the focus of our 
narrative, generalizations cannot be applied. By its very notion, a national analysis 
requires a specific approach that has each single case study under examination. With 
the term ‘national’ I refer not only to the geographical entity of the nation but also to 
the cultural and intellectual traditions of the analysed country. One major lacuna in the 
narrative of the CCF is the absence of investigations on the interaction between 
transnational forces and the internal political, social, and cultural context. Attention 
needs to be addressed to the reciprocal dynamics of external-internal factors and to the 
interaction between ideas, belief, and identities with the structural environment in 
which action takes place. The cultural evolution of Cold War dynamics that took place 
in Britain according to Wilford’s investigations was not applicable to the Italian case. 
The reasons can be found in the peculiarity of the Italian domestic structure, its 
political culture, and the fact that, compared to the two Anglo-Saxon countries that 
shared some cultural, linguistic, and historical similarities, the Latin country was a 
completely different reality. All these aspects will be analysed in the further chapters.  
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The Problematic Aspects of Cultural Transmission and Hegemony. 
 
With the cultural turn of Cold War studies, a recurring aspect in most of the analyses 
is the notion of hegemony, and more precisely cultural hegemony. Raymond Williams 
in his book Marxism and Literature observed that while the “traditional definition of 
hegemony is political rule or domination, especially in relations between states” 40 the 
word has acquired a new meaning following the posthumous publication of Antonio 
Gramsci’s Quaderni Del Carcere. This was a collection of essays written during his 
incarceration and published for the first time by Einaudi between 1948 and 1950.   In 
his writings, the Italian intellectual reflected at length over the complexity of power  
relations and hegemony. While classical Marxist theory identifies economy as the 
predominant aspect of hegemony, Gramsci brought forward the concept of ideology 
and culture as crucial aspects of social power. 
Despite the fact that Gramsci did not provide a precise definition of hegemony, in the 
section dedicated to the intellectuals he treated hegemony as ‘the “spontaneous” 
consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed 
on social life by the dominant fundamental group’ as opposed to the coercive power 
of the state. ‘This  consent is “historically” caused by the prestige (and consequent 
confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in 
the world of production.’ 41  Gramsci insisted that effective leadership can be 
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established when there is spontaneous consent among the leaders and the led. Only 
when this consent is established, the leaders can exercise their intellectual and moral 
influence and build their hegemonic role. 
However, as the critical theorist Stuart Hall reminds us, “it is crucial to the concept 
that hegemony is not a given and permanent state of affairs, but it has to be actively 
won and secured; it can also be lost.”42 In order to be maintained, hegemony requires 
that “ideological assertations become self-evident cultural assumptions. Its 
effectiveness depends on subordinated peoples accepting the dominant ideology as 
‘normal reality or common-sense’.”43 According to Gramsci the concept of hegemony 
was strictly linked to the “transformation of sectional interests, via influence or 
compromise, into a ‘general interest’ for society as a whole that could overcome 
conflicting interpretations of the world.”44  
Dominants groups within society can obtain consent and legitimacy from the masses 
by spreading specific ideas, values and assumptions through social institutions such as 
labour unions, the church, school and so on. These institutions play an important role 
in socialising people into specific norms and beliefs of the dominant social group. 
Therefore, if a specific group can exert some control over these institutions they can 
control the masses. From its dominant position, the leading elite can exert control over 
social institutions and influence the behaviours and beliefs of society by creating what 
                                                             
42 Stuart Hall, “Culture, the Media and the Ideological Effect,” in Mass Communication and 
Society, ed. James Curran, Michael Gurevitch, and Janet Woollacott, vol. Set books / Open 
University (London: Open University Press, 1977), 333. 
43 Gail. Dines and Jean McMahon Humez, Gender, Race, and Class in Media : A Critical Reader 
(SAGE Publications, 2011), 34. 
44 G Scott-Smith, The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, 
and Post-War American Hegemony, Routledge / Psa Political Studies Series (Routledge, 
2002), 5.  
45 
 
Gramsci used to refer as the “common sense”, a dominant view of society. To create 
this, the dominant groups have to present their own definition of reality in a way that 
is acceptable to other social groups and convince them that the one promoted is the 
only admissible interpretation. The role of the intellectuals is central to the creation of 
a “common sense”. They represents, according to Gramsci, “the dominant group’s 
“deputies” exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political 
government.”45 They can transform set of values and ideas into common sense. 
Hegemony, in Gramscian terms, is also a recurrent notion among historians of the CCF. 
The cultural organization was created with the intention to establish an hegemonic 
influence among specific social strata and to provide “a sense of consensus around 
certain shared values and interests” 46  Overall, scholars tend to characterise this 
organization as a relatively successful hegemonic institution, capable of establishing a 
transnational cultural hegemony in Western Europe. Despite the claims, those who 
approached the US cultural project in terms of hegemony have failed to thoroughly 
establish whether this goal was reached and on which degree it was reached. In The 
Politics of Apolitical Culture, Scott-Smith defines the Congress for Cultural Freedom 
as a hegemonic instrument of US foreign policy by applying Gramsci’s theory to the 
projection of American cultural power in Western Europe. The attempts to construct a 
transnational hegemony play here an important theoretical role by using it as the 
grounding framework for his understanding of the CCF. While claiming that the 
apolitical culture of the Congress for Cultural Freedom “had a decidedly political 
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impact during the Cold War”47, there is essentially a lack of explanation of why and 
how the CCF proved successful in establishing a transnational hegemony and, 
particularly, in which contexts. His definition of hegemony as well as the idea of an 
Atlantic community remained far too abstract and linked to the idea of an undefined 
transatlantic community. This idea of the “West” and of an “Atlantic Community”, 
Richard Pells states, “sometimes seemed an American invention, useful politically but 
not entirely comprehensible as a cultural phenomenon.”48 
Similarly, Hugh Wilford, while correct in suggesting that the construction of 
hegemony is a two-way process not solely exerted from the top down, remains vague 
in his definition of the CIA success. While recognizing the British non-Communist 
left’s ability to embrace ideas and values and manipulate the CIA according to 
different aims, he eventually argues that the Agency intervention proved successful in 
reinforcing American transnational hegemony in Britain. How the CIA operations 
effectively contributed to the success of a transnational anti-communism needs to be 
clarified.  
Despite the fact that the CCF was successful in creating a platform for a transnational 
intellectual debate or, as Risse-Kappen claims, an “intellectual space for changes”49, 
the different national outcomes need to be analysed further. The limit of previous 
analyses in offering a totally convincing explanation of how the US succeeded in 
establishing a hegemonic culture is mainly due to the absence of the local from 
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consideration in transnational dynamics. By simply looking at either the transnational 
dimension of the Cold War or the nation-state only as part of this transnational 
framework, we forget to question the importance of the nation state50. 
Scholars rarely consider how cultural products, ideas, and values were received abroad. 
There is a gap in the literature, for instance, about the interaction between the 
transnational attempts to promote specific values such as anti-Communism, individual 
liberty, and intellectual freedom and the context and culture in which these attempts 
took place. Neither is there a thorough interrogation over the audience’s response to 
the promotion of those values. Were individuals eventually convinced that the 
American Way of Life was the only solution to their national problems? Did the CCF 
successfully achieve the promotion of an alternative culture in specific national 
contexts? These are questions that must be answered. To do so, however, we cannot 
study the CCF simply from an abstract transnational perspective without seriously 
questioning the impact Western ideas and values had on specific targeted country. This 
perspective does not allow us to fully understand the complexity of negotiations and 
variations taking place along this process of construction of a transnational community. 
We need a “bottom-up” approach that looks at specific national cases and their 
negotiations beyond the Cold War dimension. As Tity De Vries claims: 
“Situating the Congress for Cultural Freedom and Cold War 
intellectuals in their national cultural contexts and traditions offers a 
different perspective to the grand narratives of the CCF organization, 
its main members and its activities that have been published so far. 
The apparent unity in opinions and actions of the Congress might 
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actually appear to have been more diverse if studied from different 
national perspective.”51  
 
One possible explanation that led many scholars to talk about Cultural Hegemony in 
terms of a transnational success could be seen as linked to the tendency of treating 
anti-Communism as a monolithic ideology. But ‘anti-Communism’ meant different 
things to different people. In many cases, the Cold War was not necessarily the central 
determinant of the opposition to communism and national negotiations. Different 
approaches were often conditioned from a ground-up dynamic. In order to understand 
the complexity of the CCF, we need to understand what Communism meant to these 
intellectuals and how they perceived the intellectual opposition to it.  
The intellectual anti-Communism was not an isolated or static ideology but rather a 
negotiated process that interacted with domestic structures and was modified by them. 
As the analysis of the Italian case will reveal, this mobilization was never a micro-
reproduction of the ideological conflict on the macro level. It was a national variation 
meant to obtain specific objectives that had nothing to do with the international conflict. 
Therefore, when studying the CCF, a set of questions needs to be addressed, such as: 
What did Anti-Communism mean to these intellectuals? What did these intellectuals 
stand for? Was liberal democracy and capitalism the best solution for all? What 
alternatives were they promoting? Without addressing these questions, the 
investigation of the CCF in terms of cultural hegemony would remain incomplete.  
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While hegemony could be achieved through military and economic means, cultural 
hegemony requires a much more complex strategy. The circumstances under which a 
group can exert cultural control and how transnational ideas are accepted, modified, 
or rejected by specific groups or countries are fundamental aspects that need to be 
analysed. First, we need to bear in mind that Cultural Diplomacy is a two-way process 
whose outcomes do not merely depend on how dominant a group is. The effectiveness 
of cultural diplomacy and the dissemination of cultural products always rest on the 
local response and its reception. In Collaboration across Nations: Context and 
Dynamics, Sharon Dawes, Lei Zheng, and Brian Burke claim that: “A fundamental 
challenge for transnational knowledge networking is that every participant comes to 
the engagement deeply embedded in layers of context.” They further expand on this 
by elaborating on this concept:  
“Every participant, whether an individual or an organization, 
communicates, acts, and understands the world through well-
established, contextual lenses. […] Much of the work of a 
transnational network is embodied in the effort to bridge or shrink 
“contextual distances” so that the participants can create shared 
meaning and productive collaborations. Despite similar shared 
values, the transnational networks found difficulties in national 
context because of national issues, cultural misunderstanding and the 
fact that the international ideological clash was prioritized to 
national issues. Most of literature on cultural transnational networks 
ignored the interactions with specific national context and culture.”52 
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Even though transnational projects were constructed around specific shared values and 
objectives, the idea that American democratic principles were “universally and totally 
applicable at all times and in all places”53 reflected, according to Gienow-Hecht, the 
US “cultural ignorance as well as its geo-political aspiration.”54  
Despite operating on a transnational level, the CCF’s cultural projects were addressed 
toward specific national context and relied on individuals who brought in their own 
“webs of significance” and their set of values generated in their pre-conscious level. 
The publication of these journals did not take place in a political, intellectual, or 
organizational vacuum. National identities, cultures, and contexts represented 
important determining factors for the outcome of this cultural warfare. And these could 
not simply vanish with the creation of a transnational network. To further understand 
the complexity of the Cold War, we need to move beyond a one-way cultural 
interpretation of the Cold War that ignore the role of structural elements within one 
country. The differences between each domestic structure shaped and modified the 
overall impact of the transnational project. 
 
The Italian Political Culture and Context. 
 
A series of attempts to change the cultural landscape in Italy took place upon the 
beginning of the Cold War. While national actors were trying to negotiate their cultural 
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space and redefine Italians’ national identity, international and transnational actors 
tried to step in to redefine the political culture of the country and to influence beliefs 
and ideas in a way that it would benefit US post-war plans. Since the end of the world 
conflict and the beginning of the Cold War, the US gave start to a broad and ambiguous 
psychological warfare campaign addressed toward the Latin country. They relied on 
covert-overt operations to change Italians’ behaviours by intervening on labour issues, 
political campaigns, the dissemination of cultural products and ideas, and economic 
matters. What they found, however, was a political system so immutable that it proved 
difficult for those transnational actors to intervene and change things.  
Even though scholars tend to consider the CCF as a transnational cultural success, an 
examination of the Italian branch, Associazione Italiana per la Libertà della Cultura, 
and the publication of the journal Tempo Presente, which will be analysed in the last 
chapter, will support my main argument that cultural diplomacy in Italy was not as 
successful as it is thought. In the specific post-war Italian context, cultural hegemony 
could only be exerted through political recognition. Despite exercising authority, 
intellectuals did not possess any direct power, and their influence over civic society 
had to be filtered by the political system and a political class, which could legitimate 
their role as opinion moulders. 55  Different from the British context analysed by 
Wilford, Italy did not have a structure this Non-Communist intellectuals could rely on 
for establishing an alternative culture. They remained marginalised within the Italian 
cultural environment. The story of Tempo Presente, its failure in promoting a non-
Communist left intellectual culture, its authors’ isolation within the Italian literary 
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world, and their reluctance to embrace the Congress’ directions reveal how national 
interests, culture, and context still play a decisive role in transnational network.  
While there have been important works on American psychological warfare in the 
country and on US-Italian relations—such as Federico Romero’s analysis of Trade 
Unionism56; Mario Del Pero's study of US-Italian political negotiations57; Kaeten 
Mistry's recent publications on the US, Italy, and political warfare 58 ; and James 
Miller’s analysis of the 1948 elections59—the Italian Cultural Cold War has not been 
fully analysed. In particular, there has been no significant work in English on the 
Italian relationship with the Congress for Cultural Freedom and on Tempo Presente.  
Scholars who worked on the CCF have briefly addressed the Italian case, emphasizing 
the peculiarity of the Italian journal as the most leftist cultural product among the other 
CCF cultural projects. In most cases, the explanations given remain vague and 
unconvincing. One of the main limits of previous narratives is that by looking at local 
negotiations and national efforts only through a narrow Cold War prism many 
anomalies in the political as well as cultural and social context can only be explained 
as a temporary deviation from the American-leading direction, or as an external 
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concession to the new Republic. However, it was not a matter of loose guidance or of 
benevolent concessions from the outside that shaped the Italian post-war era, but rather 
it was the result of national efforts and negotiations taking place in the specific 
structure of an environment that allowed them to move beyond the strict boundaries of 
the Cold War. The peculiar responses of cultural and political actors, their choices, and 
individual efforts revealed the limitation of these international narratives.  
From this perspective, national contexts, such as Italy, are often perceived as 
appendices of Washington, and their national choices are often seen as natural 
extensions of Cold War international dynamics. In spite of the invasiveness of Cold 
War discourses, considering anti-Communism as an over-imposed product of the Cold 
War leads to an underestimation of the antebellum origins of Italian intellectual 
impegno in reforming society and culture. Although some sort of opportunism might 
have guided these intellectuals’ actions, they were not passive players of US soft 
diplomacy; they strategically chose to play for specific reasons that went beyond mere 
Cold War dynamics. 
Italians had their own cultural structures and their own Way of Life that the Americans 
could not simply substitute from above. Despite the fact that many Italians adopted the 
fierce Cold War language for evident propagandistic reasons, especially with the 
attempt to obtain foreign aid from one of the two super powers, the complexity of the 
Italian contexts and negotiations obliges us to go beyond this propagandistic reading. 
Interesting dynamics revealed how Italy was capable to co-opt the effort and exploit 
the anti-Communist propaganda for national reasons, creating its own local cold war. 
The main focus will be on Italians’ constant attempts to safeguard national interests 
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and priorities, depicting its long-lasting tendency to adapt to external pressure through 
a series of stratagems and negotiations.  
The time has come for a new discussion on the multiplicity of histories of the Cold 
War in different contexts remembering that, as Matthew Connelly claims, national 
transformations often obeyed their own logic rather than that of the Cold War, even 
when backed by one of the two superpowers. The Italian case shows how, for structural 
and strategic reasons, the US anti-communist campaign could not have been replicated 
in the Italian case without the support and negotiations of conscious national actors. It 
is time to look at the multiple dynamics of the Cold War remembering that, often, 
national events were not essentially a product on a micro level of the global 
confrontation. In particular we should analyse how Cold War ideologies and identities 
interacted with, influenced, and were influenced by larger cultural patterns in the 
Italian context. 
 
Conclusion. 
 
Despite the fact that since the Cold War transnationalism has become a central aspect 
of US foreign policy and cultural diplomacy, the nation-state still represents a cultural 
and political force of power in determining the evolution of transnationalism. With 
nation-state I do not mean simply the geographical entity or the political institution, 
but also the relations between the state and other socialising agencies and those values, 
ideas, behaviours that are part of a country’s political culture. As I will demonstrate, 
internal and external actors can try to intervene and modify the national context, but 
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they can only do it within the narrative framework of the domestic structure. Since 
they represented the variables under which specific ideas and values are selected, 
modify, adapted, or rejected, domestic structures can determine the success or failure 
of transnational relations. They work as a filter that mediate the impact of transnational 
efforts to influence policy in the various targeted areas60. Because the outcomes of 
transnational networks depend so much on domestic structures, the impacts and effects 
of these exchanged ideas across the boundaries vary greatly from state to state. 
Therefore, a generalising approach cannot help us to determine the success or the 
failure of these networks.  
When approaching the analysis of transnational relations, the “national” dimension of 
it cannot simply be removed; it is “inherent” to the concept. In the introduction to the 
book State/Nation/Transnation, the authors argue that: “If transnationalism is 
understood as sustained activities across national borders, then the importance of a 
‘national scale’ and ‘national space’ that can be transcended through these processes 
is obvious. With no ‘national’, there can be no ‘transnational’”61 .The term nation-state 
is used here to define not only the government, but also the socialising agencies and 
the relations with the populace for what we can define as political culture.  
While transnational actors and organizations can challenge the power of the state, the 
organs and institutions of that specific nation-state still represent the fundamental 
centre of power where policy decisions are made and acted upon. However, 
transnational actors and ideas can still have a deep impact within the nation-state. As 
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Risse-Kappen explains, transnational actors can influence national policy but only if 
they get access to the political system of the target state. But simply gaining access is 
not sufficient to have an impact on national policy. These actors also have to “generate 
and/or contribute to ‘winning’ policy coalitions in order to change decisions in the 
desired directions”62.  
Therefore, to further our understanding of transnational organizations and cultural 
diplomacy, we should not look at how the Cold War made these transnational projects 
possible but how national issues made them fragile. For this reason, in the next 
chapters I will focus on the Italian political culture, its political system, the social and 
cultural structures, and its people in order to prove how the lack of thorough 
understanding of Italy as an “ally” led eventually to a failure of US cultural diplomacy. 
This would help us to understand that transnational or international interventions, in 
order to be successful, had always to take into consideration the national and its 
complexity.  
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-CH. II- 
THE ITALIAN DOMESTIC STRUCTURE. 
 
“Transnationalism” and “Cultural Diplomacy” have become indispensable notions to 
the understanding of the complexity of the Cold War, allowing scholars to go beyond 
bilateral relations and investigate the interactions between state and non-state actors. 
Similarly to what happened in other European countries within the American sphere 
of influence, US-Italian relations fit within the transnational framework of the bipolar 
conflict. In Italy too, culture, as an instrument of statecraft, was deployed for the 
establishment of an environment in which the Capitalist system could flourish and 
anti-Communism could become a new form of collective identity extending beyond 
the boundaries of the nation.  
However, it was within these national boundaries that US soft power interventions 
took place. Therefore, since these operations did not occur in a political, social and 
cultural vacuum, the American psychological efforts would have to adapt to the 
structure of the targeted country. For this reason, attention will be addressed towards 
the definition of the Italian domestic structure. By domestic structure I refer to the 
institutions of policy networks that link the state with other societal actors, state-
society relations, and the values and norms embedded in the political culture of the 
selected country63. To look at the nation-state and its domestic structure is therefore 
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indispensable, as is an examination of the leading elite’s attempts to rebuild Italian 
institutions and networks in the post-fascist era. 
The starting point for understanding the US-Italian political and cultural relationship 
is not American foreign policy or the “trans-Atlantic” dimension of the Cold War; it 
is instead the national context and the negotiations of power within Italy. Despite the 
fact that transnational and international actors would eventually step in to take part in 
the Italian Reconstruction at the beginning of the global conflict, since the Armistice 
declaration in September 1943, a contest of power within the state had been already 
taking place.  
Since the legitimacy of the old system was destroyed, Italy needed a new political 
structure that could facilitate the transition to democracy from its authoritarian past. 
Instead of focusing on international policy, post-war political leaders initially gave 
priority to domestic policy, concentrating on the rehabilitation of the country and its 
institutional renewal. Italy had to be recognized as a modern and democratic nation-
state. Initially, the priority seemed to be stability through democracy. The domestic 
concerns took precedence with the reconstruction of the political establishment. While 
economic reconstruction, with US involvement, would follow, this politics-first 
approach meant Washington was not a central player in the negotiations.  
Party leaders set the accomplishment of three important issues as basic preconditions 
for democratization: the legitimacy of the new political system constructed around the 
notion of anti-Fascism, the institutional form of the state and the republican question, 
and the drafting of a new Constitution. Despite representing fundamental aspects of 
the political history of the country, they could not alone symbolize Italian 
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democratization. One major obstacle on the way to political stability had to be solved 
first: fragile Italian state-society relations. As the political history of the country 
reveals, Italians have always distrusted governments, making their identification with 
the State almost impossible64. In order to decrease Italians’ animosity towards the 
institutions, the tradition of political culture needed to be reshaped. To facilitate 
people’s identification with the State, Italians had first to recognize themselves as part 
of the nation; their almost non-existent sense of a solid national identity had 
historically proved to be a hindrance to the process of political development. In post-
war Italy, Anti-Fascism was widely perceived as the only viable solution for unifying 
the nation and for moving forward with the political and ideological rehabilitation of 
the country.  
But because anti-fascism was neither a cohesive nor a monolithic ideology65, political 
leaders produced a distorted narrative of it, depicting the majority of Italians as Anti-
Fascists jointly fighting the external-internal enemy. Based on this myth, they 
established a new political system built on a coalition of all democratic parties: 
Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (National Liberation Committee- CLN).  However, 
due to the fragility of anti-fascism as a unifying force and ideological divisions within 
the political establishment, political unity failed to be upheld, as did the consolidation 
of democracy. The problem was that the coalition was never the powerful executive 
actor in Italian post-war negotiations. Instead, the individual political parties, namely 
the Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy- DC) and the Partito Comunista 
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Italiano (Italian Communist Party-PCI), that emerged from the war years ended up 
representing the driving forces capable of mobilizing the population. Despite 
representing the new Italy, however, these political parties operated within the old 
framework of Italian policy. The contest for power and the construction of political 
consent took place within the tradition of Italian political culture, and Italy remained 
the same divided country, characterised by a wide gap between the ruling elite and the 
masses.  
The time frame examined in this chapter mainly covers the period from the end of the 
Second World War to the 1947 communist exclusion from the cabinet, definitely 
dismissing the resistance legacy, with the establishment of a centrist DC-led political 
formula that would dominate Italian politics for almost five decades. Italy moved from 
being a totalitarian regime to a partitocrazia (partitocratic regime) in which political 
parties ended up being the central actors exerting strong control over the government 
and society. Italy, eventually, became a country dominated by political parties. With 
the beginning of the bipolar conflict the DC obtained enormous “authoritarian” power 
due to the lack of a possible alternative from the opposition. This system would 
eventually collapse with the end of the Cold War, revealing the fluid nexus between 
national and international dynamics.  
 
The Political Reconstruction of the Country.  
 
In the early post-war period, political leaders were neither expecting Italy to regain its 
lost status as a Great Power nor attempting to essentially build the country’s foreign 
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relations; they preferred instead to focus on domestic policy, concentrating on the 
reconstruction of the country and its institutional renewal. Because of its ambiguous 
role during WWII, Italy needed to be rehabilitated as a democratic country, not only 
to the international community but also in the eyes of its own people. While economic 
recovery and social reforms were initially moved to the background, political leaders 
worked to ensure the political development of the country. As the Socialist leader 
Pietro Nenni famously put it, what Italy needed in the aftermath of the conflict was 
“politique d’abord”, politics above all.  
The political elite was aware that the successful transition of the country from an 
authoritarian regime to a modern nation-state rested on the precondition of establishing 
a solid and democratic political system that could manage political and economic 
issues and prevent social instabilities. As a consequence of the fall of the Fascist 
regime and King Vittorio Emanuele III’s escape to Brindisi, Italians had to confront 
both a political crisis and an institutional vacuum. The legitimacy of the old political 
establishment was gone, and Italy was left to face a lack of functioning political and 
administrative bodies. With Mussolini’s fall from power on July 25, 1943, the structure 
of the state, based on the one-party system, crumbled66.  
Unlike in Germany, where the Allies played a major role in the “democratic retraining” 
of the country due to its central place in Cold War policy, Italian reconstruction and 
rehabilitation was not at the top of the US foreign policy agenda. Washington chose 
not to get involved in Italian affairs, and the process of democratization was taken over 
by local political forces. The partial removal of the Italian case from US concerns and 
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post-war plans was not solely due to geopolitical reasons; the post-war status of the 
country further complicated the picture.  
Despite being a defeated country, Italy was not as defeated as its former ally Germany. 
As a result of the Armistice declaration of September 1943 and Italians’ active role in 
fighting the internal enemy and the foreign invaders, Italy was neither an enemy nor 
an ally. To overcome this impasse, the local elite was given substantial autonomy in 
the political reconstruction of the country, while American officials on the ground 
offered generic advice and suggestions to the emerging political forces. During the 
final phase of the war, talks about how to plan a political reconstruction of the country 
began. The only requirement everyone agreed upon was the establishment of a new, 
legitimised government of an anti-Fascist nature. Anti-Fascism became a practical step 
toward a “new” political structure, the only condition for each party’s inclusion in the 
government and the legitimising factor for participation in the political reconstruction 
of the country.  
The Italian post-war political leaders, who derived their political legitimacy from their 
connection with the Resistance movement, strongly believed that the fundamental 
preconditions for a democratization of the country rested on the achievement of three 
major goals: the legitimacy of a new political system, the institutional form of the state, 
and the drafting of a new Constitution. The main problem with these newly post-war 
political forces was that they were too weak and inexperienced with the principles of 
statecraft. Most of their leaders had spent several years in exile or in prison due to their 
opposition to the regime. Lacking expertise and operating within a weak institutional 
structure, all political factions had no other alternative than to establish a government 
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of national unity that had anti-Fascism as its ideological foundation. Furthermore, no 
single party was willing to face the uncertainties of the peace treaty settlements on an 
individual basis. The fate of Italy and the consequences of its actions were not yet 
decided, and sharing responsibility seemed the only option for the emerging political 
parties. The collaboration was based on three preconditions: a government of national 
unity, the guarantee of the formation of a Constituent Assembly following the end of 
hostilities, and a united front against the Germans and the Fascists67.  
The symbol of the political renewal was the CLN (the National Liberation Committee), 
a multi-party organization that, from the liberation of Rome on 4 June 1944 to the 
formation of the Constituent Assembly in June 1946, worked to coordinate military 
and political actions in Italy. Temporarily, it served as the main Italian political body, 
with parties enjoying great influence and authority. Within the CLN were members of 
all the major anti-Fascist parties, namely the Italian Communist Party (PCI), Christian 
Democracy (DC), Italian Liberal Party (PLI), Action Party (PdA), Italian Socialist 
Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP), and Labour Democratic Party (DL). Because of 
the impossibility of demonstrating each party’s political weight due to the non-elected 
nature of the government, all six parties apparently shared equal influence and equal 
responsibilities of power within the Committee.  
From a moral point of view, the CLN represented a clear break with the past and 
Italians’ intentions to set aside political differences for the common good. Political 
leaders accepted the need to compromise and negotiate with each other (and with other 
non-governmental actors). Self-interest, opposing ideologies and agendas were 
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apparently set aside. This coalition was largely portrayed as the symbol of a new 
beginning for the country and the chance for Italy to finally lay the basis for its 
democratization. At least on the surface, it provided an organizational and ideological 
consensus as well as an area for cooperation and communication.  
In regards to the institutional form of the state, on July 2, 1946, a popular referendum 
was held and Italy became a Republic. The abolition of the Monarchy symbolically 
represented the death of Fascist Italy. The House of Savoy had been largely blamed 
for the advent of the regime, the war and, eventually, the defeat. The figure of the King 
had been irremediably compromised, and as long as Vittorio Emanuele III remained 
head of the State, as Benedetto Croce put it, Fascism would continue to “corrode” and 
“weaken” the country68. On the same day as the referendum, a Constituent Assembly 
was also elected by universal suffrage, charged with drafting the Constitution that 
would be enforced on January 1, 1948. The new Constitution, which was the only legal 
text approved by all political parties, was largely acclaimed as the product of a new 
anti-Fascist national identity. From a superficial perspective, the country was finally 
becoming a democracy.  
Despite representing pivotal events in Italian political history, these three 
achievements alone were not enough to finalise the Italian transition to democracy. 
Their symbolism, however, gave the country the semblance of a modern nation-state. 
In the attempt to move from mere symbolism to factual achievement, a major obstacle 
to political evolution had to be removed: the weak state-society relationship. Even 
though the anti-Fascist factor gave political parties the legitimacy needed to enter the 
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political establishment, maintaining this legitimacy required a more complex and long-
term strategy. Italian political culture had to be recreated and people’s beliefs and 
behaviours reshaped.   
 
Transition towards Democracy and the Challenge of the State-Society Relation.  
 
Since democratic governance and political development entail some degree of 
expanded popular participation and political and civic engagement, the state cannot 
act in isolation, but requires politically conscious citizens to legitimize it. 69 As has 
been largely proved, throughout history, political participation in Italy had always been 
very low due to a general feeling of distrust towards governments, which were 
considered heavily corrupted and largely disinterested in the community70. The so-
called transformismo (party-switching) and the trading of votes and loyalties within 
the government in return for favors, the use of repressive force to control social and 
political unrest, and a lack of popular legitimacy were seen as deviations of the liberal 
state from its democratic path. Not surprisingly, these practices alienated part of the 
population and gradually led to a deterioration of state-society relations71.  
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The leading elites had long discouraged, if not opposed, popular participation in the 
decision-making process, considering the masses unfit for the tasks of government, 
which had always been undertaken only by specialized elites. After the Unification 
(1861), only wealthy educated men, a small minority of Italians, had the right to vote. 
In the first general elections held in the Kingdom of Italy, only 1.9% of the population 
was allowed to vote, and of those with the right just 57.2% exercised it in the 
elections72. (Only in 1912 suffrage would be granted to all men, while women would 
have to wait until 1946).  
The alienation towards the political system was not simply the result of a general 
political apathy but was also the direct consequence of past experiences that had 
generated feelings of hostility, disillusion and a sense of powerlessness among the 
population. Centuries of external tyranny before the unification of the Kingdom, under 
which Italians had neither political nor effective legal rights, had eventually lessened 
popular reliance on governments 73 . Among the masses, there was a tendency to 
consider political participation and mobilization highly ineffective. Italians hardly 
believed their actions could either have an impact on the decision-making process or 
spur political and social changes74. This sense of powerlessness had estranged them 
from policy, leading them to consider the government “not as a social institution 
amenable to their influence, but as a natural force – often catastrophic, like an 
earthquake – to be endured”75. By recognizing that this anomaly represented a basic 
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impediment to the consolidation of democracy in the country, post-war political 
leaders sought to radically reduce Italians’ distrust of the state.  
However, building “civic” trust and confidence in post-dictatorial contexts is not an 
immediate process, but instead requires a long and complex series of negotiations and 
mediations between the ruling elites and society 76 . The question of state-society 
relations is interwoven with another important aspect: the construction of a national 
identity. As Lucian Pye demonstrated, the absence of a well-defined sense of 
nationhood could represent an obstacle to the process of change and reconstruction, 
increasing tensions and frustrations among the elites and widening the gap between 
the governors and the governed77. The role of identity represents a crucial factor for 
state legitimacy, “because a legitimate political order is usually built around a cohesive 
group and uses institutions that are a reflection of that group’s historical evolution”78. 
For an overall improvement of state-society relations, the absence of an Italian national 
identity had therefore to be addressed once and for all. By recognizing themselves as 
part of the nation, Italians could eventually identify with the state. If this issue were 
not solved, the Reconstruction of the country would remain unaccomplished. 
Despite the reunification of Italy at the end of the war, the notion of unity was more a 
myth than reality. Italy had never been a united or a truly democratic state. Instead, it 
had always been a disjointed country in which socio-political, territorial, economic and 
cultural subgroup identities co-existed and clashed. Since 1861, the leading elites had 
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had to face a deeply divided reality. Cultural and economic disparities had been 
widening the gap both between an educated class and the illiterate masses and between 
the developing northern regions and the underdeveloped South. Furthermore, the 
presence of countless regional dialects, some of which barely resembled the official 
language, produced even further divisions. Italians felt more attached to the ideas of 
local community, family and clan rather than to the idea of a Nation79. This division 
inevitably complicated the path towards social and political unity, as well as the 
formation of a collective community. 
The expression Fatta l’Italia, bisogna fare gli italiani (Having made Italy, we must 
make Italians) had discursively shaped political discourses since the mid-nineteenth 
century. Since the formation of the Kingdom of Italy, there had never been a real and 
solid unity, mainly due to Italians’ disaffection with the idea of the nation, and a nation 
that many felt had been imposed upon them by a minority. This lack of italianità 
resulted from the fact that the unification of the country had not been achieved through 
a mass revolution. It was instead a failed, “passive revolution”, according to Gramsci, 
orchestrated by elites, form which the majority of the population had been excluded.80  
Worried about anti-system feelings, Liberal governments refused to enlarge the spaces 
for political participation and to educate the masses, preferring to keep Italians as 
passive subjects rather than politically active citizens.  Their unwillingness to involve 
the majority of the population in the decision-making process led to the upsurge of 
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hostile feelings towards the Liberal state and, eventually, the collapse of the political 
system and the rise of Fascism.  
In response to the failure of the political system and the widespread popular discontent, 
the Fascist regime advocated mass participation and mobilization through its populist 
rhetoric. Creating an organic community that could identify with the totalitarian state 
became a fundamental aspect of the new ideology. Only through a process of 
nationalization of the masses, Mussolini believed, could the identification with the 
State be achieved. The regime sought to instil among Italians a sense of belonging and 
loyalty built around the notion of “homeland” and imperial grandeur. More than a 
geographical space, the “nation” ended up representing an ideological and symbolic 
construction81.  
If through nationalism the regime sought to unify Italians around the State, political 
and economic interests allowed factionalism to be tolerated in order to gain political 
consensus and support among major interest groups, such as the Church, big industry, 
the army, and the agrarian elite82. Like other European Fascisms, Mussolini was forced 
to compromise with the traditional elite that made his access to power possible83. 
Despite its populist rhetoric, the regime’s approach to politics became more and more 
elitist, choosing to preserve the interests of a few rather than the common good, 
eventually failing to create an overarching national identity. 
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Since 1941, popular support for the war and to the regime had been drastically 
declining in Italy. In 1943 Mussolini, was ousted and arrested by order of Vittorio 
Emanuele III, and a civil war broke out. The entire peninsula was divided and occupied 
by two foreign powers. This dual occupation once again compromised the fragile sense 
of national belonging. Italians were left to choose to which of the factions they would 
be loyal. Some Italians decided to collaborate with the German occupiers; others chose 
to resist and fight the Nazis; others opted to isolate themselves while passively waiting 
for their fate to be sealed. The Armistice declaration, the collapse of the regime and 
King Vittorio Emanuele III’s escape to Brindisi reinforced the impression that “the 
death of the country” was taking place84.  
As a consequence of WWII, nationalism ended up being a synonym of defeat and a 
reminder of the failure of the regime that had led Italy into war and catastrophe. The 
tragedy of the conflict and the collapse of the regime forced subsequent governments 
to distance themselves from this ideology, but if nationalism was no more an option, 
it had to be replaced by another unifying narrative. Anti-Fascism, largely perceived as 
the only legitimising ideology for a renewal of the country, was initially considered as 
a viable solution for unifying the nation and for confronting the problem of the political 
and ideological rehabilitation of the country.   
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Anti-Fascism and the Politics of Memory.  
 
When, in April 1945, the war was finally over in the peninsula, Italians had to face the 
excruciating reality of a country that had experienced the tragedy of twenty years of 
Fascism, a violent civil war and a world war. The immediate economic, political and 
social situation appeared disastrous. There was chaos everywhere. The material and 
moral devastation was great. Inflation was high; the cost of living skyrocketed; 
millions of people, who lived beneath the minimum level of subsistence, were now 
pressing the government, sometimes violently, to take some actions to ameliorate their 
conditions. Despite the dramatic times, feelings of living an extraordinary moment 
were widespread, especially in the North, where the Resistance movement was 
stronger.  
Besides representing a fight against external and internal enemies, the Liberation 
carried within itself a new wave of hope. Among the maximalist and more intransigent 
factions of the Resistance movement, the Liberation was experienced as the initial 
phase of a national process to radically transform the country and its political, social 
and economic framework. It brought forth great expectations for a political and social 
revolution able to sweep away the old system. By being a popular movement, it offered 
Italians the chance to make up for the failed revolution of the Risorgimento. Leading 
forces within the movement strategically drew a parallel between the anti-fascist fight 
and the unification of the kingdom. There was a re-appropriation of many symbols and 
icons of the Risorgimento. While the Liberal Socialists of Giustizia e Libertà named 
their political organization, formed in 1942, Partito D’Azione (Action Party), just like 
Mazzini’s party, during the Resistance fight the Communists named their units Brigate 
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Garibaldi (Garibaldi Brigades)85. This symbolic use of the Risorgimento became a 
powerful asset for representing opposition to the Fascist regime as Italians’ second 
chance to bring forth their own revolution. By denouncing the Risorgimento as a 
“betrayed and unaccomplished” historical event that eventually opened the door to 
Fascism, radical forces within the movement saw themselves as the legitimate actor to 
complete the Italian revolution.86  
Political forces within Italy realised that the Resistance movement had the potential to 
unify the country while offering a cohesive form of identity Italians could identify with. 
Even more so, their legitimacy was strictly connected to their active participation in 
the fight against the internal enemy. Anti-Fascism was not, however, a monolithic 
ideology. Besides being a war against Fascism, the Resistance was also a civil war. As 
Claudio Pavone demonstrates, during the Liberation, Italians were not simply fighting 
the intruders; Italians were also fighting Italians87. Besides violently confronting the 
supposed supporters of the Nazis or Fascists, the more radical faction of the movement 
stood against the entire Italian system and the bourgeois symbols of a capitalist reality. 
Landowners, professionals, entrepreneurs and clerics, as well as ordinary people, 
became the targets of a violent uprising88. This perspective, however, was seen as 
detrimental to the idea of national unity the leading class was hoping to build. 
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The political elite deemed necessary the production of a national culture that could 
support the political system. Therefore, they chose to build a memory that could be 
collectively accepted by the population89. Like Mussolini had done with Fascism 
before them, they produced a subjective “representation or construction of reality”90, 
and the mythical narrative of anti-Fascism produced by the elite eventually became the 
new “civic religion” of the country.  
According to Roland Barthes’ theoretical conception, “Myth hides nothing: its function 
is to distort, not to make disappear […] The relation which unites the concept of the 
myth to its meaning is essentially a relation of deformation […] in myth the meaning 
is distorted by the concept.”91 Therefore, in order to unite the country around this 
ideology, recent Italian history needed to be revised. Undoubtedly, the Italy who joined 
WWII in 1940 concluded its wartime experience as an Axis Power as a defeated 
country. However, the period running from September 1943 to April 1945 made this 
clear picture far more complicated. Despite the different narratives constructed around 
the role Italians played before and during the Liberation fight, in the aftermath of the 
war one became predominant.  It hinged upon the interpretation of the Resistance as a 
patriotic fight against the invader and depicted the majority of Italians as anti-Fascists 
that jointly fought this national war to free the country.  
By choosing to adopt this narrative construction, cultural and political elites rejected 
the idea that the Resistance was also a civil war. This collective “amnesia” was part of 
a tendency to strategically select a “usable” past useful for gaining political legitimacy 
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and for creating the illusion of a “new” country while removing the sense of guilt 
Italians suffered. The Duce became the only one to be blamed for the war; Italians 
were instead portrayed as victims of this totalitarian regime, to be eventually glorified 
by their active role in defeating the internal enemy92. The ventennio ended up being 
defined as a mere “parenthesis” in Italian history. As Benedetto Croce famously put it, 
Fascism represented a deviation from the liberal state that had nothing to do with the 
historical past of the country. It was a moral illness that had to be cured, but, as a 
parenthesis, it should not have been taken as an embedded aspect of the Italian culture. 
From this perspective, the belief that Fascism might have been a mass phenomenon 
became taboo.  
Eventually, anti-Fascism was reduced to a mere contingent phenomenon with defeat 
of the enemy as its manifest objective. Indeed, once it had been defeated, the urge to 
deal with the debris of Fascism dissipated. When Mussolini was executed on 28 April, 
1945, and his corpse, together with those of his mistress Clara Petacci’s and other 
infamous fascists, was strung up by the feet in Piazzale Loreto in Milan93, the unifying 
factor begun to recede.   
The narrative of the Resistance as proposed by the elite, however, clashed with the 
interpretation other Italians provided for it. Anti-Fascism was neither a cohesive nor a 
monolithic ideology. As Roy Domenico demonstrates, it meant different things to 
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different people94. If defeating the enemy was the common denominator among all 
political and social factions, disagreements on what the enemy represented and what 
to do after its defeat became a source of tension, especially outside the political 
establishment. The more progressive forces of the Resistance movement perceived 
anti-Fascism as the initial phase of a broader plan to create a more equal and just 
society and to deal with longstanding unresolved issues, such as economic inequalities, 
social disparities, geographical divisions and so on. Only by abolishing the Monarchy 
and establishing a Republic could Italy begin its transition towards democracy. 
Furthermore, by blaming the upper classes for supporting the establishment of the 
totalitarian regime, this faction emphasised the importance of moving away from a 
bourgeois society. This could be achieved by fostering the advancement of the working 
class and the promotion of radical reforms.  
At the other side of the spectrum was a more conservative interpretation of the period, 
shaped by a fear of radical changes and the protection of private interests. According 
to moderate forces, “the capacity to contain drastic fractures with the old order” 95 
represented a non-negotiable element of the transition to democracy. Stability and 
order were the keys. In particular, the invocation for a restoration of order 
exponentially increased with the intensification of requests for radical reforms that 
would not leave the largest interests untouched. For instance, when in 1945 Italian 
Prime Minister Ferruccio Parri proposed a plan to punish those who had derived profits 
from the Fascist regime, he faced fierce opposition within the parliament and, 
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eventually, was forced to resign. Since big Italian businesses were potentially more 
vulnerable for having largely benefitted from Fascist economic policy, conservative 
parties saw in this plan a threat to the economic structure of society and denounced it 
as a radical attempt to purge the Italian ruling class and a direct attack on property 
rights96.  
There was also a moral and religious dimension to the Liberation. In particular, 
Catholic activists perceived reconstruction as a mission for a moral and spiritual rebirth 
of the country and of the whole of Christian civilization. This interpretation clashed 
with the anti-clerical dimension of the Marxist perception of the Resistance and the 
possibility of establishing a socialist society. Liberals, instead, opposed any break with 
the past advocating a return to pre-1922 Italy, a possibility strongly opposed by the 
Left, which considered the failure of the liberal state as the main cause of Fascism.  
If the Resistance fight made clear that Italy did not stand for Fascism, what it did stand 
for remained unclear and controversial. Instead of addressing these questions, political 
parties played up the idea of national unity, using the anti-Fascist rhetorical 
construction as a moral framework. This, however, could only bring a partial victory 
to the country because it would not obliterate Fascism in its ideological and political 
fundamentals. The CLN, the Republic, the Constituent Assembly and eventually the 
new Constitution became mere symbolic expedients to uphold the façade of an 
achieved democratization and defascistization of the country, even when anti-Fascism 
would drastically abate and anti-Communism would replace it.  
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The elite distortion of reality for political aims deprived anti-Fascism of its substantive 
content; it became an empty shell, an instrumental expedient for gaining political 
legitimacy. The result was that Italian democracy remained a “simple procedural norm” 
and never a “historical conquest”97. Even though the leading elite tried to establish 
their interpretation of anti-Fascism as the basis of Italian national identity, social 
upheavals and uncontrollable emotions could not simply vanish with the establishment 
of an anti-Fascist political government.98 The unsolved issues that had allowed the 
totalitarian ideology to emerge and the regime to be established continued to threaten 
the stability of the country.  
By being deprived of its inner meaning, the distorted notion of anti-Fascism could not 
represent an ideology around which a national identity could be created. The leading 
elite chose not to negotiate the construction of a national identity with the rest of 
society. They produced their own narrative, making of it a powerful “foundational 
mythology”99 that could be used as an instrumental expedient to gain and maintain 
power and legitimacy; however, a national identity cannot be “solely promoted by a 
ruling elite, but must instead be continually renegotiated between the government and 
the people.”100  
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Consensus Building and the Demise of Anti-Fascism. 
 
While the narrative of post-war reconstruction remained built around the central notion 
of anti-Fascism at its mythological foundation, the Italian political elite was gradually 
and strategically moving away from it. This was due to a series of practical 
considerations that shifted political leaders’ priorities from improving state-society 
relations to single parties’ attempts to enlarge their electoral support bases. With the 
sole probable exception of the Action Party, which insisted on transforming the CLN 
from “a pure and simple coalition of parties” 101 into a permanent institution, the other 
parties rejected this proposal, realizing the advantages of increasing their political 
strength through elections. The Communists and the Socialists, despite insisting on 
slogans such as ‘tutto il potere ai CLN’ (all power to the CLN) and publicly supporting 
the CLN, were not willing to subordinate their own political line to it.102 As Togliatti 
repeatedly claimed, once the liberation of the country was achieved, the CLN should 
be reduced to an auxiliary organ of the central government. Alcide De Gasperi, the 
leader of the Christian Democracy party, defined the CLN as a “contingent 
phenomenon” generated by the necessity to defeat a common enemy, soon to be 
replaced by new political solidarities.103 Once these parties obtained the legitimacy to 
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participate to the political reconstruction of the country, they would move away from 
the CLN. 
The CLN experiment formally ended in June 1946, and a government of national unity 
under the leadership of the DC was formed, including both the PCI and the PSI. Even 
though the political cooperation would last until May 1947, when left-wing parties 
would be ousted from the cabinet, the fragility of the anti-Fascist coalition had already 
begun to emerge. The choice of Alcide De Gasperi as Prime Minister in December 
1945 clearly represented the first sign of a gradual demise of anti-Fascism as a unifying 
ideology and the tilt of the political balance to the conservative right. Political 
historians have pinpointed this precise event as the starting point of a “back to 
normalcy era” 104 , an era in which the government chose to undertake moderate 
measures of political and economic recovery meant to restore order and to promote 
stability105. As Giuseppe Dossetti, one of the left-wing Christian Democrats, observed: 
“in just a few short months, the propulsion toward reform was contained. And in a few 
years, progressively compressed up to the point of being practically wiped out […].”106  
The failure to get rid of the old administrative fascist apparatus or to efficiently 
intervene on economic matters weakened the feeling that there had been a break with 
the past and fostered a class struggle that would escalate in 1947. While Fascism had 
been defeated in its manifest form, the possibility of another form of fascism returning 
had not. This would have required the political parties to address and solve all those 
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issues that had made the advent of the regime possible. Despite their rhetoric, Italian 
politicians were more concerned with creating and maintaining their own hegemony 
rather than in solving Italians’ basic problems. As Duggan claims, “[…]With so much 
of the past carried over into the Republic, it was difficult for Italy’s post-war rulers to 
fashion a fresh and convincing vision of national identity that would in the years to 
come help keep the country on a sound political footing.”107 The new democratic 
symbols remained evasions or diversions from the main issues, and political legitimacy 
became more important than the effectiveness of the political system. 
While people in the piazzas were urging for a transformation of the social system, 
political leaders more concerned with smooth progress towards recovery and 
reconstruction soon became conservative. As James Martin reported in citing Stephen 
Gundle, “although Anti-Fascism served as a set of general ideals against which the 
mass parties of the First Republic might, in its early years, mobilize their 
constituencies, the Resistance failed to form into a ‘civil religion’ or hegemonic 
worldview.” 108 As Ferruccio Parri said, the path to democracy remained unfinished 
due to “a political class that poured words into their inability to act, quickly and 
properly, as the country’s interest demanded.”109 Political leaders exploited, distorted, 
and finally rejected this ideology in the attempt to satisfy specific interests and gain a 
large popular electoral base. Eventually, they made “anti-Fascism fit their own 
                                                             
107 C Duggan, “Italy in the Cold War Years and the Legacy of Fascism,” in Italy in the Cold War: 
Politics, Culture and Society 1948-1958, ed. Christopher Duggan and Christopher Wagstaff 
(Oxford: Berg, 1995), 24. 
108 James Martin, “Ideology and Antagonism in Modern Italy: Poststructuralist Reflections,” 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 8, no. 2 (June 2005): 157. 
109 Mola, A Preface in L Mercuri, L’epurazione in Italia, 1943-1948, L’Altra Storia (L’Arciere, 
1988), 5–6. 
81 
 
agendas”110 and not the other way round. Once legitimacy was obtained, these parties 
would gradually move away from this principle.  
 
The Illusion of the “Ethical” and the Political Establishment.  
 
Tensions and ideological clashes within the coalition began to reveal the fragile 
equilibrium within the political system. These six parties had little in common with 
each other, having their own tactical and strategic needs as well as different, if not 
opposing, ideas and values.  Due to the ways in which the coalition was conceived and 
the process of transition towards democracy planned, political unity failed to be upheld.  
For a series of practical reasons and considerations, political leaders’ desires shifted 
from cooperation to single parties’ attempts to enlarge their electoral consensuses. The 
CLN symbol of political unity and renewal of the country ended up being as illusory 
as the ideological foundation on which it had been created. Out of the array of post-
war organizations, only two political parties would dominate the post-war political 
arena: the DC and the PCI. The so-called moderate parties, such as the republicans 
(PRI) and the liberals (PLI), were not in positions of power in the aftermath of the war. 
The Liberal Party, which represented the political failure of pre-Fascist Italy for many 
Italians, was largely perceived as an elite body mainly composed of highbrow 
intellectuals and was largely blamed for the advent of Fascism. Similarly, the Action 
Party, which had gathered together liberal democrats, radicals and socialists and 
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played a central role in the Liberation process, began to disaggregate due to internal 
disagreements and the lack of a large popular body of support.  
The DC was the successor of the Italian People’s Party, a party founded in 1919 by the 
priest Luigi Sturzo, declared illegal by the Fascist regime a few years later. Rejecting 
the idea of class struggle, the DC became a “catch-all party” advocating the political 
unity of all Catholics, both rightists and leftists. It became the main recipient of anti-
Socialist and anti-Communist votes. The other mass party was the PCI. Because of its 
active role during the Liberation, this party was transformed from a marginal political 
actor into a massive party of nearly two million members. Due to the absence of a real 
alternative coming from the Left, it ended up representing the only radical party within 
the political system that could represent the great expectations of the Resistance fight.  
Despite their opposing political agendas, the DC and the PCI had something in 
common. The constant quest for legitimacy led the two mass parties to engage in a 
policy of doppiezza (duplicity), embracing more moderate rhetoric within the 
government, and a more radical or intransigent one outside the parliament. Their 
political predominance and electoral support were impressive, especially in a society 
in which isolation and alienation from political life and distrust of institutions were 
deep-rooted traits of the political culture. 
These two parties stepped in and took over the legacy of the Fascist regime in seeing 
the party as the major political actor and referent of an entire society. Both the PCI and 
the DC represented what Gaetano Mosca defined as “quasi-religions stripped of the 
divine element”. 
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“All religions, even those that deny the supernatural, have their 
special declamatory style, and their sermons, lectures, and speeches 
are delivered in it. All of them have their rituals and their displays of 
pomp to strike the fancy. Some parade with lighted candles and chant 
litanies. Others march behind red banners to the tune of the 
“Marseillaise” or the “International” [...] In our day sects and 
political parties are highly skilled at creating the superman, the 
legendary hero, the “man of unquestioned honesty,” who serves, in 
his turn, to maintain the luster of the gang and brings in wealth and 
power for the sly ones to use.”111  
 
Profoundly saturated by political myths and ideologies, both factions perceived 
themselves in messianic terms, as expressions of absolute values112 and as guiding 
forces capable of morally and politically educating the masses.  
Considering political participation and electoral support as total identification with 
each party’s agenda or as recognition of the system is misleading. These parties 
constructed their hegemony by constantly relying on sub-cultural and material ties 
more than on consonance with broader political ideas, leading Italians to identify with 
one group against the other. Their predominance in the Italian political system was 
also connected to the fact that both parties relied on the two main subcultures that since 
the late nineteenth century had been dominant within Italian society: Catholicism and 
Syndicalism. Despite remaining outside the state system, these two ideologies had 
represented the most important forces of cohesion during the late nineteenth and early 
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twentieth centuries and remained capable of mobilizing the masses through mass 
movements and organizations, such as Catholic organizations and trade unions.  
Political loyalty to one group against the other was not the consequence of a thorough 
political analysis or identification with a party’s agenda. This sense of belonging had 
its roots in a phenomenon known as “familism”, or “amoral familism” 113 . First 
introduced by Edward Banfield114 (1958) in his fieldwork on a southern Italian village 
(Chiaromonte), this concept emphasises one central element of Italian political and 
social culture: namely, the tendency to identify with one specific group and to prioritise 
the interests of one’s family over those of one’s community. Banfield used it to support 
his theory of Italians’ inability to act together for a common good. The popular loyalty 
to a specific party had to rest on the so-called voto di appartenenza (vote of 
belonging).115 Around this religious dimension of political affiliation, each of these 
two parties built its own mass consensus. 
As I will discuss in the next chapter, the two parties’ reliance on socialising agencies 
was extremely important in gaining consensus. The term socialising agency would be 
used to define those non-political institutions or organizations capable of politically 
mobilising specific social groups. These were able to mobilize Italian subnational 
groups through the promotion of ethical values and forms of identity that different 
social groups could recognise. The DC could rely on the endorsement of the Catholic 
Church and its organizations, and Vatican support would bring the party credibility 
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and legitimacy as well as a dominant position in Italian politics. As Alessandro Ferrari 
claims, in a fragmented, divided and isolated reality like Italy, “Catholicism—the 
religion of most of the population— was the only cement binding the new country 
together: a country without a common language and without a widespread culture 
capable of founding civic engagement”116. The PCI, instead, had a hegemonic position 
among the working class and the anti-clerical forces.  It would rely on the CGIL (the 
Italian Confederation of Labourers), ARCI (Recreational and Cultural Italian 
Association) and other organizations.  
By relying on the promotion of ethical values that could be adopted not by the whole 
of society but by subnational groups, these parties failed to support the creation of a 
unifying identity. Political parties promoted the construction of collective identities in 
which groups could recognize themselves as part of a faction opposed to another. 
Political affiliation, therefore, became the instrument of identification and filled  the 
void left by the absence of a strong national identity. Instead of leading Italians to 
identify with the state and its institutions, it led the population to identify only with 
one of these two parties.  
Both parties exploited the long-lasting ideological division between Catholics and 
Marxists by using the same antagonistic rhetoric they had used towards the Fascists. 
This led to further divisions and the creation of oppositional sub-group identities, 
making ideological clashes almost inevitable. As Lapalombara claims, in post-war 
Italy political rhetoric became very intense. Political discourses were:  
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“[…] full of ideological assertions, sweeping condemnations of 
political opponents, and other expressions that [suggested] open 
warfare and irreconcilable conflict. Were one to read only the 
partisan press and to listen to speeches made in parliament or in the 
piazzas, one would quickly get the impression that, politically 
speaking, Italians [were] engaged in a war of all against all.”117  
 
Delegitimizing the ‘other’ became instrumental for legitimising the ‘self’. The 
problem is that as these parties legitimised their participation in the political process 
of reconstruction, they chose not to fully legitimize each other 118 ; however, the 
existence of each party was the legitimizing factor for the existence of the other. The 
DC “was kept in mostly to keep the Communists out”119, while the PCI, despite 
constantly being in opposition after 1947, was legitimized by the presence of the 
Catholic party as the only radical party that could curb the power of the DC and the 
Church.  
 
Conclusion.  
 
Despite invoking the renewal of the country, these two parties took over the legacy of 
Fascism by making political parties the predominant decision-making actors, 
supplanting the state and conceiving it as instrumental to achieving their moral and 
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political objectives120. While from 1922 to 1943, the only “legitimate” party was the 
PNF (National Fascist Party), in the aftermath of its dissolution the Italian political 
system was instead constructed around these two opposing factions and their leaders. 
Italy moved from being a totalitarian regime to a partitocrazia (partitocratic regime) 
in which political parties exerted strong control over government and society. Instead 
of being governed by political parties, Italy became dominated by them121. 
This particular political system was an anomaly that could not be found anywhere else 
in Europe. While having a form of a democracy, Italy had the essence of an 
authoritarian state. Nowhere else in Western Europe would a single party, namely 
Christian Democracy, dominate politics for half of a century, with all coalitions 
centred on it.122 Instead of promoting a democratization of the country, this regime 
would increase political and social tensions, cause a series of governmental crises, 
destabilise the Italian political system and alienate the Italian electorate even further 
through exploiting ideologies to antagonize subgroups of society.  
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-CH. III- 
ITALIAN SUB-NATIONAL NETWORKS. 
 
 
The Italian post-war political reconstruction was characterized by a series of 
negotiations and compromises that took place within the political arena. Initially, there 
was a rhetorical consensus among the elite. As previously demonstrated, leading elites 
set as their primary objectives the political rehabilitation of the country and the renewal 
of its institutional structure. Despite the various attempts to create political and social 
unity, the anti-Fascist government failed in becoming the central force for a democratic 
rehabilitation of the country due to the destabilizing tensions and factional interests 
that, in the end, reduced the coalition to a mere symbolic façade of democracy. Under 
the weight of individual parties’ constant attempts to gain predominance among the 
electorate political unity succumbed and an undemocratic political system known as 
partitocrazia was established. As a result, political parties ended up exerted a vast 
control over the government and society. 
While anti-Fascism allowed post-war political forces to gain legitimacy, the 
construction of hegemony required leading actors to secure the political and 
ideological consensus through a process of negotiations that included both dominant 
and dominated groups. As a consequence of the authoritarian experience of the 
Ventennio, post-war political parties were weakly grounded in civil society and 
uncertain of the political loyalty of the Italian electorate. Furthermore, the Italian 
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populace lacked the habits to political participation and identification with the new 
institutional structure123.  
Considering the weak state-society relation, in order to shape political consciousness 
these parties could not operate independently, but they had to rely on various non-
governmental ‘agents’ or institutions that were rooted in the Italian society.  
Dominants groups within society can obtain consent and legitimacy from the masses 
by spreading specific ideas, values and assumptions through social institutions such as 
labour unions, the Church, schools and so on. These institutions could play an 
important role in manufacturing consent and in socialising people into specific norms 
and beliefs of the dominant social group. 124 Despite being outside the political 
establishment, these actors held a politically and socially relevant place within Italy 
and could effectively penetrate into civic society by performing recruiting functions. 
Among them the Church and labour unions had a unique role in reaching out to the 
Italian society. Both forces could exert a fundamental pressure on the political 
establishment trying to use their influence to both enhance their political and economic 
interest and to convey political participation towards one party against the other.125  
While negotiating their political and cultural space in the institutional structure, 
political parties gradually established closer links with these actors and interest groups 
to build a series of alliances based on conditional premises and factional interests. The 
constant search for political legitimacy led the two mass parties, the DC and the PCI, 
to exploit long-term social and political divisions to enlarge their electoral base and 
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establish their hegemony. The masses, instead of being involved in the reconstruction 
of the country, became instrumental to the consolidation of political party legitimacy.  
Because the rhetoric of these non-governmental actors was based on an antagonizing 
stance, especially between Catholic and Communist groups, the political parties’ 
reliance on these networks resulted in an increase of instabilities within the country. 
Unity, which was the pre-condition of post-war reconstruction, succumbed under the 
weight of each party’s interest in securing their political authority. 
This chapter, therefore, focuses on the process of recruitment of the Italian post-war 
electorate through a strategy of consensus building in which, the Catholic Church, the 
CGIL and, eventually, the intellectuals played a pivotal role. The alliances between 
political and non-political actors would eventually create a divided ideological context 
in which, with the beginning of the Cold War and the future intervention of the US, 
divisions and instabilities would reach a new level of intensity. Two sub-national 
collective identities, in constant opposition with each other, would emerge rooted in 
the Catholic and Marxist tradition of the country.  
 
The Italian Power Structure and the Socializing Agencies. 
  
Based on the complexity of the power structures in modern nations, the attempts to 
penetrate into civil society and the construction of political hegemony required a long-
term, methodical and wide-ranging strategy mediated by cultural, political and 
religious agencies that could slowly and effectively shape the collective mentality. The 
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PCI could rely on various institutions such as the confederation of labours (CGIL), 
Camere del lavoro (centres for Italian syndicalist labour unions), Case Del Popolo, 
ARCI (Recreational and Cultural Italian Association) and on the organic intellectuals. 
Similarly, the DC could count on the Catholic Church and its network of associations 
that would successfully mobilized thousands of thousands of activists and, eventually, 
would foster the creation of a united Catholic front beyond different political beliefs. 
Due to their influence within the Italian society, these non-governmental actors could 
perform a socializing action and their mediating activities were seen as instrumental 
to solve the weak state-society relation.  
While at the government level the political parties appeared willing to preserve 
stability by playing down long-lasting ideological tensions between Communist and 
Catholic forces, the ideological battle was exacerbated by their sub-national networks 
that functionally inducted individuals into Italian political culture while forming their 
own political orientations. Despite being non-governmental forces, these agencies 
performed a political function within society. Through their rhetoric they indirectly 
conveyed political messages and reshaped Italian political culture.  
All these non-governmental actors considered politics not as their final objective but 
as an instrument to further specific group’s interests. Both networks would exert a 
fundamental pressure on the political establishment and would use their influence to 
enhance particular interests by conveying political support towards one political party 
against the other.126 Without entering the party-political realm, they could influence 
parties’ decisions from the outside through a complex process of negotiations, co-
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optations and mediations. Their goal was not a struggle for political power or direct 
management of government, but to establish closer links with Italian political actors 
in order to exert some sort of influence on government policy and legislation as an 
attempt to gain advantages over other socio-political and economic groups127. By 
relying on these moral and social values they made easier for Italians to identify with 
these non-governmental groups. Eventually, thanks to their connection with political 
parties, they could eventually exploit the loyalty of specific sub-groups to obtain 
political objectives.  
These socializing actors mainly operated on a regional and local scale trying to attract 
part of the population that had been at the margin of the political life. Facilitated by an 
absent and distant State, these actors gained a dominant position within society 
eventually becoming a guiding force capable of educating from a moral and political 
point of view the masses. Furthermore, by relying on accessible means of 
communication such radio, newspapers and, later on, television, they could reach both 
educated and uneducated groups. By constructing their own rhetoric on antagonizing 
discourses, these networks proved successful in persuading other groups to accept their 
moral, cultural and political values.  
Their mobilization resulted in aggravating the ideological divisions affecting Italian 
stability in the pre-Cold War period. Initially, the ideological clash was essentially 
engaged outside the government system. The struggle for hegemony took place in the 
piazzas, factories, radios, journals and newspapers. By getting involved in national 
politics, however, these socializing actors did not act in name of Italy and its people; 
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they got involved in support of one sub-group against the other and this had the 
unfortunate consequence of exasperating the ideological tensions within the country.  
The hostility between these two subcultures, however, had a long history and despite 
the political elite’s attempts to defuse it by creating government coalitions based on 
anti-fascism the potentiality for a clash was always present, especially among the 
masses.  
 
The Catholic Church and Its Socialising Function.  
 
The fact that in post-war Italy the Catholic Church exerted substantial influence within 
the country should not be surprising. For centuries, the Holy See had represented a 
unique point of reference for the entire society, especially in those contexts where 
institutions were absent and a large number of Italians were excluded from 
participating to the political life of the nation. In contexts of social marginalization, 
the Vatican with its networks managed to step in and through a slow and constant 
process of trust building became a major social interlocutor for large segments of the 
population. Furthermore, as David Martin observes, after the war “all old symbols of 
legitimacy were compromised except the Church”128 that despite its close relations 
with the Fascist regime still represented a major social actor in the country. Many 
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Italians, therefore, saw in the Holy See the spiritual guide for a social and moral 
renewal of the country.    
Despite representing a spiritual force in the aftermath of the conflict the Catholic 
Church gradually became a political and diplomatic authority. In particular, with the 
first national election of post-Fascist Italy in June 1946, the Vatican activities became 
more politicised. The factors that led to a shift from a moral to a socio-political activity 
were the opposition to Communism and the promotion of Catholic values as a new 
form of identity for the country.  
Between 1945 and 1947 Catholic forces in Italy had a different approach in regard to 
Communism. While the DC opted for a more pragmatic strategy based on a prudent 
collaboration with the PCI, the Holy See embraced a total breakage and a head-on 
confrontation with Communists and fellow travellers. Since the establishment of the 
CLN, the theme of national political unity played up by all anti-Fascist parties 
represented a matter of great concern for the Vatican. Within the Church there was a 
widespread opposition to considering anti-Fascism as the fundament for reconstructing 
the country. According to many in the ecclesiastic circles, Catholicism was the only 
way through which reconstruct both Italy and Europe and the only acceptable unifying 
factor that could make up for Italian lack of a national identity.  
Between the Vatican and Communism there had always been an openly declared war. 
The Church had never concealed its basic opposition to historical materialism and 
Bolshevik atheism. In the Divinis Redemptories (1937), for instance, Pope Pius XI 
defined Communism as an “intrinsically wrong” ideology at odds with the 
fundamental values of Christianity; good Christians, therefore, should not in any way 
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whatsoever collaborate with or support it. 129 Based on the irreconcilable nature with 
true Christianity, according to the Vatican “no one [could] be at the same time a good 
Catholic and a true socialist”130. Similar to his predecessor, Pius XII shared the same 
staunch opposition. Since his appointment to the papacy in 1939, he pinpointed Soviet 
communism as a major threat to Catholic civilization.  
Following the fall of the Fascist regime, the Holy See expressed its fears about the 
eventuality of a Communist access to power in Italy. Furthermore, the radical 
interpretation of the Resistance fight as the starting point for establishing a new and 
just society concerned the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The increasing rise of violent 
demonstrations and retaliations against priests, catholic activists, and ecclesiastic 
properties by anti-clerical individuals within the partisan movement exacerbated these 
fears. The revolutionary rhetoric within the labour movement was perceived as a major 
threat to the establishment of a Catholic identity. As defensor civitatis, Pope Pius XII 
took a clear stand against atheists, sinners, and revolutionaries. Recalling Marx’s 
statement that “religion is the opium of the people” and Lenin’s fundament of Marxism 
as “absolutely atheistic and positively hostile to all religions”, the Church morally 
condemned the PCI and those who supported it.  
Dreading the vulnerability of the populace, the Vatican mobilized its own activists to 
prevent the popular support to the PCI. The Church’s general tendency to distrust 
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democracies and mass politics was nothing new. In 1906, for instance, Pope Pius X 
reminded Catholics in his encyclical Vehementer Nos that: 
 “[…]the Church is essentially an unequal society, that is, a society 
comprising two categories of persons, the pastors and the flock, those 
who occupy a rank in the different degrees of the hierarchy and the 
multitude of the faithful. So distinct are these categories that with the 
pastoral body only rests the necessary right and authority for promoting 
the end of the society and directing all its members towards that end; 
the one duty of the multitude is to allow themselves to be led […] like 
a docile flock […]”131  
 
The populace was expected to be governed, to remain submissive to the ecclesiastic 
hierarchy, and to avoid political participation. The Vatican had hoped that after 
Fascism a moderately authoritarian government would follow in order to limit the 
freedom of the masses, considered immature and extremist.132 But with the emergence 
of mass political parties and the extent of popular participation following the end of 
the conflict for the Vatican there was no other option than an all-encompassing 
mobilization meant to educate, influence and direct Italians. To counteract these 
“enemies of the Church”, as the Pope used to refer to Marxists, the Vatican became 
more and more involved in the political life of the country.  
                                                             
131 Pope Pius X, “Encyclica ‘Vehementer Nos,’” Documenta catholica omnia, 1906, 
http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/04z/z_1906-02-
11__SS_Pius_X__Encyclica_’Vehementer_Nos’__EN.doc.html. 
132 Based on this fear, the Vatican long insisted on continuing the Allies occupation of the 
country, postponing the elections as much as possible, and supporting the Monarchy in the 
institutional referendum. 
97 
 
This mobilization was largely perceived as a moral crusade meant to convince Italians 
to accept Catholicism as the pillar of their own national culture while refusing to 
embrace all materialistic and atheistic ideologies. The turning point that transformed 
the moral crusade of the Church into a political confrontation was the 1946 national 
election. In addressing the convention of the diocesan presidents of the Catholic Action 
Pius XII exhorted the audience to mobilize and instruct the Catholic electorate on the 
moral and political importance of casting a coherent vote in light of the 1946 
election133.  
Without openly supporting a specific party, the Pope urged the Catholic masses to 
stand against those parties that represented a threat to the fundamental values of 
Christianity. The DC, at that time, was the only Catholic party that could prevent a 
Communist political success. The Pope recognized that only a centralized Church and 
a united Catholic front could stand as a bulwark against a Communist incursion. A 
united party, instead of a multiplicity of anti-communist catholic fronts, was 
considered the best strategy “to oppose a powerful dyke against the evil that is seeking 
to overflow.”134 The establishment of an alliance between the DC and the Vatican was 
conditional to the opposition to the PCI.  
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The Catholic Networks. 
 
Despite the DC in the 1946 national election obtained more than 35 % of the votes 
(The PSIUP 21% and the PCI 19%) becoming the major political actor, the Vatican 
perceived the results only as a partial victory since leftist parties still retained an 
impressive popular support. The Catholic mobilization had therefore to reach a new 
level of intensity. In order to win this war against Communism and Socialism, the 
papal moral and political condemnation was not enough. The Holy Father had to rely 
on his wide network of activists that could operate on a regional and local scale. The 
pulpit became a platform from where to ignite a fierce anti-Communist campaign. 
While the DC was a relatively new political actor, the Vatican could rely on its already 
established Catholic networks to control and influence the masses. The Church had its 
own institutional grassroots structures, such dioceses and parishes, its own cadres, the 
clergy and activists, but it could also relied on new mass communication systems such 
the radio, and later on, television135. By operating mainly on a regional and local scale, 
they could attract part of the population that had been at the margin of the political and 
civil life, becoming the social representative of specific subgroups within the Italian 
society. 
 
The perception that the Christian civilization was at risk due to the advent of the so-
called “god-less reds” was essentially exacerbated by the propagandistic rhetoric 
promoted by the clergy and Catholic activists essentially via Catholic newspapers, and 
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public rallies. The Catholic press was particularly strong, controlling some 1,800 
publications with an overall circulation of 16 million copies, more than half the 
periodical sales in Italy. 136  Besides relying on Catholic newspapers such 
L’Osservatore Romano, La Civiltà Cattolica, L’Avvenire D’Italia, Famiglia Cristiana, 
the Pope realized the importance of relying on new communication systems such the 
radio and, later on, television. This had an important effect considering that until the 
1950s the Italian reading public was very small and illiteracy outside the major urban 
centres was fairly high. Especially in the so-called Mezzogiorno, the southern part of 
Italy, the population was not very familiar with the Italian language while preferring 
to speak local dialects. Mass leisure and entertainment became important aspects of 
Italian life while movies, radio, magazines, and comics helped to deliver social, 
cultural and political messages also to isolated areas.137  
When newspapers and radio were not available, however, local parishes, priests and 
catholic organizations played a unique role in reaching out the sectarian society. 
Furthermore between 1945 to 1948 Catholics activists and priests successfully 
attempted to become a force at the level of the piazza in numerous mass rallies.138 
Because of the increasing popular support to left-wing parties, Catholic forces were 
urged to fight this crusade not only within the Parliament but in public spaces too.  Not 
surprisingly, the 1940s saw a dramatic increase in number of proselytizers. Padre 
Lombardi, the Jesuit known as ‘God’s microphone’, was one of those. From February 
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1947, he began his radio program Il Quaresimale, which was broadcasted via radio in 
cafes, piazzas, churches, and in cloistered convents. This gave him national and 
international popularity. His numerous public speeches, hold at universities, theatres, 
and public spaces, attracted incredibly large audiences. Thanks to his charisma and 
powerful rhetoric, Padre Lombardi was capable of winning the hearts and the minds 
of large sectors of the population, rousing the crowd to action by exasperating both 
their fears and their hopes for reconciliation, peace, and unity after the tragedy of the 
war. 139  
The combined actions promoted by the Vatican, the clergy, the activists and Christian 
Democrats led to the transformation of the political consciousness strongly anchored 
to the notion of Catholic civilization. The Church, however, became inclusivist and 
exclusivist at the same time. While seeking to attract and unify all Catholics around its 
mission, it also condemned and eventually expelled those Italians who were labelled 
as “un-faithful”140. Catholicism, therefore, ended up representing only a subgroup of 
society that identified itself in oppositional terms. Based on the moral condemnation 
of the Vatican, it became almost impossible for Italians to embrace simultaneously 
both Communism and Catholicism. This had a great impact on public opinion 
especially in Italy where faith was central to people’s lives.141 The apogee would be 
reached with the excommunication in 1949 of those “who profess the Communist 
credo, materialist and anti-Christian” 142 . The ideological divide that had been 
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characterizing Italy over a long period was exacerbated and antagonism became a 
powerful instrument for identification. Through the politicization of the Church’s 
moral activities the boundaries between morality and politics were altered. This 
permanently affected Italy’s construction of identity with the result that since 1946 
Italy was experiencing a process of moralization of politics and, simultaneously, of 
politicization of morality. However, the convergence of ethical and political values 
eventually facilitated the creation of a moral and political consensus, allowing the DC 
to gain legitimacy and political hegemony as well as offering to the party an instrument 
for de-legitimizing other political actors. 
As a consequence of the Church political mobilization, the contraposition between the 
Christian Democracy and the leftist parties was exacerbated with the result of creating 
a space of legitimacy within the political context for anti-Communist policy. The 
Catholic groups’ insistence on the exclusion of left-wing parties from the government 
coalition would increasingly pressurize the DC leader to oust both the PCI and the PSI. 
This pressure would eventually lead De Gasperi to open up a governmental crisis in 
May 1947 and establish a new centrist government coalition from which the two 
Marxist parties would be excluded. The fierce Anti-Communism promoted by the 
Church through its own institutions created a climate of fear that would eventually 
facilitate the American intervention in the country in the early 1948 by providing the 
US both the rhetoric and the leadership for an overarching anti-Communist strategy.143 
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The PCI and its Socialising Actors.   
 
If the Catholic party could rely on the Church and its networks to secure its authority 
and broaden its electorate, the PCI constructed its hegemonic base through various 
institutions and organizations. Among the others, the Party could rely on the 
confederation of labours (CGIL), Case Del Popolo, ARCI (Recreational and Cultural 
Italian Association) and on the organic intellectuals.  
The CGIL represented the most powerful socializing agency that could convey the 
working class’ votes towards the PCI. It was established in June 1944 as a nationwide 
confederation of labours to replace the dissolved Fascist syndicates. The urgency to 
reorganize the labour organization was linked to the revolutionary protests of the mid-
1940s. While initially welcomed as part of a large anti-Fascist mobilization to fight 
the Fascists and the Nazis, these protests soon came to be perceived as a potential 
threat to national unity and a destabilizing force that would delay the reconstruction of 
the country. Therefore, the three main parties (DC, PCI, and PSI) agreed to create the 
CGIL, theoretically independent from political parties, to unite all workers and reduce 
the revolutionary potentiality of the protests. Mirroring the governmental coalition, the 
three general secretaries within the CGIL were leading figures of the Communist party 
(Giuseppe di Vittorio), Socialist party (Emilio Caneveri) and Christian Democracy 
(Achille Grandi). Despite it was meant to be independent from political parties, the 
organization was highly politicized.  
However, as political cooperation and anti-Fascist unity would last, political parties 
were confident that ideological divisions within the trade union could be eased. While 
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in Rome politicians were attempting to keep the semblance of a coalition, consensus 
was breaking down beyond it. As already mentioned, the end of the war did not bring 
peace to Italy; Italy was still a country at war. Despite the Fascist attempt to mitigate 
longstanding unresolved issues through its pervasive ideology, territorial disunity, 
class division, and social and political tensions represented a major source of 
instability for the country. The series of violent protests and strikes that broke out from 
1943 onwards were the visible expression of the failure in solving these issues.  
Particularly in the northern industrial areas, demands for social justice and labours’ 
rights became interwoven with anti-Fascist sentiments, allowing the working class to 
unite under the demands for regulations and reforms. If the North experienced a 
stronger and active working class mobilization, the whole south, instead, was shaken 
by a series of agitations and violence between local peasantry and landowners due to 
the occupation of large estates by the former. While countrymen attempted to overturn 
the previous system that saw them as submitted subjects to the agrarian aristocracy, 
landowners sought to restore the order and to impede the promotion of radical reforms. 
Reactionary forces largely perceived the national unity government as a threat due to 
the inclusion of the communists and socialists in it. Since economic strains were 
becoming unbearable, Trade unions’ unrests increased.  
While political parties were more concerned on the political reconstruction of the 
country and seemed more interested in playing up the theme of national unity, the 
CGIL cadres responded to the ambiguity of the ruling elite by mobilising the working 
class and politicising its members. The CGIL, through its Communist and Socialist 
leaders and activists, strengthened its dominant position within society becoming a 
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guiding force capable of educating from a moral and political point of view the masses. 
Facilitated by an absent and distant State, trade unions and workers’ organizations 
eventually exercised an important influence over the political life of the country, 
becoming major social forces able to convey Italians’ desire for a radical 
transformation of the economic and social structure.  
Despite initially protest movements were not strictly politically inspired, the dominant 
position political parties had within the Italian context obliged the working class to 
rely on political factions for the promotion of reforms and to protect labour rights. In 
order to achieve this, trade unions needed political forces capable of re-organizing both 
society and the State. Based on the lack of a viable alternative from the left, the PCI 
came to be considered as the only party willing to act as the representative of the 
working class. This recognition was made possible because of the role Communists 
played in the Resistance fight and the mobilization of communist activists within 
factories during the violent strikes that affected Italy from 1943 onwards, which saw 
the Communists cadres always on the front line. 
The decision to join a trade union shifted from being perceived as a tool to defend 
specific and immediate interests to a political stance meant to create a new social 
order.144 The main problem was that the CGIL was created in a deeply ideological 
context in which long-term issues such as the ideological clashes between Catholic 
and Socialist forces, originated in the pre-fascist period, and the working class’ 
hostility towards the Italian bourgeoisie ended up dividing Italians in sub-national 
groups competing one against the other. Class-consciousness and the historical 
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working class’ struggles were not new phenomena. The socialist party, which had long 
represented a major social representative of the working class within the Italian society, 
was too weak and divided to perform as the driving force for popular mobilization. 
Taking over its pre-fascist hegemonic role, the PCI was capable of operating through 
its activists and organizations on a local and regional scale reaching wider sectors of 
society.  Following Lenin’s definition of Labour Unions as a “transmission belt” from 
the Party to the masses, the working class relied on trade unions to obtain economic 
and political goals, while the party used the social influence of the CGIL to establish 
its political hegemony among the masses.  
Despite divergences between the workers and the PCI the communist party would 
remain the only party expression of the working class and capable of protecting their 
interests. This was due to the fact that the only other alternative seemed to be the DC. 
By being a mass party, the DC was initially perceived as a progressive party. But 
despite the tripartite alliance with the PCI and PSI, the DC could not represent the 
workers’ party because of its support to the industrialist class and the so–called fourth 
party as well as its close ties with the Church.  
The main problem with the DC was that it saw in the big businesses the main driving 
forces for the reconstruction of the country. One of its main allies was Confindustria, 
the Italian employers' federation and national chamber of commerce, which in the post-
war period defined the workers’ protests revolutionary. As Foa claimed, Italian 
capitalism felt the vital necessity of reducing the resistance force of the workers and 
with threat of layoff regaining control of the labour force145. This led essentially to a 
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restoration of capitalism without resolving the main issues that were affecting Italian 
stability. By prioritizing the support to this sector of society to the achievement of 
social justice the DC became largely perceived as a conservative and elite party, hostile 
to the working class.  
Many analysts believed that the communist influence within the CGIL was due to a 
top-down imposition from the party. What many could not understand was that the 
1943-44 strikes started as mass protests not strictly inspired by the communist ideology 
and the politicization of the CGIL was not merely the result of a top-down imposition; 
it was instead a bottom-up progressive recognition among the working class that the 
PCI was the only political party that would eventually support the workers' demands. 
Because of the absence of a strong independent socialist party, the PCI ended up 
representing the only political party that could support important reforms in factories 
especially after 1943. There was therefore no absolute political identification with the 
party and its ideology.  
Besides relying on the activities of the CGIL, for the PCI the organization of the social 
and cultural life of the working class was also deemed necessary. The party was aware 
they could influence the Italian electorate by relying on the support of artists, 
intellectuals and writers and shape what Gramsci referred to as the common sense of 
the nation. Alongside trade unions activities, the party also created spaces for 
recreation and socialization where activities such as music events, projection of movies, 
political discussions and festivals were organized to glorify the collective dimension 
of life. The ARCI, for instance, was created in 1957 in Florence as a non-profit 
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organization with no connection with the Catholic Church 146 . It was meant as a 
gathering space for individuals gravitating around the PCI.  As Giovanni de Luna 
claims in the preface of the Le Muse del Popolo by Vincenzo Santangelo, ARCI played 
a significant role in politicising the masses by opening branches in remote villages it 
gave life to a cultural network where people got in touch, many for the first time, with 
Marxist ideas and values.”147 Similarly, the PCI could count on Case del Popolo, ANPI 
e UDI. According to Stephen Gandle this form of subculture created “a significant pole 
of community life”. 148  
By relying on these socialising agencies, both parties exasperated social and political 
instabilities through the creation of two opposing sub-national identity, one against the 
other. The anticommunism of the Catholic masses was matched by the anti-
Catholicism of the Communists149.  As Lapalombara claims, political rhetoric became 
really intense. Political discourses were:  
“full of ideological assertions, sweeping condemnations of political 
opponents, and other expressions that [suggested] open warfare and 
irreconcilable conflict. Were one to read only the partisan press and 
to listen to speeches made in parliament or in the piazzas, one would 
quickly get the impression that, politically speaking, Italians [were] 
engaged in a war of all against all.”150  
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The Intellectuals and the Post-War Engagement.  
 
While both political parties sought to construct their own sphere of hegemony within 
the Italian electorate by relying on the mediating action of socially influential actors 
such as the Church and the Labour Unions, the attraction of the educated classes 
became a necessity for both factions. Italy, with its strong ideologies and a weak state, 
has often relied on intellectuals for promoting social changes to counteract political 
parties’ apathy and ambiguity. By recognizing their role as influential opinion makers 
and their prominent position within society, governments have traditionally sought to 
obtain the intellectuals’ support as an instrument of persuasion among the educated 
classes.  
Historically, however, Italian intellectuals had often represented a narrow elite group 
incapable of performing an effective socializing function since their audience had 
always been a social minority, particularly those educated sectors of the high-middle 
class. The aristocratic position the Italian intelligentsia had hold within society, 
however, proved to be anachronistic in the early XX century. The central and active 
role played by the popular masses required the intellectuals to rethink their role within 
society.  
During the twenty years of Fascist regime, Mussolini recognized the importance of 
establishing his hegemony among the uneducated Italians. As Cannistraro argues in 
his book La Fabbrica del Consenso: Fascismo e Mass Media, trough the creation of a 
massive and effective propaganda apparatus, the Regime was able to spread political 
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and ideological messages beyond urban areas, reaching socially and geographically 
marginalized groups eventually creating a vast popular consensus151. Due to the high 
level of illiteracy in the country, that according to the Italian National Institute of 
Statistic (ISTAT) in 1921 was 27,4%152, the Duce relied on visual propaganda and oral 
communication to emphasize the achievements of the regime and to create the cult of 
personality that allowed Mussolini to project a positive image of himself and of the 
PNF.153  
A particular effective instrument of persuasion was, as Victoria De Grazia explains in 
her book The Culture of Consent, the socializing role of the dopolavoro and the effects 
of policies applied to mass organization of leisure-time activities. Trough pastime such 
as mass sports and traditional games the regime attempted to organize the Italian 
people “into a public ostensibly above class: as audience, consumers, or participants, 
responsive, if not always enthusiastic, toward the regime’s policies.”154 The spread of 
ideas was also facilitated by the regime’s reliance on mass communication systems 
such media, radio, films and through various institutions such as Istituto Luce or the 
Istituto Nazionale di Cultura Fascista.155  
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During the Ventennio, however, the socializing activity of intellectuals was hampered 
by a constrictive reality in which the State was exerting both direct and indirect control 
over the cultural industry. As Lino Pertile claimed, besides dealing ruthlessly with 
political opposition, the regime opted for a much more lenient and sophisticated 
strategy of cultural control. If on one hand it allowed high culture “to live undisturbed 
at the margin of society, as a privilege of the small liberal elite”, on the other hand it 
could exert control over mass media for the creation of a popular subculture.156 While 
there were intellectuals who chose a more public stance, working within the political 
and ideological apparatus of the State, for the rest of them there were two options 
available. They could oppose the authoritarian culture promoted by the regime by 
choosing the exile, or to become traditional intellectuals pursuing their intellectual 
interests in a kind of Ivory Tower. Following Benedetto Croce as the prime example 
of the latter category, these intellectuals chose disengagement from society and to act 
in the name of reason and truth above sectarian and socio-political interests. Despite 
Mussolini was able to create his own hegemony the transformation of the State-Society 
relation never occurred. If the so-called “functionary” intellectuals helped in 
conveying some sort of temporary legitimacy towards the political system through an 
extensive recourse to propaganda, the “traditional” men of culture were too detached 
from society to obtain any social and political transformation of it.  
The Italian intelligentsia was blamed either for having supported the regime or for not 
having effectively opposed it. Largely blamed for their long-lasting passivity and 
connivance with the regime, they gradually reacted to the cultural apathy and the 
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Fascist experience became a reminder of a shameful heritage bringing along the need 
for repudiating the past. As the socialist writer and politician Ignazio Silone claimed, 
the systematic censorship was not the only cause for the intellectual apathy and cultural 
stagnation of the XX century; the ones to blame were the Italian Intellectuals and their 
disposition in accepting self-censorship, assimilation or connivance with the 
Regime.157 
When the regime and its own hegemony crumbled what was left were the symptomatic 
factors of a fragile country in which the State-Society relation had not been solved. 
The gap between leading elites and the masses was immense; the ideological and social 
clashes interwoven within the Liberation fight were destabilizing the country bringing 
forth all the failures of the Fascist regime in solving long-lasting issues such labour 
conditions, North-South division, and social inequalities. The establishment of a new 
political system was not enough for solving Italians’ dissatisfaction and distrust 
towards the institutional structure. It became necessary to shape the political culture of 
the country through a methodological negotiation between the institutions, the major 
socializing agencies and the people.  
Following the Armistice declaration, there was a widespread feeling of living an 
extraordinary moment; the Resistance movement brought along the desire for a radical 
transformation of the institutional system, the urge to create a new society based on 
equality, and to overcome the traumatic events of the past. Besides a desire for a socio-
political reconstruction, an intellectual and cultural renewal was deemed as necessary. 
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Rebuilding houses and factories or establishing a new solid political system was not 
enough; a transformation of the hearts and minds of society was expected.  
Alongside socio-political and economic devastations, the tragedy of the war brought 
about a cultural crisis in which the image of the intellectuals was compromised. 
Despite having negative repercussions the war created an opportunity for renewal 
infused with the desire for transformation that pervaded all sectors of society. As the 
partisan writer Italo Calvino wrote with enthusiasm and great optimism, the years 
immediately after the war represented for the country a chance to “start again from 
zero”158. It is within this context that the debate on the sociocultural role of intellectuals 
and the bond between policy and culture became of crucial interest.  
Due to the awakening force of the Resistance experience, intellectual passivity was 
replaced by a widespread desire for engagement; through socio-political mobilization 
intellectuals could gain back their social role along the process of a radical 
transformation of society. They abandoned their Ivory Towers in masses negotiating 
their position within society and their role as promoters of socio-political and cultural 
changes. To do so, they could initially operate only within the boundaries of Anti-
Fascism, which became the conceptual framework for a cultural renewal of the nation, 
removing the widespread sense of guilt among the intelligentsia. The appropriation of 
this ideology made them appeared as reliable forces within society. Intellectuals 
became therefore an invaluable asset to potentially transform the political culture of 
the country and finally solved the problematic relation between the state and society.  
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The cultural distance between them and the masses could not be sustained anymore; 
social engagement became their only chance for a national cultural redemption. While 
moving away from Benedetto Croce’s assumption stating the separation of policy and 
culture, post-war Intellectuals gradually discovered the works of Antonio Gramsci, 
and in particular Lettere dal carcere (Letters from Prison) and Quaderni del carcere 
(Prison Notebook), posthumously published in 1947 the former, and 1948-1951 the 
latter. Especially in Prison Notebook, which was a collection of essays written by the 
Marxist thinker during his eleven-year detention, the question of the intellectuals’ role 
within society represented a central point of analysis.  
Gramsci defined Croce’s theory of the apolitical role of intellectuals as simply 
anachronistic159. A common and serious error, Gramsci claimed, consisted in believing 
“that one can know without understanding and even more without feeling and being 
impassioned […] that the intellectual can be an intellectual (and not a pure pedant) if 
distinct and separate from the people-nation […]”160. Under the conditions of mass 
politics there was no possibility for maintaining a socially detached intellectual 
position; intellectuals had to renounce to their position of isolation and neutrality to 
plunge into practical life. 
A new kind of Intellectual would gradually emerge from the ashes of the war breaking 
away from the traditional conception of intellectual as specialist or savant, representing 
only a narrow class of educated people. Gramsci defined intellectuals not simply those 
individuals engaged in academic or writing professions, but also as social actors that 
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by holding a predominant position within civil society operated as permanent 
persuaders functionally contributing to the formation of a worldview, a common sense. 
If the masses could “feel” but did not always “know” or “understand”, the Intellectuals 
could use their knowledge and critical thinking to promote an intellectual and moral 
transformation of the masses and to shape the collective consciousness. By operating 
as organizer and connective element within society in relation to “hegemony” and 
“political government”, through a methodological work intellectuals could help the 
subaltern classes to move away from a submissive position to become a major force 
of changes within society.   
Culture would be no longer considered as a privilege but as a service, a revolutionary 
instrument through which the intellectuals could transfer their experience and 
knowledge “to the terrain of common utility”161. As Elio Vittorini wrote in a letter 
addressed to Togliatti, culture represented “the human force that uncovers in the World 
the necessities of change, and brings it to the consciousness of the world”162. By 
rejecting the idea of a purely academic and individualistic culture, Gramsci relocated 
the intellectuals at the centre of politics along the process of democratization of the 
socio-cultural life. It was intellectuals who, according to him, laid the “cultural 
foundations for the creation of a society’s moral and intellectual leadership.” 163 
Therefore, major changes within society were essentially played out on the cultural 
terrain. In order for the Intellectuals to become a major social force for transformation, 
as stated in an article probably written by Togliatti in June 1944 and published in the 
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Communist paper Rinascita, it was no longer possible to separate “ideas from facts 
[…] culture from politics […] and art from true life.”164 The extraordinary impact his 
theories had on post-war Italian intellectual renewal are beyond any doubts, especially 
from the late 1940s onward.  
 
The Intellectuals and the Italian Political System. 
 
From 1943 to 1947, anti-Fascism as a total and overarching ideology offered the 
conceptual framework for a cultural renewal of the country. As to produce a cultural 
transformation of the country, however, intellectuals went beyond the collective 
memory filtered by official narratives that characterised the Ventennio simply as a 
“parenthesis”. The intellectuals, therefore, began analysing and examining the Italian 
past to offer an exhaustive analysis of those factors that had facilitated the regime to 
rise and be maintained. The ideals of anti-Fascist were also exalted throughout the so-
called Neo-realism. A lot of articles, as well as essays and books were published, 
describing the partisan experience, pen-portraits of comrades-in-arms, diaries about 
the resistance movement. Despite the variety of cultural works, the focus on social 
issues and on the working and peasantry classes was a common denominator of these 
narratives. 
Initially, the urge to defeat once and for all Fascism and its legacy allowed an 
extraordinary form of collaboration between conservative and more radical members 
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of the intellectual elite and cultural productions flourished with an increase of memoirs 
and epic-celebrative works. The destabilising crisis Italians faced in the aftermath of 
the war sprung a new sense of solidarity among different ideological and cultural 
groups for an intellectual reconstruction meant to create a new culture and a new 
society in which all the contradictions of the past could be solved once and for all. As 
Piero Lucia argues, there was an initial attempt to create a new national culture beyond 
ideological or political divisions165.  The publication of authoritative reviews such as 
the social-democratic Il Ponte, the catholic Il Mulino, the Communist Società and Il 
Politecnico facilitated the intellectual ferment of the early post-war.  
Cultural unity and intellectual renewal faced a challenge when anti-Fascism broke 
down as a unifying ideology within the political establishment. When the myth of 
national unity emphasised by the rhetoric of political leaders crumbled, repercussions 
on the cultural terrain were felt. With the dissolution of the Action Party and the 
establishment of a DC-led cabinet following the ousting of left-wing parties, the spirit 
of the Resistance not only as a national but also as a social war dissipated.  
For those intellectuals that had strongly believed in the revolutionary possibility of 
anti-Fascism this was considered a betrayal. The significance this betrayal of the spirit 
of the war had on intellectuals can be highlighted through the words of Piero 
Calamandrei. As early as October 1946 he wrote on his review Il Ponte: 
“The lack of confidence in freedom, the desire to stand apart, to leave 
politics to politicians. This is the dangerous state of mind that each 
of us must guard against and fight […] [If] I catch myself doubting 
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that the dead have died in vain, that the ideals for which they have 
died for were foolish illusions, with these doubts I’ll allow the rebirth 
of fascism. In the wake of the brief epic of the heroic resistance [..] 
the long, painful and inglorious decades of the resistance in prose 
have now begun.”166 
 
The longing for a cultural reconstruction and renovation of society had to face a 
completely different reality in which political and cultural fundaments had been 
undermined in name of continuity167. This had a profound impact on intellectuals’ 
choices. Because of the peculiar post-war political system known as partitocrazia, in 
which the country became dominated by political parties that exerted a strong control 
over both society and the government, any attempts to change or influence Italian 
policy and culture could only take place within a process of negotiations with the main 
political parties, namely the DC and the PCI. Besides with their knowledge and 
influence intellectuals could bring political legitimacy and authority to political 
parties168, they had no direct power. The effectiveness of their social actions had to be 
mediated and filtered by political parties that represented the major actors for the 
promotion of social, cultural and political changes. Since the intellectuals could only 
preserve their social role by relying on one party instead of the other, they were 
eventually forced to adapt to a system characterised by political antagonism and 
struggle for cultural hegemony. The fact that in the Italian political and social context 
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was soon divided between these two political factions and their antagonising rhetoric 
forced the intellectuals to give up to their unitary project of cultural reconstruction.  
Even with the fall of the Regime, the State kept on having a predominant role in 
controlling the cultural industry. Political parties began exerting some sort of control 
over distribution and contents in the attempt to shape Italian society, culture and 
politics. They also began to employ large funds and energies for the production and 
distribution of cultural products seeking to organize and convey a vast popular 
consensus towards one party or the other. Through the fabrication and promotion of 
an antagonizing culture political parties could make up for Italians’ absent sense of 
nationhood. Ideological antagonism replaced anti-Fascism as a unifying factor, ending 
up creating cultural sub-groups in competition among each other while failing to 
address the needs and aspirations of the nation as a whole.  
Through a process of monitoring and censoring of the cultural industry by political 
parties, intellectuals found it difficult to escape the demands and controls of political 
authority. Aware of the constrictions of the political system, many of them chose to 
adapt to the Italian political context. For those who chose social engagement but 
refused to organically adapt to the political system by refusing to choose between one 
or the other political party, cultural marginalization was the outcome.  
By recognizing the importance of culture and the creation of a new intellectual organic 
class as part of broader plan of reformation of the Communist party, the PCI began 
consistently relying on and recruiting organic intellectuals. This strategy was 
perceived as necessary in order to gain legitimacy and obtain a vast popular consensus 
while counteracting the catholic hegemony that the DC had been constructing down 
119 
 
the years through its own catholic networks and the relations with the entrepreneurial 
class. The widespread feelings of uncertainty and despair that characterised this period 
led many intellectuals to gravitate towards the PCI.  
It is wrong however to simply consider the increasing intellectual support to the PCI 
as a top-down imposition. By blaming post-war literature for being subordinate to the 
party, scholars tend at times to forget the social and cultural context in which the 
intellectual reconstruction took place. Because of the revolutionary rhetoric and the 
extraordinary contribution given to the Liberation fight, the PCI represented the only 
political party that could challenge the conservative and moderate reconstruction 
promoted by the DC. The close ties between the Italian intelligentsia and the 
Communist party were deemed necessary for a transformation of the political culture 
of the country that could make up for the failures of pre-fascist leading elite in 
integrating the ‘submissive’ classes into the political system and ameliorate the state-
society relation. During the post-war period Intellectuals got closer to Communism as 
a way to approach the masses. 
 
For the majority of the intellectuals there was not a total identification with the political 
agenda of the party. Generally speaking, the so-called engaged post-war intellectuals 
had a relatively poor knowledge of Marxism169 ; many became “politicized” as a 
consequence of the Resistance experience. Largely seen by the anti-Fascist 
intellectuals as the heir of the Resistance, the PCI became the organ for elaborating 
and promoting a new cultural transformation that could eventually allowed the 
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connection between culture and politics.  It is worth noticing that many Catholic 
intellectuals who had participated to the resistance fights shared the overwhelming 
desire for a radical transformation of the country. Their desire for radical changes 
basically clashed with a policy of moderation promoted by the DC. As the Catholic 
priest and writer Primo Mazzolari wrote, “today’s dissatisfaction has a name; the 
novelty a face: Communism. In this sense, we are all somehow communists, even those 
who fear it or speak ill of it. If we really urge for something different from what has 
been achieved so far, it would be advisable to make ourselves willing to build a path 
alongside the communists”170. 
 
Communism was perceived not in its political dimension, but in its moral force for 
renewal against the social status quo. This doesn’t mean that the relation between 
intellectuals and the PCI was smooth. There was not a single and cohesive set of beliefs 
among the so-called engaged intellectuals. Disagreements on economic development 
and policy, labour issues, division between the north and the south, the analysis of the 
historical past, the explanatory causes for a lack of a national identity, the reasons that 
allowed Fascism to rise and the role of the Vatican within the Italian society were only 
a few of the issues over which the intellectuals had different perspectives. Furthermore, 
the PCI’s constant appeal for realism in arts was combined with an intolerant attitude 
towards avant-garde movements and foreign products, especially American ones. This 
closure towards what was new arose a lot of criticism. PCI members were labelled 
“illiberal” and their cultural policy “dictatorial”. Even among the communist 
supporters there was a criticism towards the party guilty, in their opinion, for 
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promoting a sectarian and out-dated literature not easily understandable by the Masses. 
This, for instance, was one of the factors that brought to a clash between Togliatti and 
Vittorini with the consequent end of Politecnico in 1947. Vittorini claimed that culture 
could enrich policy and could be useful only if it was autonomous and not politicized. 
He wrote:  
 
“to be a revolutionary writer doesn't mean to play the pipe for 
revolution. Revolutionary is the writer who can disclose, through 
their works, revolutionary needs different from those created by 
policy: domestic needs, secret, hidden in the human being that only 
them can perceive”.171  
 
While PCI chose to rely on the mediating function of organic intellectuals as 
ideological guides that could change Italians political culture and construct an 
alternative hegemony, the DC mainly invested most of its efforts on mass-cultural 
programs. Similar to the Fascist period, the Catholic party constructed its own 
hegemony through the press, television, publishing houses (I.e. Morcelliana, SEI, 
Studium, l’Ave, Cinque Lune), and public meetings while also exerting control on the 
Ministry of Public Education. Thanks to its massive propaganda campaigns, it was 
capable of presenting catholic values as an integral part of Italian political culture. By 
simply focusing on mass culture, however, the party failed to establish its own 
intellectual network172. The reason why the party chose to rely on mass-culture and 
not on high-culture was probably due to the party’s failure in understanding that 
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political culture was not a static concept but always involved in a process of 
transformation and evolution. The party did not realise that the intellectuals did not 
simply produce ideologies, but they also operated as “organiser of hegemony”, that is, 
they could theorise “the ways in which hegemony can be developed or maintained”173. 
The DC, however, massively relied on the powerful rhetoric of the Church in 
convincing Italians to identify with the party, as the only one within the political 
system closer to catholic values and conservative positions. Furthermore, its 
connection with businesses and entrepreneurial groups allowed the party to attract the 
conservative high middle-class and win its support. Without recognizing the 
importance of relying on the intelligentsia to achieve consensus, the DC could not 
reinforce its own hegemony among the intellectual class. Many among the 
conservative intellectual elite, therefore, had to rely on other intellectual groups, 
groups that not only had different opinions but in many cases antithetical too.  
The connection between intellectuals and the PCI was favoured by the fact that it was 
perceived as the only party capable of opposing the censorship promoted by the 
Catholic party. Criticism toward the DC's censorship techniques brought a great 
number of conservative, bourgeois intellectuals closer to the PCI. Intellectuals 
mobilized against the “clericalization” of arts, culture, education and science. By 
representing the only viable alternative to the conservative faction within the Italian 
political system, the Communist party operated as the most effective connective body 
between the various anti-fascist elements and the only cultural referent for those 
intellectuals that, besides their ideological positions, desired to bring forth their social 
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function within society.174 This meant that for many of them, the only “democratic” 
party seemed to be the communist party. Undoubtedly the PCI exerted a great 
influence on cultural activity and was capable of attracting great numbers of 
intellectuals especially until 1956. However, its main flaw was that the party looked at 
intellectuals as simple instrument to obtain political, social and cultural legitimacy and 
not as social actors that could shape the collective consciousness and the political 
culture. 
 
 
Conclusion. 
 
Despite the fact that post-war political parties’ official rhetoric was initially built 
around the notion of anti-Fascist cooperation and unity, the leading elite never really 
condemned the bombastic ideological discourses of their own satellite agencies. They 
instead exploited the antagonizing rhetoric to instrumentally reinforce ideological 
divisions and build their own hegemonic space within sub-national groups. Instead of 
uniting the country, parties’ strategy of using the recruiting ability of the socialising 
agencies created two opposing and antagonizing networks that found in Catholicism 
and the Communism sub-national forms of identity. The construction of these two 
collective identities, however, led groups to identify themselves as part of a faction 
opposed to another. It did not, however, unite Italians nor improve the state-society 
relations. Even though political parties obtained immediate electoral advantage, their 
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reliance on these social institutions exacerbated political and ideological tensions 
within the country leading to further instabilities. As Lapalombara claims, the presence 
of these groups within Italian society constituted a source of weakness and instability 
for democracy since the fragmentation of Italian society and its peculiar political 
culture led antagonising pressure groups to compete for specific interests instead of 
restoring the unity of the state175.  
This ideological divide would eventually create the space for American intervention 
and the legitimacy for anti-Communist policy in the Italian government.  The result 
would be the creation of a triangular relationship based on conditional alliances 
between the DC, the Church with its networks, and eventually the US.  Each of these 
actors could not act independently but had to rely on one another to promote a 
transformation of the political culture of the country.  
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-CH IV- 
RETHINKING US-ITALIAN RELATIONS AND THE ECONOMIC 
RECONSTRUCTION. 
  
 
The cooperation at the government level between the three mass parties lasted until 
May 30, 1947, when De Gasperi announced the formation of a new government with 
the exclusion of both the PCI and the PSI from the cabinet. It was the fourth 
consecutive cabinet presided by the DC’s leader since he was firstly appointed in 
December 1945. The exclusion of the Left from the government, however, represented 
the beginning of a new political era for the country that affected both its domestic and 
foreign policy. This event laid the foundations of an ideological and political 
antagonism between Catholics and Marxists that would divide the country for decades. 
With the establishment of a DC-led government, the political equilibrium shifted to 
the right and this formula would eventually dominate Italian politics for nearly five 
decades. Furthermore, the so-called May crisis, which has been largely characterized 
as the catalyst for the establishment of an US-Italian alliance, would determine the 
evolution of transatlantic relations shifting Washington’s approach to Italy from an 
indirect to a more direct form of intervention. It was at this precise time that anti-
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Communism substituted anti-Fascism and became the new legitimising ideology 
allowing the convergence of American and Italian interests.  
Scholars’ attempts to find answers to De Gasperi’s choice to end the tripartite coalition 
have produced a series of explanations. Because it took place in the shadow of the 
Cold War, precisely two months after the Truman Doctrine declaration and days before 
the Marshall Plan speech at Harvard, the Prime Minister’s decision has often been 
considered as the result of American pressure meant to infringe on Italian sovereignty. 
Scholars tend at times to identify De Gasperi’s journey to the US in January 1947 as 
the central cause of the May crisis, sometimes implying that Truman asked the Italian 
Prime Minister for the exclusion of the communists from the cabinet as a prerequisite 
for American future economic and financial aid. Besides the fact that there is no 
evidence proving that the US President explicitly requested the exclusion, a critical 
analysis of mere international factors is not sufficient for a thorough understanding of 
the political turn and the reasons behind it. This perspective alone fall short of what is 
a complex and multidimensional passage of the Italian history.  
The evolution of US-Italian relations is the core interest of this chapter. The objective 
is to offer a reinterpretation of Cold War dynamics that goes beyond the unilateral 
narrative that tends to focus on the supposedly pivotal role of the US by assuming a 
primacy of American power in defining the relationship. Even though the US 
intervention might have had an impact in the Italian context, Italian political actors and 
their socialising agencies played a fundamental role. As this chapter purports to 
demonstrate, the ousting of the two leftist parties was the by-product of an intricate 
process of consensus building and mass parties’ struggle for creating spheres of 
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hegemony. In particular, it was the result of a political loss of consent and fears for a 
collapse of the system due to the aggravation of the economic crisis within the country.  
The first section of this chapter focuses on the early post-war period and the economic 
dimension of Italian reconstruction.  Even though until 1947 Italy was not at the top 
of Washington foreign policy agenda, the Italian case required attention as a matter of 
principle due to its geographical position and autarkic past. Before anti-Communism 
would become the central tenet of US foreign policy towards Italy, stability came to 
be seen as the crucial key for US post-war plans for an overall recovery of Europe and 
for protecting American interests in the Mediterranean. Even though the façade of 
political stability was maintained through the establishment of anti-Fascist government 
coalitions, the worsening of the economic conditions became a matter of concern for 
US observers. By avoiding a total collapse of the economy, Americans sought to 
prevent Italy from being swept into an international alliance hostile, if not opposed, to 
US strategic interests. Economic assistance was therefore offered to the country 
especially through the United Nation Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Up 
until 1947, the US adopted an indirect form of intervention in the Italian affairs and, 
while the local ruling elite was given substantial autonomy, the Italian government 
constantly received advice and suggestion on how to plan an effective economic policy. 
Following this advice, however, depended not so much on the degree of pressure 
exerted by Washington but on the Italian leading elite’s decisions to accept American 
directions.  
The second part of this chapter focuses on the beginning of the Cold War and the 
evolution of US-Italian relations from an indirect to a more direct involvement in the 
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political and economic reconstruction of the country. The DC leader De Gasperi 
played a pivotal role in advancing relations between the two countries and in 
convincing Washington to change its strategy towards Italy. However, the DC was 
initially perceived as a far too conservative and unreliable political actor. The close 
ties with the Vatican also represented a major concern for the US, worried that an 
excessive Church involvement in Italian politics could push anti-clerical and secular 
forces towards the left. De Gasperi, therefore, had to prove himself and his party to be 
a reliable interlocutor for the US in order to obtain political support and strengthen his 
authority within the Italian political establishment. The catalyst was the Prime 
Minister’s journey to the US in January 1947, and the mediations of Italian and 
American Ambassadors, made this possible. Once there, De Gasperi exploited the 
American anti-Communist fear as leverage to obtain political and economic support. 
When in the US he strengthened Washington’s belief that the inability to pursue an 
effective reconstruction of the country rested on the PCI and the radical protests 
organised by the Italian federation of Labour. Once obtained the reassurance of 
political and economic support, the DC leaders took the initiative and excluded the 
PCI and the PSI from the cabinet.  
The third section of this chapter focuses on the post-1947 era. Despite the 
establishment of De Gasperi IV cabinet represented a phase of magnitude importance 
for the future of the Italian political system, the following years contradicts the 
interpretation of a primacy of American power in defining the US-Italian relationship. 
As Harper argues, “what the cold warriors of 1947-8 conceived as an alliance for 
progress with the Italian people was only the latest marriage of convenience for the 
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predominant political class.”176 Since the priority of the Catholic party was the creation 
of a political space for its authority, the US became a significant asset in contributing 
to securing that space of authority from 1947 through the 1950s.The interesting point 
is that by supporting the DC, the US lost its already weak control over Italian economic 
and political forces to the Italian conservative party. The conservative party became 
even more conscious of both its autonomy and its indispensability for the US177. By 
being the only political alternative to Communism in the country and the only reliable 
interlocutor Washington had in Italy, the DC could not be easily replaced.   
 
The Economic Question in the Early Post-War. 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, Italian economy was in deep distress. Compared to 
other European countries, only a small percentage of Italian industrial plants were 
damaged by the war. Nevertheless, communication systems and transportation 
networks were shattered; forty per cent of the pre-war railroad network was unusable 
and Italy had to deal with the massive wreckage of bridges, roads, and hydroelectric 
systems. Despite the end of hostilities brought forth widespread feelings of hope for a 
prompt renewal of the country and its institutions, in the aftermath of the conflict the 
State was on the edge of bankruptcy; the country was hit by high inflation also caused 
by the issuing of AM-Lire, the currency the Allied Military Government for Occupied 
Territories (AMGOT-AMG) had put in circulation during the occupation; the rate of 
                                                             
176 J L Harper, American and the Reconstruction of Italy, 1945-1948, First Pape (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 166. 
177 Idem, 160. 
130 
 
unemployment was over 2 million; the standard of living instead was far lower than 
other European countries.  
Besides material devastations and the financial chaos caused by the war, long-lasting 
socio-economic issues that had existed since the foundation of the Kingdom of Italy 
in 1861 remained unsolved. Social inequalities, political corruption, class conflicts 
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the impoverishment of the masses, and the 
high illiteracy rate, all factors that had facilitated the rise of the Fascist regime, were a 
constant remainder of Italian failed transition to democracy. Furthermore, the vast 
differences in terms of regional wealth, education and infrastructures that divided the 
country appeared to be even more evident in the aftermath of World War II. The 
economic and social disequilibrium between northern and southern regions grew even 
wider due to the different impact the course of the war had had in those regions. 
Compared to the rest of the country, the Italian South had always been poorer and less 
developed. While in the North there was a more or less functioning industrial network 
that survived thanks to the resistance movement, in the under-industrialized southern 
regions the massive damaged caused by the war and the occupation aggravated the 
structural problems of the backward agriculture system. Due to a skyrocketing 
unemployment rate, a great number of southern Italians decided to migrate northwards. 
For those who chose to stay, the situation appeared quite depressing. The persistence 
of latifondi with its system of privileges that had characterized Italy for centuries 
aggravated the tensions between local peasants and landowners, leading to the 
occupation of lands and the increase of radical protests and clashes.  
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In the meantime, the recourse to another kind of violence of partisan nature brought 
terror to the northern regions. Moved by the revolutionary spirit of the Resistance, the 
most radical factions of ex partisans resorted to extreme actions to dismantle the Italian 
bourgeois system, its clerical tradition and its fascist debris. The most gruesome events 
took place in Emilia, more precisely in specific rural areas that would become 
infamously known as the Triangle of Death178, where nearly three thousand people 
would be executed from 1945 to 1947. Social instabilities and violent outbreaks 
aggravated the precarious economic condition of the country with businesses 
renouncing to undertake investments and industrialists, entrepreneurs, and financers 
threatening massive capital outflows that could paralyse Italian economy.  
Furthermore, structural problems such as the scarcity of natural resources and the lack 
of deposits of coal and metallic minerals were seen as a major impediment to Italian 
recovery and its industrial capacity179. While Italy had relied on German and British 
coal before the war, in 1945 neither country was exporting. Italians had to secure raw 
materials by looking for other external producers. However, the state lacked monetary 
capacity for importing goods and resources. To revive internal production and increase 
exports, Italy required external financial assistance.  
In the aftermath of the conflict, the United States appeared to be the only external actor 
that could offer economic assistance to Italy. Since July 1945, the overseas power 
began to pour money into Europe through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA). This was an international relief agency founded in 1943 
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with the mission to help those invaded countries whose resources had been depleted 
and lacked foreign exchange to pay for importing the necessary supplies. However, in 
the early phase of post-war reconstruction Italy was not on top of Washington’s 
priority list. The US congress was reluctant to send extensive economic and financial 
aid to the Latin country. As an ex-enemy, the Peninsula was not initially entitled to 
UNRRA aid.  
Fearing to recreate the same social and economic conditions that had led to the 
explosive popular outcry on the early 1920s that eventually facilitated Mussolini’s 
access to power, Italy with its autarkic past required attention as a matter of principle. 
There was a widespread belief that the massive economic dislocation the country was 
experiencing in the aftermath of World War II could be a fertile breeding ground for 
the rise of a new totalitarian or authoritarian regime. Furthermore, the critical 
conditions the population was enduring could lead to violence and anarchy and, 
therefore, worsening the already unstable situation. The consequences for the whole 
Europe would be fearful. Therefore, despite the initial reluctance, a limited UNRRA 
relief plan for the country was approved in mid-1945 and eventually extended in 1946.  
Much of the money was used to provide the local population with food, shelter and 
medical supplies. Despite crucial, this intervention offered only a short-term solution 
for an immediate relief for the population to overcome the dramatic times, but it was 
not enough to secure a long-term stability of Italian economy. As an UNRRA poster 
made clear “UNRRA can only lay the foundations for the reconstruction of Italy, and 
provide temporary aid. THE REST FALLS TO THE ITALIAN PEOPLE- THAT IS 
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TO EACH OF YOU.” 180  Getting Italy back on its feet was therefore Italians’ 
responsibility.  
According to the United States, the first step towards Italian stability rested on the 
establishment of a political coalition built around the anti-Fascist tenet. Only through 
the formation of a united and legitimised front Italy could plan and coordinate an 
effective political and economic reconstruction while avoiding the spread of anarchy 
and chaos within the country. Differently from their British ally, the US was less 
interested in the monarchical question and immediately displayed its support to the 
Italian anti-Fascist ruling class.  
Because in the early post-war anti-Communism was not the priority of US foreign 
policy towards Italy, the State Department welcomed both the establishment of the 
government coalition, which included the PCI, and the reorganization of the Italian 
federation of labours, CGIL, largely believed to be an extension of the Communist 
party. These two bodies were initially seen as positive forces that could help 
maintaining the order and preventing social, political and economic chaos. Stability, 
therefore, was the key for an American approach to Italian reconstruction up until 1947.  
After receiving official diplomatic recognition in September 1944, the newly created 
Italian government was given substantial autonomy on domestic affairs. Except on a 
few sporadic occasions such as the schedule of national and administrative elections, 
the referendum issue, and the role of the constituent assembly, the US did not openly 
intervene on Italian matters. Initially, the American economic intervention to foster 
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Italian recovery was possibly perceived as a mere public recognition of the country as 
part of the West but not as a thorough attempt to effectively reconstruct the country. 
While the anti-Fascist institutional façade of post-war Italy gave the semblance of 
political order, the deterioration of social and economic contexts concerned the US. 
Nevertheless, no specific economic measures were provided until the signing of the 
Marshall Plan in July 1948.  
While Washington formally withdrew from intervening, the US tried to establish a 
form of indirect control through the activities of mid-level officials, labor unionists 
and diplomats. 181  Among the others, the American Embassy and the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) operated as mediators between Washington and Rome by 
establishing close ties with right-wing Socialists and Christian democrats as well as 
influential non-governmental economic actors. The main objective was to convince 
the Italian political class to implement an American approach to the Italian 
reconstruction. The AFL leader Luigi Antonini, who in 1944 had been sent to Italy to 
reform the trade union movement, described the post-war situation as critical. 
Unemployment, delinquency, poor conditions and social tensions were holding Italy 
back from reaching stability.  
In the early phase of post-war reconstruction, however, Americans had positive 
feelings about the leading elite’s ability to solve the economic crisis. Without exerting 
direct control on the Italian decisional dynamics, the US kept on offering suggestions 
to the political class. According to some American analysts, a policy plan constructed 
on classical economic tenets represented the best strategy for stabilizing Italian 
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economy.  They suggested to the Italian government to promote multi-lateral free trade, 
currency convertibility, the end of protectionist policy and the removal of the state 
from the economic sphere. On July 1945 Undersecretary to Foreign Affairs William 
Clayton asked the American embassy to Rome to encourage the Italian government to 
dismantle bilateral commercial agreements and trade barriers in order to facilitate 
Italian integration in global economy 182 . Other economic experts were instead 
convinced that deficit spending and social liberalism would facilitate Italian recovery 
and would create employment, distribute income, while promoting social and political 
reforms. Furthermore, Italian leading forces were given the advice that, in order to 
finalize Italian economic recovery, the production capacity had to be restored, the 
unemployment crisis solved, the internal monetary situation stabilized, industrial 
plants and infrastructures that had been damaged during the conflict had to be rebuilt 
and a solution had to be found to the Mezzogiorno question.  
The implementation of these policies depended not so much on Washington’s pressure 
but in large part on the decision of the Italian political class to implement them. The 
main problem, however, was that the US relied on a political class that, instead of 
prioritizing an effective economic plan, was seeking to secure its own power within 
the political establishment. Instead of addressing the economic issue, up until late 1946 
the Italian government proved more concerned on promoting a political reconstruction 
of the country and its institutional renewal. Social and economic reforms were initially 
put aside in the attempt to avoid instabilities within the political establishment due to 
political parties’ different economic and social agendas. Beside this, another pivotal 
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reason that led parties’ leaders to prioritize political instead of economic reconstruction 
was linked to the widespread feeling of electoral insecurity within political circles and 
the strategy of consensus building to counteract it.  
The delay in effectively addressing the daunting economic questions had the 
unfortunate consequence of driving the country into a financial and economic chaos. 
In late 1946 the situation appeared to be beyond control. The Lira’s free market value 
felt from 528 to 909 per dollar. Popular discontent drastically increased due to poor 
working conditions, the lack of social justice and labour rights led to massive mass 
protests that broke out in many Italian cities. In response to social agitations, the most 
conservative groups and the Italian capitalist class eventually increased pressure on 
the government to halt social unrest by regaining control of the “revolutionary” 
working class. Industrialists, entrepreneurs, and financers threatened massive capital 
outflows and renunciation to undertake investments unless the PCI would be removed 
from the cabinet.  
In this context of great instability, local Mafiosi added more fuel to the fire.  In the 
absence of the State, these outlaws made major inroads within the population and 
exerted their powers through the recourse to violent actions against Communist and 
Socialist members and supporters. Violent retaliations in the South due to the 
increasing support to Left-wing parties culminated with the massacre at Portella delle 
Ginestre, Sicily, on May 1, 1947. Eleven people were killed at the hand of Salvatore 
Giuliano and his band days after the victory of the Blocco del Popolo, the PCI-PSI 
coalition, for the regional election in Sicily. Fear of a possible socio-political and 
economic collapse of the system was widespread. In response to social unrest, State 
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repressions increased, especially following Mario Scelba’s appointment to the 
Ministry of Interior in February 1947.  
The government coalition became the target of fierce criticism inside and outside the 
country for its inability to solve the economic crisis and to effectively reconstruct the 
country. Among the most conservative Catholic circles and the economic right, the DC 
collaboration with the PCI and PSI became a matter of great concern. The presence of 
what De Gasperi named ‘the fourth party’183 exacerbated the situation and the pressure 
it exerted on the DC ended up representing a primary factor that led to the political 
crisis and the eventual ousting of the leftist parties from the cabinet. The term fourth 
party was a metaphoric expression used to define the political influence of non-
political economic forces able to paralyze Italian recovery by threatening loan 
sabotages, massive capital outflows, renunciation to undertake investments, as well as 
promoting libellous campaigns184. The “blackmailing powers” of the economic and 
financial elites caused a widespread fear of a possible socio-political and economic 
collapse of the system185.  
Social and political tensions put some constraints on the government and led the DC 
to accept the idea that without solving the economic crisis the political legitimacy of 
the government would be jeopardized. The regional elections in 1946-7 showed a 
decrease of electoral support to the DC especially in the South. In Sicily vote for the 
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Catholic party dropped from thirty-three per cent to twenty per cent186. Moderate 
segments of the working class that had initially perceived the DC as a progressive party 
begun to withdraw their support to the conservative party in favour of either Left wing 
parties or the right-wing populist and anti-Communist party L’Uomo Qualunque (The 
Common Men).  
With national elections approaching in April 1948, the Prime Minister had to secure 
its political authority to impede a further drop of electoral consensus. When it became 
clear that there was no possibility for maintaining political hegemony without 
addressing Italian economic and industrial issues, De Gasperi turned to the Italian 
capitalist class seeking political support and collaboration of the entrepreneurial 
class.187 Establishing hegemony among this economic group was not an easy task. Big 
businesses, entrepreneurs, bankers, and industrialists had openly declared their 
dissatisfaction towards the Catholic party and its ambiguous agenda. To overcome this 
impasse, De Gasperi strategically established close ties with well-respected Liberal 
economists, whose positions on economic policy were largely accepted among the 
capitalist class.  
The Christian Democrat leader, however, had to acknowledge that an economic 
reconstruction without external aid was very unlikely to happen. The United States 
appeared to be the only economic power that could assist the country in its path 
towards recovery. When in November 1946 the Republicans won the midterm 
elections and took control of the House of Representatives, the prospect of a Congress’ 
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refusal of an economic and financial commitment abroad speeded up the Italian ruling 
elite’s intention to establish close ties with Washington. Furthermore, UNRRA founds 
were about to come to an end and Italy was in desperate needs of external economic 
aid.  
Despite the fact that an external economic assistance was vital for the country, the 
primary reason that led the Gasperi to reach out to Washington was linked to the loss 
of his party’s political consent. When the Prime Minister finally came to terms with 
the idea that the political legitimacy of his party largely depended on finding a viable 
solution to the economic crisis, he conveyed his energies and used its personal 
networks within and outside the country to secure the US political and economic 
support to his party. Ironically, the US would become relevant at the time the DC faced 
a political challenge to retain its authority rather than simply for economic reasons. By 
the late 1946, De Gasperi sought to convince Washington to revaluate its approach 
towards Italy from an indirect to a more direct form of intervention.  
 
The United States and Christian Democracy in the Early Cold War. 
 
In order for the US to directly intervene in the country a major issue had to be solved: 
the lack of a political interlocutor. The very nature of the Italian government coalition 
with its ideologically divided political parties represented an impasse for the 
promotion of an effective economic recovery according to American plans. First of all, 
political parties’ inability to overcome divisions due to different economic and social 
agendas impeded to reach agreements on economic policy. Secondly, concerns about 
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the Italian economic status shifted Americans’ intentions from an indirect to a more 
direct form of control, the absence of a major political interlocutor in the political 
system further delayed the US involvement in the Italian recovery process.  As Romero 
argues, without a political counterpart with whom starting a productive dialogue on 
reconstruction, there was no chance for Italy to obtain substantial economic aid and 
political support from Washington188.  
In the early post-war, when anti-Communism was not the central tenet of US foreign 
policy towards Italy, American officials believed that Italian successful transition to 
democracy depended on the victory of a social democratic front. According to many, 
a lay party similar to the Labor Party in UK would represent the best option for a 
political and economic recovery of the country. American trade unionists, mid-level 
politicians and diplomats expressed their support to the right-wing faction of the Italian 
socialist party and since the Armistice declaration in 1943 began actively supporting 
the socialist leader Giuseppe Saragat. Even though in the final stage of the war and the 
early reconstruction period the State Department was more concern on a united anti-
Fascist front and eventually stability rather than anti-Communism, Americans 
individuals with close connections in the Italian political system mobilised to urge 
right-wing socialists to break away from Pietro Nenni’s party, the PSI, which held to 
the wartime pact of unity with the communists. The Italian American Labor Council 
(IALC), founded in New York in 1941 under the leadership of the AFL’s delegate 
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Antonini, actively promoted and financed a split within the Socialist party by seeking 
to establish a political leftists alternative to the Communism party.189  
When the break eventually occurred in January 1947 with right-wing socialists leaving 
the PSI, the outcome was unsatisfying. If, on the one hand, Saragat’s new party, the 
PSLI (Partito Socialista dei Lavoratori Italiani), was too weak and divided into 
different factions to represent an alternative to the PCI, on the other hand, the PSI 
seemed not inclined to break the pact of unity with the communists and re-join the 
secessionist group. Therefore, the US turned to the most tenacious anti-Communist 
political actor: the DC.  
Despite the shared anti-Communist interest, this convergence did not eradicate all 
American doubts about establishing an alliance with the Catholic party. The close ties 
between the DC and the Vatican, for instance, raised great concerns in Washington. 
State department officials were worried that an excessive Church involvement in 
Italian politics could have played into the hands of the PCI “by pushing disillusioned 
anti-clerical and secular forces towards the left, alienating key groups on which US 
reconstruction and reform programs relied.”190 However, the disappointing results of 
the 1946 local elections that showed an increasing support to the PCI and PSI required 
an immediate intervention and support to the only effective anti-Communist force.  
The declining support for the DC also allowed a further convergence between US-mid 
level officials, De Gasperi and his party, and non-state actors all willing to halt the PCI 
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increasing electoral success191. The diplomatic efforts of the two ambassadors, Alberto 
Tarchiani and James Clement Dunn, proved pivotal for an improvement of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries by filling the communication vacuum between the 
two governments as well as by influencing public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Thanks to their mediations, Washington would be soon led to believe that both De 
Gasperi and his cabinet could be trusted. The Italian ambassador to the US, for instance, 
constantly praised De Gasperi’s leadership, identifying him as the most able politician 
among the anti-Communist moderate forces. Furthermore, to clear the Prime 
Minister’s doubts of a possible infringement of Italian sovereignty, Tarchiani 
reassured the DC by claiming that a US-Italian alliance was not only fruitful for 
economic purposes but also for fostering the DC’s political objectives192. Through this 
alliance the Catholic Party could strengthen its authority within the national political 
system and the international community.  
However, it was De Gasperi who played a central role in improving US-Italian relation 
managing to present himself as a reliable interlocutor for the US. The catalyst was his 
journey to the US in January 1947. To solve the economic crisis and political 
uncertainties, the DC Prime Minister accepted the invitation by the American magnate 
Henry Luce to attend an international conference held in Cleveland. Walter Dowling, 
the State Department Italian desk officer, had forwarded news about this conference 
to De Gasperi’s secretary noting that this was an “excellent medium” to present the 
Italian case before influential American figures such as Republican Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg, John Forrestal and George Marshall, and Secretary of State James 
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Byrnes193. De Gasperi saw in this journey the chance to get economic and material aid 
from the US, to convince the Export-Import Bank to offer a loan to Italy, but, above 
all, to receive political support to his party.  
Once in Washington, De Gasperi met with the Secretary of State James Byrnes and 
eventually with President Truman. Unable to present a coherent economic strategy to 
reconstruct the country194, the Italian Prime Minister tried to obtain the US support by 
exploiting the American anti-Communist fear as leverage.  He described the Italian 
situation as on the verge of a collapse strategically blaming Italian “radical” groups as 
the major obstacle to carry out an effective reconstruction of the country. “The greatest 
political pressure,” he reported to Byrnes, “was being brought at this time by the 
Communist Party to bring Italy within the orbit of Russian influence.” 195 In order to 
face this threat, some help was required especially considering the economic crisis 
Italy was facing.  
The trip to the US would help secure a 100 million dollars loan from the Export-Import 
Bank and 50 million dollars payments related to the wartime occupation.196 However, 
despite the fact that many DC politicians considered this loan inadequate, it was more 
important for its symbolic meaning than for its economic benefits. It eventually 
allowed De Gasperi to obtain the American political support to his party197 and it 
would help him securing its authority within the country. Thanks also to the media 
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campaign led by some American journalists and correspondents as Anne O’Hare 
McCormick, Sumner Welles, Stuart Alsop and Walter Lippmann De Gasperi’s ten-
day tour, which was described as a media “triumph”, made him the perfect 
interlocutor.198  
This journey has engendered an historical debate among scholars. There is a tendency 
to identify this event as the central cause of the political crisis that led to the ousting 
of the PCI from the cabinet.  Scholars tend to imply that either Truman asked the Italian 
Prime Minister for the exclusion of the communists as a prerequisite for American 
economic and financial aid or that De Gasperi promised to expel the Left from the 
coalition. However there is no evidence proving these theories. Whether it was the 
Italian Prime Minister or the American President to first introduce the problematic 
issue of the Italian Communist party’s inclusion in the government coalition is not of 
interest here. The interesting point is that the nature of this alliance was due to the 
convergence of both countries’ anti-Communism.  
By choosing anti-Communism as the new legitimizing ideology, De Gasperi would 
obtain political leverage to strengthen his power both within the Italian political 
establishment as well as in the transatlantic relation. Even though this journey to the 
US was not the cause that led to the political crisis, it soon became the expedient that 
could eventually allow the DC leader to remove the Left from the cabinet. De Gasperi 
The strategy of incoming US-aid was used to reassure the Italian masses during a 
period of great political, economic and social instability and to isolate both the PCI 
and PSI. Despite the fact that there is no evidence proving that Truman openly 
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demanded the Communists exclusion as a prerequisite for receiving American 
economic aid, the Catholic party strategically published a list of such “demands.” 199 
It was a shrewd manoeuvre designed to convince the Italian public that the Communist 
exclusion was the only effective key to obtain America’s aid.  
It took few months, however, for De Gasperi to eventually oust the PCI and PSI from 
the cabinet. Nevertheless, once back from the US the DC leader started removing 
communists and socialists out of sensitive posts and placed Carlo Sforza in the foreign 
office and Scelba at the interior.200 The former was a noted anti-monarchist who spent 
the early years of the war in the US where he established close ties with State 
Department officials. The latter was an Italian Christian Democrats politician known 
for his anti-Communism often referred to as the “Iron Sicilian” for his ruthless 
suppression of left-wing protests and workers’ strikes.  
After signing the Art. 7, which recognize the Lateran Pacts of 1929 and guaranteed the 
special status given to the Catholic Church in Italian society, and the signing of the 
Paris Peace treaty, the need for a political alliance with the PCI came to an end. 
Furthermore, with the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 De Gasperi 
made a forced comparison between the Greek and the Italian case. The US anti-
Communist approach to Italy was then made more explicit and De Gasperi, who gained 
internal and external credibility since the journey to the US, was now ready to move. 
Encouraged by the news that the communists had been expelled from the French and 
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Belgian government without producing any serious repercussions, De Gasperi finally 
decided to act by ousting the leftist parties from his government on May 31, 1947.  
 
The Evolution of US-Italian Relations in the post-1947. 
 
Besides the ousting of the Communists from the cabinet in May 1947, the appointment 
of liberal economists was seen as an indicator of Italian final acceptance to take into 
great consideration America’s advice for an economic reconstruction of the country. 
Unsurprisingly, Washington expressed its satisfaction for the political change and in 
particular for the appointment of Luigi Einaudi as Budget Minister. The establishment 
of an alliance with an anti-Communist political party that could count on the support 
of liberal economists, middle-class forces and entrepreneurial groups was seen as a 
guarantee to American interests in the Mediterranean201. Furthermore, Washington 
was led to believe that the PCI had represented the major obstacle for Italian economic 
paralysis. Now that the threat was removed, the Americans were optimistic about a 
rapid recovery of Italian economy according to US approach and within the framework 
of the European Recovery Plan. Furthermore, with the PCI out of the game, 
Washington was convinced that it would be able to exert remarkable pressure on the 
Italian government and play a preponderant role in the Italian reconstruction. 
Days after the establishment of the new cabinet, Secretary of State George Marshall 
delivered a speech at Harvard University in which he outlined the need for an 
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economic aid plan for the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe. Despite 
the fact that the US would give financial aid, the responsibility to rehabilitate each 
country’s economy rested on the states with each economic plan to be drawn up by a 
European government and, eventually, to be approved by the US.   
To grant its approval, Washington informed the Italian government through its 
embassy in Rome that the precondition for sending economic and financial subsidies 
rested on Italians’ responsibility to take some resolute measures to stabilize currency 
and to reduce inflationary pressures. Luigi Einaudi, the newly appointed minister of 
the Budget, started its anti-inflationary battle. The so called «Einaudi line» consisted 
in a deflationary stabilization plan reducing money supply and imposing restriction on 
bank credits. The result was immediate, with inflation rates slowing down and the 
severe foreign exchange crisis brought under control202.  
Stability, however, was not the only preconditions set by Washington. The DC 
government was also expected to reform Italian society by tackling unemployment and 
improving Italians’ living standards. Once again, the DC would begin to act 
independently from the US. Einaudi refused to apply any policy of deficit spending or 
wage growth rather aiming to saving private investment restocking through balance 
readjustment and cutting state subsidies on prices.203 Furthermore, its credit restriction 
plan hit small and medium-size businesses severely, with a decline in investments and 
a halt in industrial productivity. The consequences of his policy led to unemployment 
increase, social tensions, and productive reconstruction paralysis. The United States 
                                                             
202 P Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988 (St. Martin’s 
Press, 2003), 113. 
203 C Spagnolo, La Stabilizzazione Incompiuta. Il Piano Marshall in Italia (1947-1952) (Roma: 
Carocci, 2001), 89–92. 
148 
 
was deeply concerned about the political consequences of this stabilization policy, 
especially with national election approaching in April 1948.204 
Even though not all the conditions set by the Americans were reached, the urgency to 
defeat the PCI in the national election convinced President Truman to hasten the ERP 
bill through Congress in order to be signed before the vote205. The priority given to 
anti-Communism allowed the DC not to deal with American requests while still 
emphasising Italian need for US support and assistance in politically defeating the PCI.  
With the approaching of the national election in April 1948 Washington began to fear 
the possibility of a communist access to power. In a CIA report in March 1948, the 
Agency noted that it would have been “the first actual extension of Communist (Soviet) 
territorial control (except in China)”since the end of the war and “the first instance in 
history of a communist accession to power by popular suffrage and legal means”206. 
Besides authorizing a series of covert-overt actions to impede a Communist electoral 
success, which would be analysed in the next chapter, during the last week of the 
electoral campaign, the US publicised the imminent arrival of Marshall Plan aid to 
Italy, aids that would have been cancelled in case of an electoral success of the Italian 
communist party.  
When the day of the election came, the Left was defeated and the DC obtained an 
absolute majority in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. After the electoral 
success, Washington welcomed the newly established government led by De Gasperi 
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and Ambassador James Dunn expressed the beliefs that both American and Italian 
interests would benefit from it. According to him, this political change would lead Italy 
towards “economic and institutional reforms necessary to modernize and democratize 
the country”207 as well as a final ideological defeat of Communism. 
However, if the Americans thought that this new US-Italian alliance would allow 
Washington to play a major role in Italian reconstruction they would be soon proved 
wrong. The DC continued instead to pursue an independent or at least autonomous 
agenda. Despite Washington’s requests to use the ERP aid to increase productive 
investments, to absorb unemployment, to promote a vast land reform in the South, as 
well as to increase productive efficiency and labour productivity in Italian industry, 
Italians seemed reluctant to follow this advice. Instead, the Italian government kept 
production growth slow and employment level down, pursuing economic policies 
aimed at recovering public budget and curb inflation208. A large part of the Marshall 
Plan funding was also used to build up the Banca d’Italia reserves, against the 
objections of the ERP 209 . Tensions emerged on issues such as agricultural and 
industrial productivity, new management methods and technologies, apolitical and 
corporative trade unions, land reforms, private and public monopolies, and the 
antiquated financial system 210 . The American plans for transforming the socio-
economic and political structure of the country clashed with the DC intent to pursue 
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stability and the restoration of order, rejecting any radical transformation of the 
structure of the country. The Italian government chose to promote a more conservative 
economic policy that could safeguard the economic right and the conservative 
electorate’s interests211.  
The priority for the Catholic party was to consolidate its own networks and, despite 
the economic assistance was vital, the DC’s priority still remained politics. The 
effectiveness of an American direct approach towards Italy did not automatically mean 
the US would be free to exert its will. Even though the US wanted the implementation 
of reforms, the final decision rested in the hands of those Italian actors who had the 
construction of a political hegemony as the primary objective. This priority did not fit 
with Washington’s vision of a proper economic reconstruction.  
The reluctance to follow the US advice and to promote social and economic reforms 
was interpreted in Washington as further proof of the DC passive conservatism. The 
Italian party, however, considered this conservative approach necessary to stabilize 
social alliances at the base of DC government. In particular, it was meant to build a 
hegemonic social block composed of the middle-class that could give the DC political 
legitimacy 212 . De Gasperi continued in pursuing his own fundamental objective 
namely the consolidation of networks of alliances that could secure him and his 
political party’s power within the country.  
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Despite frustration, the American government continued to politically and financially 
support the DC to ensure the country would remain anti-Communist. The priority 
given to reduce the Communist political influence within the country gradually led 
Washington to adapt its foreign policy agenda towards the country. According to 
Giulio Sapelli, in the Italian case, economic policies deviation from Keynesian line 
was barter with a strong control with anti-Communist function.213 As Harper argues, 
“Once committed to the DC-led alliance, the United States would fall prey to the 
dilemmas inherent in the complex relationship of a great power to a smaller local client. 
Events would be determined less by the architects of the Marshall plan than by factors 
essentially beyond the American executive’s control: Congress, objective economic 
circumstances, and, above all, by the Italian political forces themselves.”214 No matter 
how powerful the US was, by being the only effective anti-Communist political actor 
the DC could not be easily substituted. De Gasperi’s refusal to outlaw the Communist 
party as the US repeatedly asked for, allowed him to obtain great leverage in the 
negotiation with the American ally.  
 
Conclusion.  
 
In less than ten years since the 1948 election Italy would undergo a series of major 
changes. In 1949 it became a founding member of the NATO, in 1955 a member of 
the United Nations, in 1952 a founding member of the ECSC and of the European 
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Economic Community in 1957. In the 1950s Italy revived its economy, which led to 
an impressive economic growth dubbed the “Economic Miracle” that unfortunately 
widened the economic gap between the wealthy and the poor classes. Despite America 
contributing greatly to the economic growth of the country and facilitating the 
establishment and maintenance of a centrist government that prevented a communist 
political success, relations between the two countries did not seem to ameliorate. Initial 
optimism gradually vanished as Americans became more and more frustrated over the 
DC’s pursuit of independent objectives as well as the unsuccessful attempt to make 
transatlantic anti-Communism as a new form of collective identity.  
The failure in reducing the appeal of the PCI was considered as a consequence of the 
Italian government passivity to act as an anti-Communist force. In a letter to 
Ambassador Luce, Eisenhower complained about the Italian case. As he wrote: 
 
 “It seems strange that among all the states in which we opposed 
communism, we had less results in Italy than in any other country. 
The whole area of Western Europe, including Italy, has experienced 
a high economic growth in recent years and this is especially due to 
the American help. However, each new report from Italy gives 
evidence of a growing resentment towards us, and an increased 
respect for the Soviets. [...] So, while I recognize your argument, 
namely that the United States should interest more about Italy, I also 
believe that the greatest responsibility belongs to the leaders of those 
countries.”215   
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The main problem was that the alliance was never meant to be an invitation to the US 
to paly a major role in Italian political and social reconstruction. According to Del 
Pero, the so-called phase of  “invitation” had ended once Italy received the guaranteed 
of Marshall plan aid. De Gasperi and his party began resisting to American pressures 
knowing that Washington needed a political interlocutor to pursue anti-Communist 
policy within the country. Aware that the Communist presence represented the only 
guarantee for economic aid, external security, and the US political support to the 
Christian Democrats, De Gasperi strategically oppose any internal or external requests 
to outlaw the PCI.216 Eventually, what took place in Italy was a strategic co-optation 
of US money, its influence and networks in order for the Catholic party and its leader 
to obtain credibility.  
With the DC electoral success the US lost its already weak control over Italian 
economic and political forces to the Italian conservative party. The conservative party 
became even more conscious of both its autonomy and its indispensability for the 
US217. By being the only political alternative to Communism in the country and the 
only reliable interlocutor Washington had in Italy, the DC could not be easily replaced. 
Eventually, it was De Gasperi and not Truman who played a pivotal role in US-Italian 
relation. Up until when Italy would receive economic aid or the international 
conditions would allow it, the Italians would be the one setting the terms for an Italian-
American agenda. No matter how useful the US intervention in favour of the DC was; 
Washington could not dictate its own will due to the fact that Cold War dynamics had 
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the effect of solidifying the DC position as the only powerful anti-Communist political 
force.  
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-CH. V- 
THE US SOFT POWER AND THE ITALIAN POLITICAL CULTURE. 
 
 
While seeking to foster an effective recovery of Italian economy and to establish close 
ties with anti-Communist forces within the political establishment, the United States 
recognized the need for transforming Italians’ political culture through a process of 
Americanization of the whole society. As highlighted by the American diplomat 
George Kennan in his famous Long Telegram, it was largely believed that the 
Communist menace could be resisted by publicly exposing the realities of the Soviet 
situation and by educating the population about the benefits of the American system 
and its Way of Life218. American culture was therefore deployed in a transnational 
attempt to influence the Italian public opinion and teach Italians about the uniqueness 
of America and the desirability of its economic, political, social and cultural system.  
Americans were also becoming more and more concerned about widespread feelings 
of hostility and distrust towards their country219. This negative attitude towards the 
Western Power was mainly caused by deeply rooted stereotypes and misconceptions 
about America and its people220. Washington, therefore, authorized the recourse to 
covert-overt operations to promote a better understanding of the American modus 
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vivendi abroad221. In January 1948 the US Congress passed the US Information and 
Educational Exchange Act, also known as Smith-Mundt Act, a bill that clarify the 
terms in which the US government could engage in public diplomacy. Radio 
broadcasts, films, posters, cultural exchanges and educational programs all became 
powerful instruments to shape Italians’ perceptions and manoeuvre the public opinion 
to create a friendly and healthy environment in which the United States could exert an 
indirect pressure on governments and their political agendas. As part of a broad process 
in which people around the globe were slowly and gradually led to identify with the 
Western Power, cultural diplomacy was meant to enhance the image of the United 
States abroad as well as to influence ideas and beliefs among specific segments of 
society to transform the political culture of those selected groups. 
Despite the US could exert some pressure that could led to a change of the Italian 
political culture this could not take place without a series of negotiations and 
mediations with local actors. The Americans had to adapt their objectives to the 
national context in which they chose to intervene and its challenges. In Italy, when the 
US intervened in the April 1948 national election, Washington had to rely on anti-
Communist forces that had been active in the political and social fight against the PCI. 
These actors were deeply rooted in the Italian society and despite being non-
governmental forces they operated as powerful political and social actors. The 
influence and experience of the Catholic Church and its organizations, for example, 
was used by the US to advance its position within the Italian society and achieved their 
anti-Communist intent. However, the establishment of this conditional alliance 
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between Washington and the Vatican had some unfortunate consequences. Instead of 
Americanizing the masses and leading Italians to accept a transnational anti-
Communism as a new form of collective identity, the US intervention in support of the 
DC strengthened the influence of the Church within society and Catholicism became 
a strong form of identity.  
While seeking to transform the catholic masses, the United States also attempted to 
change the political culture of the working class by taking control of the labour unions 
away from the PCI.222 As discussed in the previous chapter, the USA through the 
American Federation of Labor initially campaigned for the establishment of a non-
political trade union. This would be revealed soon to be practically impossible for a 
country in which ideology and politics were so deeply interwoven and embedded in 
all strata of society. Americans had, therefore, to change their tactics and they began 
supporting a split within the CGIL. When this happened, the formation of two separate 
trade unions, the catholic CISL and the social democrat UIL, were not powerful 
enough to neutralise the Communist influence within the working class. Despite the 
US pressured both organizations to merge the unification never took place. The 
socialists’ hostility towards the Catholic Church and the DC’s distrust towards the Left 
proved much stronger than the lure of American dollars.  
One of the major flaws of US public diplomacy was that it was based on the 
assumption that, once understood the American Way Life, people around the world 
would be more than willing to adopt the US system, its culture and its values. This was 
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not the case for the Italian population. Despite the large dissemination of American 
cultural products, Italians always showed some resistance to the process of 
Americanization. The transnational attempt to sell the American modus vivendi faced 
the challenge of the Italian cultural and social barriers. 
 
Selling the American Way of Life in Italy. 
 
Even though the US State Department had traditionally being reluctant on relying on 
propaganda and psychological weapons, in the aftermath of WWII these became 
indispensable assets of American foreign policy for waging a global and total war.223 
Washington’s concerns about the expansionist aims of the Soviet Union escalated after 
George Kennan, the American Diplomat stationed at the US embassy in Moscow, sent 
to the State Department what it would become known as the Long Telegram. The top-
secret document was cabled in response to the election meeting speech delivered by 
Stalin at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow in February 1946. The analysis produced took 
the form of a lengthy and detailed memorandum in which Kennan outlined his views 
of the USSR and its foreign policy. After denouncing the aggressive behaviour of the 
Soviets, he advocated the US government to mobilize and prevent the spread of 
Communism beyond the Iron Curtain through a long-term, patient, but firm, 
containment of Soviet expansionism. Disillusioned by American policy of 
appeasement, Kennan tried to persuade the US government to abandon any plans for 
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cooperation with the Soviets and to pursue a sphere of influence policy in Western 
Europe. If the Soviet menace was to be halted, the US had to play a much more active 
role in world affairs. According to him, Washington should mobilize to protect those 
areas of vital strategic importance to the US against the spread of the Communist 
menace. This strategy would become known as “policy of containment”.  
Despite the seriousness of the situation, Kennan believed that the Soviet threat could 
be removed without the recourse to a military conflict. A major challenge to the 
survival of Capitalism was coming from within the Capitalist world itself. Internal 
divisions, systemic flaws, as well as structural problems within the ‘Free World’ 
represented a source of vulnerability that would have played into the hands of the 
Soviets. Because, as Kennan claimed, “world communism is like malignant parasite 
which feeds only on diseased tissue”224, the US government had the responsibility of 
restoring European countries to an healthy condition and build a friendly and harmonic 
environment that would allow Capitalism to survive and flourish225. The first necessary 
step toward a final defeat of the USSR was the orchestration of a collective 
mobilization of state and non-state actors to solve internal problems and instabilities 
as well as to improve self-confidence and to boost community spirit in the West.  
Since the end of World War II, Americans had expressed some concerns about the 
reputation of the US abroad and the increasing manifestations of hostility and distrust 
among European countries towards the oversee power. Attitudes of enmity were badly 
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received and Europeans were often criticised for what the United States perceived as 
a lack of gratitude and appreciation towards the country that had brought them victory 
against the Nazis and Fascists. However, the self-proclaimed characterization as 
bastion of democracy and freedom seemed at odds with the ideas people in the Old 
World had of the US. As Richard Pells reports in his book Not Like US: How 
Europeans have loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War 
II, in the early post war American diplomats began travelling around Europe to 
evaluate the state of America’s post-war reputation. The results came as a surprise. 
Appalled by widespread feelings of distrust towards the US, these encounters also 
revealed deeply rooted misconceptions about America and its population226. Foreign 
public opinion tended to see the United States through deeply rooted stereotypes that 
had been formed in the early 19th century and persisted throughout the 20th. America 
was often described as vulgar, brutal, materialistic, and immoral. Many of these views 
were forged through Hollywood but also from accounts of fellow countrymen who had 
migrated to the US and complained about their social conditions and racist system. 
The average middleclass person tended to see Americans as uncivilised, dangerous 
and culturally illiterate. Intellectuals and the leading elites also shared the same 
misconceptions and used to criticise the cultural and social life of the overseas power. 
European intellectuals tended to view America with distrust and hostility. In particular, 
they criticised the advent of mass culture perceiving it as a menace to the Western 
culture. Mass culture represented for them a synonym of decay, vulgarity and 
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superficiality.227  Furthermore, the promotion and dissemination of American cultural 
products in the Old World was seen as a threat to the preservation of local traditions 
and moral values.  
With the beginning of the Cold War and the increasing support to Communism in the 
West, the US State Department recognized the necessity for promoting a better 
understanding of the American modus vivendi to make its system more desirable than 
the Soviet one. Building positive international relations and coalitions became 
fundamental for promoting American interests as well as for securing its hegemonic 
role in the Western hemisphere. In the attempt to ameliorate its image abroad, the US 
gave start to a massive psychological campaign meant to teach public opinion abroad 
about the uniqueness of the American system.  In January 1948 the US Congress 
passed the US Information and Educational Exchange Act, popularly referred to as 
Smith-Mundt Act. The purpose of this bill was to clarify the terms in which the US 
government could engage in public diplomacy. While various information activities 
were already in operation before the passing of the bill, such as Voice of America and 
the Fulbright Programs, this act made them permanent and extended them to a larger 
number of countries. As stated, the major objective was “to enable the Government of 
the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other 
countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United 
States and the people of other countries.” It provided for “an information service to 
disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people, and policies 
promulgated by the Congress, the President, the Secretary of State and other 
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responsible officials of Government having to do with matters affecting foreign 
affairs”228 This gave a legal authorization and financial support to overt information 
programs through press, publication, radio, motion pictures, information centres as 
well as cultural, educational and technical exchange programs.  
Through public diplomacy, the US sought to emphasize the uniqueness and the 
desirability of the American Way of Life as a universal claim. Despite its vagueness, 
the American modus vivendi was strictly connected to four fundamental principles 
such as liberal democracy, individual freedom, capitalist economy and modernity229. 
Furthermore, the constant representation through movies of the American Dream with 
its system of mass production and good wages was used to make the American Way 
of Life more desirable in the eyes of Europeans. 
Since the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, Italy had been flooded with propaganda 
aimed at selling the American model in order to convince Italians they could enjoy the 
same welfare and individual freedom as Americans did. The constantly evolving 
modern instruments and techniques of communication facilitated the dissemination of 
ideas allowing messages to reach geographically isolated areas and socially 
marginalized groups. Due to the high illiteracy rate in the country, the reliance on 
stamps, cartoons, posters, movies, radio programs and public events represented a 
great advantage for the promotion of the American Way of Life.230  
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Because of the invasive dissemination of US cultural products, scholars began to talk 
about cultural imperialism with US culture ending up representing the “dominant” one 
through a process of destruction, substitution or simply transformation of the “local” 
culture. As Victoria De Grazia argues in her book Irresistible Empire, after WWII the 
American presence became tangible in Italy thanks to the growth of mass culture, 
movies, and consumerism231. She explores the massive impact American products and 
images had on European societies, in particular in Germany, France and Italy. Through 
movies, the USA was depicted as a growing modern economy. The dissemination of 
US products in post-war Italy was massive and it operated through a series of 
institutions and cultural industries. In particular, the US reliance on movies seemed to 
be the most powerful and effective way to Americanize the Italian audience by 
influencing and shaping tastes, ideas, and belief. Due to the high illiteracy rate in post-
war Italy, movies represented powerful instruments even more than the radio, which 
not all Italian families could afford to buy. A very popular form of entertainment in 
the early post-war, it also allowed the Italian audience to overcome the traumatic 
experience of the war. While Italian neorealist films presented stories about the 
economic and moral difficulties of post-war Italy, American movies worked as a 
distraction from the everyday life and a chance for briefly forgetting about a reality 
made of poverty, destruction, violence and injustices. In 1949, for instance, 73 per cent 
of box-office takings were American movies. Italy became the most important market 
in Europe for the American Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA), with nearly 
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600 ﬁlms per year.232After that year this percentage would drop conspicuously and in 
1953 Hollywood would control less than 43 per cent while the local industry 
production would gradually increase. 233 
While relying on films to sell the American Way of Life in Italy, the US also invested 
on radio programs. The Voice Of America (VOA) was the official broadcasting body 
of the United States created with the purpose of disseminating news about America 
and the world abroad. Created in February 1942, soon after the US joined World War 
II, the VOA was part of the Office of War Information (OWI) and was meant to inform 
foreign audiences about the world conflict. After the end of hostilities its maintenance 
was under consideration. Even though the OWI was liquidated in August 1945, 
Truman, pressured by VOA staff and supporters in the Congress, decided to keep the 
program alive and its responsibilities were transferred to the State Department234. With 
the passing of the Smith-Mundt Act it was finally institutionalised. 
As historian Simona Tobia observes, VOA programs tended to emphasise American 
peaceful and unique nature. The United States was depicted as the cradle of democracy 
and freedom of thought. While the West Power was described in benevolent terms, the 
constant reference to the imperial and aggressive attitude of the Soviet Union was used 
to warn the European public opinion against the threats of Communism. Because the 
Western Way of Life was under attack by the East force, Europeans were asked to 
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mobilise against the expansionist aims of the Communist world in the name of freedom 
and democracy235.  
Italy had the highest quota of VOA radio broadcasts among US’ allies and, according 
to the first VOA director John Houseman, the Italian Desk was the third largest after 
the French and the German236 . With the approaching of the April 1948 national 
election, its radio broadcasts largely increased with the purpose of offering support to 
the Christian Democracy’s campaign against the PCI. Besides warning the Italian 
audience about the fate awaiting them in case of Italy’s falling under Communist 
control, its daily broadcasts tended to report examples of American assistance and to 
constantly praise the friendly relations between the US and Italy. The idea was to 
emphasize Americans’ goodwill towards Italians and its disposition to help the country 
to get back on its feet.  
Up until mid-1950s, when the DC government decided to reduce the programming 
times of foreign broadcasting and to move VOA programs to a less favourable airing 
time, VOA transmissions were followed by a large number of Italians, especially 
during lunchtime and in the evening 237 . Besides news programs and political 
commentaries, Italians could also enjoy entertainments and educational programs such 
as Cronache d’America, Università per radio, Ai vostri ordini. From 1948 VOA staff 
expanded their interests to cover topics like economics, sport, literature, medicine as 
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well as programmes especially addressed to women and youth describing the 
desirability of the American Way of Life.238  
While the VOA aimed at reaching the largest audience possible, the United States 
Information Service (USIS) operated with the purpose to reach a more selected and 
educated public239. Seeking to form new opinion moulders that could influence the 
general audience and transform the political culture of selected groups, a network of 
overseas branches of various offices, based in embassies and consulates, was created. 
The aim was to promote a better understanding of America through the broadcasting 
of documentaries and featured films, cultural programs, as well as library collections 
available to local public. The agency also dealt with the international educational 
exchange program also known as the Fulbright Program. William Fulbright, an 
American academic and politicians, strongly believed that through a better 
understanding of other cultures and societies, conflicts between countries could be 
diminished and a peaceful coexistence achieved. Around this idea of cultural and 
educational exchanges among countries, the program was designed and placed under 
the State Department’s responsibility. 
Another quite significant psychological warfare instrument was the propaganda 
campaign constructed around the European Recovery Plan, also known as Marshall 
Plan. When signing it, each European country accepted a clause for the dissemination 
of “information and news” on the working of the plan itself. Besides receiving money 
for an economic and financial reconstruction of the country, 5% of the funds of the 
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Marshall Plan was used for publicity and propaganda meant to change attitude, 
outlooks, and aspirations of each recipient countries. As David Ellwood claims, “From 
these premises, barely noticed at the time, there sprang the greatest international 
propaganda operation ever seen in peacetime.”240 As Ellwood has revealed, concerts, 
contests, radio shows, arts exhibitions, cartoon strips became valuable mediums to 
influence local audiences and remake European countries in the likeliness of the US. 
While the Soviet system was depicted as an underdeveloped world, characterized by 
scarcity of consumers good, lack of personal freedom and low living standard, positive 
propaganda messages projected the idea of American abundance, prosperity and 
freedom.241  
 
US Cultural Diplomacy and the Challenges of the Italian Way of Life. 
 
Buying American products, watching Hollywood movies, listening to rock and pop 
music, or reading American books did not however symbolize Italians’ acceptance of 
the American Way of Life. One of the objectives of US Cultural diplomacy was to 
convert Italians to Americanism by promoting a new form of identity beyond the 
boundaries of the nation. At the core of this process of Americanization laid 
transnational concepts such as anti-Communism, Capitalism, and individual freedom. 
The adoption of these models could not simply take place through imposition. Because 
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this process did not occur in a cultural vacuum, it faced the challenge of a clash with 
Italian notion of identities and its Way of Life.  
The idea that through the dissemination of cultural products the US managed to create 
an empire and built its cultural hegemony is simply an overestimation that excludes 
from considerations domestic dynamics and the reception of these products by the 
locals. Supporters of this thesis have a tendency to simply place the promotion of 
American values at the centre of their analyses and at how people reacted to that 
promotion. This interpretation is however only a partial view. First of all, it does not 
consider the question of the structural vacuum from their case studies. Even if it was 
true that between 1945 and the late 1950s the Motion Picture Export Association of 
America, sometimes called as the “little State Department”, allowed the US to control 
the film market, having a near-monopoly of distribution242 , the predominance of 
Hollywood movies on the market was not the result of Italians’ preference for 
American films. In many cases, as Lorenzo Quaglietti claimed in Storia economico-
politica del cinema italiano, Italians watched American movies because there was no 
other alternative243. In the aftermath of the war the Italian movie industry was in poor 
conditions due to the destructiveness of the conflict. As soon as fascist protectionist 
barriers were removed, the US conveyed great energy and money to expand the market 
to its own advantage. When the Italian government attempted to introduce a law for 
broadcasting Italian movies at specific times it faced the stiff opposition of the 
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Americans. But once the Italian cultural industry was rebuilt, Italians would go back 
to their own familiar products.244 
The similar argument worked with the radio programs. The Italian audience tended to 
turn to foreign networks only when other sources of information were scarce or not 
available. But when in the 1950s the Radio Audizioni Italia (RAI) resumed its 
transmissions and could broadcast at a national level, the Italian audience switched to 
its wider range of programmes, which were considered far more interesting than the 
American one. While in 1947 20 percent of the Italian population in possession of a 
radio was listening to American programs, a survey by DOXA revealed that in 1956 
the number had dropped to 2.9 percent.245 The reason for this was that national radio 
networks tended to cover not only international issues but also local and national news. 
Attention was also paid to cultural and social matters that seemed to be of greater 
interest for the Italian audience then the ones covered by the VOA, often created on 
misplaced assumptions about the tastes, values and habits of the Italian public. 
Furthermore, the very nature of VOA focusing essentially on America, its history, its 
culture and its democratic values, did not attract a large local public. Because it was 
all about America and its superiority, it was only natural that when the opportunity 
came, Italians listeners tuned to local networks. 246  An Italian Fulbright fellow 
complained that, despite the joint planning between countries and the sharing of 
insights among people of different culture, “the exchanges were mostly designed to 
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teach foreigners about the  ‘superiority of American-style democracy’”.247  
 
But Cultural Diplomacy also worked on the level of values. Once again, if there was 
for the Italians the possibility to promote their own values this would always became 
problematic for the dissemination of US values. The promotion of local ideas and 
beliefs would be stronger and more effective than a mere imposition from an external 
actor. In many case, US ‘cultural diplomacy’ attempted to transform the Italian culture 
according to American views without taking into consideration the cultural and social 
barriers of the local and the economic and political diversity between the two countries. 
The propaganda produced by the ERC, for instance, conveyed a vision of life that was 
at odds with the Italian culture. Despite the slogan “You too can be like us” and the 
emphasis on high productivity, good wages and prosperity, Italy was not like America; 
it had a different economic, political and cultural system, a distinctive set of values, 
and its own history. As the Italian entrepreneur Angelo Costa once pointed out, one of 
the limits of US psychological warfare in Italy was the Americans’ lack of 
understanding of the context in which they try to sell their Way of Life. 
 
 “No matter how cheap synthetic fibres became […] Italian women 
would always prefer clothes made in the home with natural materials; 
tinned food might be sold cheaply, but Italian traditions of cooking 
would always be preferred […] As for the concept of productivity, it 
ignored the basic difference between Italy and America: there capital 
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was cheap, labour was expensive; at home the situation was the 
opposite.”248  
 
Attempting to remake Italy in America’s likeness was more difficult than expected. 
The persistence of small family-owned businesses, the traditional craftsmanship, the 
lack of cheap capital and the over-supply of labour represented a huge obstacle for the 
achievement of US plans.  
In Italy there was also a general critique towards capitalism, which the US not only 
tried to defend but also to expand. By being the epitome of capitalism, the US was 
often criticised for being inherently aggressive, exploitative, and neo-colonialist.249 
This attitude of hostilities towards the US was not only a prerogative of the Left. Large 
sectors of the Right and the Catholic world disdained the Western Power, even though 
for different reasons than the Communism. Furthermore, also some segments of the 
socialist democrats, a group the US was trying to win over, also disliked the US 
political and economic system. The main problem with the US was that Capitalism 
and democracy came to be seen as an undistinguished entity with the latter viewed as 
a proxy of the former. The non-Communist left, therefore, advocated for a Third Way 
between American Capitalism and Soviet Communism.  
Furthermore, the promotion of concepts such as progress, modernity, and individual 
freedom proved hardly effective within the Italian society. These ideas were not so 
easily transmissible or positively received in a conservative country like Italy where a 
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large part of the population tended to identify with values connected to the moral and 
religious tradition of Catholicism. American culture and materialism were often 
perceived as a threat to Catholicism. Italians tended to distrust the American concept 
of individual freedom, the idea of consumerism and modernity, while perceiving 
American individualism and liberal values as a symptom of depravation of the spirit. 
The slowness and difficulty in overcoming cultural and moral traditions can be 
exemplified by referring to a peculiar event that happened in Italy in 1963, during the 
election campaign. The DC, hoping to enlarge its electoral base, chose to resort to an 
American advertising agency to improve the image of the party. The agency suggested 
a ‘rejuvenation’ of the party’s image because, according to the founder of the Institute 
for Motivational Research in New York Ernst Ditcher, the perception of the DC among 
the Italian public was of an old and staid party. The agency came up with a poster 
portraying a young good-looking 20-years-old woman with the heading “La DC ha 
vent’anni” (The DC is twenty years old). The poster threw ridicule on the party as well 
as embarrassing comments both from its political enemies and its supporters. 
Recurrent jokes about the poster were “Allora bisogna farle la festa” (Then we must 
throw a party for her or Let’s give her one then) or “E’ ora che vada a farsi fottere”, 
which in Italian corresponds to “It’s time she got screwed.”250  
Aware of their constituents’ frame of mind, Christian democrats realized that both the 
Italian middle class as well as part of the working class they tried to attract could be 
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frightened by sudden changes in the Italian way of life.251 The major flaw of US public 
diplomacy was that it “was based on the assumption, dubious at best, that if other 
people understood us, they would like us, and if they liked us, they would do the things 
we wanted them to do.”252 The consumer society and the American way of Life, 
therefore, came to be seen as a threat for the Italian modus vivendi. It became a largely 
supported belief that “a specific Italian identity, with its distinctive cultural and 
political features, had to be preserved and not sacrificed on the altar of the Cold 
War.”253 So while the US was considered by many as a useful ally to prevent a 
communist political success in the country, the promotion of its values and culture 
were not largely welcomed in the country. In the early 1950s, Ambassador Clare Booth 
Luce had to admit that in Italy “we are definitely losing the ground in the propaganda 
field.”254 
 
The April 1948 Election and the US Short-Term Intervention. 
 
Home to the strongest Communist party in Western Europe, with the beginning of the 
Cold War Italy came to be seen as a crucial testing ground for American psychological 
warfare. In the eyes of many American observers the PCI represented the major 
challenge to the promotion of an Italian-American solid alliance and, therefore, to the 
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consolidation of a US hegemonic role within the country. Italians, therefore, not only 
had to accept the American Way of Life but also to assume transnational anti-
Communism as a new form of collective identity. However, due to the large electoral 
support to the PCI, achieving this goal required more than a simple dissemination of 
cultural products. Besides a long-term strategy based on the promotion of transnational 
values and ideas meant to facilitate the abandonment of national modes of thought, 
American policymakers believed that a short-term strategy to defeat Communism by 
bringing the conservative forces to power was indispensable for counteracting the 
increasing electoral support to the Left. The prevention of a Communist access to 
power via legal or illegal means as well as the deployment of psychological weapons 
to reduce the increasing appeal of the PCI among the Italian electorate became a US 
priority. The United States deemed necessary to depoliticise the working class 
movement.   
In light of the incoming national election in April 1948 and the increasing electoral 
support to the PCI, on February 1948 the National Security Council produced its first 
policy document, NSC-1, assessing the position of the United States in respect to Italy 
and the communist question. This top-secret document called upon the US to provide 
full political support to De Gasperi or an “equally satisfactory successor” as well as an 
extension of economic assistance. 255  Due to the slow American response to the 
communist challenge and since the lengthy bureaucratic processes of the newly created 
National Security Council, the responsibility for organizing and waging a 
psychological warfare was largely delegated to local actors that had been actively 
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engaged in a series of anti-Communist campaigns256. Washington, however, offered 
financial and political support to various religious, civic, labour and business groups 
that could help defeating the enemy. Individuals and organizations in the USA also 
expressed their support.  
The well-known letter-writing campaign represented a remarkable psychological 
effort organized by private Italian-American groups with the support of the US 
government. It involved the exchanges of letters from Americans of Italian origins to 
their relatives and friends in Italy. Guided by sample letter published in newspapers or 
given away in Catholic communities, Italians were informed of the gruesome fate 
awaiting them in case of a Communist electoral success. According to different 
sources, millions of letters were written and distributed by radio stations, newspapers, 
and wealthy and influential individuals. Finally, business advertisement companies, 
with the approval of the Post Office, facilitated the dispatches. Beside this, anti-
Communist appeals from famous Italian-Americans such as Frank Sinatra or Joe Di 
Maggio were broadcasted through the Voice of America.257 During the last weeks of 
the election campaign, State secretary George Marshall made it publicly clear that ERP 
aid for Italy would be cancelled in case of a Communist electoral success.  
In Italy, Washington had to rely on the experience and influence of anti-Communist 
groups that had been actively operating to diminish or neutralise the PCI influence. 
The most powerful and influential ally the US could count on was the Catholic Church. 
With the beginning of the Cold War and the struggle for hegemony between the two 
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Super Powers, Truman recognized the need for establishing a fruitful alliance with the 
Catholic world by relying on Pope Pius XII as a powerful mediator. As US President 
wrote to his wife Bess in 1947: “If I can mobilize the people who believe in a moral 
world against the Bolshevik materialists […] we can win this fight.”258   
In mid-1947, the two leaders sealed their alliance with a highly publicized letter exchange. 
Both the President and the Pope, without naming the Soviet Union, recognized the 
dramatic time the world was going through and informally agreed on cooperating for the 
achievement of a lasting peace which both affirmed could only be built on Christian 
principles. In these letters, Truman wrote about an “evil and disruptive force intent on 
thwarting the hopes and ideals of mankind”259. The New York Times defined this US-
Vatican alliance as an “anti-red Crusade”. As it was reported: 
 “President Truman and Pope Pius were believed in Vatican circles 
to have virtually pledged themselves to resist communism by all 
means at their command, in the letters they exchanged through Mr. 
Taylor260. […] As is usual in Papal pronouncements, he did not 
mention communism by name, but referred to it half dozen times so 
clearly that there could be no doubt about his meaning. The Church, 
he said at one point, ‘cannot compromise with an avowed enemy of 
God. […] Indeed, the Pope’s references to communism were so 
insistent […] that it was being whispered in the Vatican today that 
the true purpose of Mr. Taylor’s present mission in Rome is to enlist 
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the Vatican’s support for an anti-Communist ‘crusade’ that Mr. 
Truman is thought to be about to launch.”261  
 
Concerned by the expansionist aims of the Soviet Union and the increasing support to 
the PCI, both leaders found in anti-Communism the common ground for overcoming 
ideological differences and the catalyst for establishing a sort of alliance. While the 
US recognized Pius XII’s influential power across the globe and the potentiality for 
waging and winning the Cold War, the Pope acknowledged American wealth and 
power and welcomed US economic aid as deterrent to the spread of communism in 
Italy. The religious anti-Communist rhetoric largely contributed to the onset and 
fomentation of the conflict and provided a moral justification to the psychological 
warfare between the two blocks. The Cold War came to be seen as a conflict between 
‘good’ and ‘evil’ in which the survival of religion was at stake and it was finally 
reduced to the moral question of being with Christ or against Christ.  
In the months before the 1948 election, the Vatican opposition to Communism became 
more and more politicised. Without openly asking to cast a vote for a specific party, 
the Church suggested the clergy and their followers to vote for those candidates who 
offered guarantees “sufficient for the safeguarding of the rights of God”262. The newly 
established comitati civici (civic committees)263 played a pivotal role in the political 
mobilization of Catholics. This organization was created in February 1948 under the 
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leadership of Luigi Gedda, the vice-president of the association Azione Cattolica. It 
was financially supported by the episcopacy with the objective of transforming this 
election into a moral crusade. Italians were not simply asked to choose between two 
political parties but between two different moral systems. There were three million 
members of Catholic Action (almost 50% more members than the Italian Communist 
party), plus more than one million from other Catholic groups. The members received 
precise instructions as to their role in the anti-Communist struggle.264 The aim was to 
“Get people to vote. Get them to vote Christian. Get them to vote Christian 
Democrat.”265 Furthermore, the Catholic Action hired airplanes and dropped about 
9,000,000 copies of anti-communist leaflets on major cities and regions. An article in 
Life Magazine praised Luigi Gedda for his successful attempt in organizing in one 
single month committees in all of Italy's 300 dioceses and in 18,000 of its 24,000 
parishes. 266 Particularly effective was also the female political mobilization in favour 
of the DC.  
Despite the initial pragmatism, the DC greatly benefitted from the religious 
mobilization by gaining legitimacy and a vast electoral consensus. Furthermore, the 
mobilization of the Vatican and the clergy successfully allowed the establishment of 
political unity among Catholics. As Kalyvas observes, the similarity and common 
religious creed could not automatically lead to the establishment of a political unity 
due to the fact that Catholics were divided along class and ethnic lines, and had 
different interests and background267. However, the mobilization of individuals and 
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their incredible rhetorical speeches allowed Catholics to unite together under the flag 
of Christendom and the climate of anti-Communist fear they created.  
When the day of the election came, the DC stood as the winner obtaining 48 per cent 
of the votes and an absolute majority in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.  
The Left, instead, was defeated and obtained only 31 per cent of the votes. The 
electoral outcome was perceived within the Truman Administration as an American 
success. US observers and media tended to emphasize the American role, defining the 
Italian electoral decision as a demonstration of Italians’ acceptance of transnational 
concepts such as “Freedom” and “Democracy”.  Furthermore, the electoral result was 
read as “proof of America’s ability to influence the domestic affairs of other nations 
through the use of unconventional instruments”268.  
Whether the 1948 election can be seen as an American success is at least debatable.  If 
we consider the mere short-term outcome of this election, namely the defeat of the PCI 
at the election, the American success theory can be partially accepted. The financial 
support to the DC and the threat of economic repercussion played in favour of the 
Catholic party’s electoral success. Nevertheless, the long-term strategy to convince 
Italians to adopt a transnational anti-Communism as a new form of collective identity 
proved unsuccessful. The main factor that led to the failure is connected to the nature 
of the American tactic. When the US intervened, they relied on national subgroups 
such as the Church and its Catholic organization to advance its position and fight anti-
Communism. Instead of Americanizing the Italian society, this strategy reinforced the 
Catholic identity of specific subgroups. Despite being the most powerful economic 
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force, Washington could not transform these identities completely because the US 
alliance with the Catholic world was established out of necessity more than for a 
mutual identification with each other’s values and aims. 
Between the United States and the Vatican there was a mere convergence of interest 
but never a total submission to a cause or another. Both actors saw this alliance as a 
temporary necessity for neutralizing the communist menace. Furthermore, their 
actions were not the expression of a single unitary anti-communist identity; they did 
not always share the same objectives and strategies and both sides had their own 
motives and agendas for fighting this war. While the US tried to Americanise the 
Italian populace by promoting anti-Communism as a transnational identity, the main 
goal for the Vatican was to neutralize the Communist threat in order to build Italy as 
the bastion of Christendom and to enhance the Catholic Church’s influence across the 
world. Besides the anti-Communist shared interests, relations between the two were 
not always smooth. The Vatican, for instance, never concealed its distrust towards the 
United States. According to Fabbrini, numerous underlying reasons impeded the 
Vatican to overcome its hostility towards the United States. Among them, a central 
factor was that the United States was by large a Protestant country. Furthermore, the 
Church’s despise for liberalism, which not only guided the US public behaviour but 
also the rigorous separation between state and church, further complicated their 
relations. 269  The Vatican also perceived the American Way of Life as a threat to 
Catholicism and its values.  
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Instead of reinforcing the American hegemonic position within the country, the US 
intervention simply strengthened the social power of these local subnational networks 
and their ambitions. The combined actions promoted by the Vatican, the clergy, the 
activists and Christian Democrats led to a transformation of the political consciousness 
strongly anchored to the notion of Catholic civilization. From an Italian perspective, 
the identification with Liberal democratic values or some sort of Euro-Atlantic identity 
was simply perceived as an empty rhetoric. Many concepts the US tried to export such 
as individual freedom and progress were far too abstract and clashed with Italian 
notion of a Catholic identity. In the Italian case, the religious and moral dimension of 
the local cold war proved to be a key factor of the electoral success of the DC. But the 
anti-Communism promoted by Catholic groups was “very distant from the reformism 
the United States wanted to promote”270. 
 
The US and the Italian Working Class After the 1948 Election 
 
Even though the DC emerged from the 1948 election as the major party holding a 
substantial influence within the Italian society, the Communist hegemony among 
specific social groups still represented a matter of great concern for the US. In 
particular, the Italian federation of labour, CGIL, was perceived as instrumental to the 
PCI for maintaining a hegemonic position among the working class. Therefore, while 
trying to Americanize the masses, the US also sought to take control of the working 
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class away from the Communist party. To do so, the US began to encourage free trade 
unionism by promoting the American system as a model for Italy.  
As previously argued, Italy had always lacked a sense of nationhood; Italians instead 
tended to identify themselves with sub-national groups that gravitated around 
socializing agencies such as the Church and the Labour Union. These socializing 
actors never entered the party-political realm but they exerted considerable power on 
political parties and were capable to influence government policy and legislation in 
order to gain advantages over other groups.271  
Because of the complexity of the Italian political system and the weak state-society 
relation, these sub-national actors tended to exercise an important influence over the 
political life of the country. While distrusting governments, Italians used to rely on 
these socialising forces that, along the years, had been able to build trust and loyalty 
among the populace. They mainly operated on a regional and local scale seeking to 
attract part of the population that had not been involved in the Italian political life. 
Facilitated by an absent and distant State, these actors gained a dominant position 
within society eventually becoming a guiding force capable of educating the masses 
from a moral and political perspective. Eventually, they became the reference point 
for large segments of society.  
In the attempt to reduce the Communist influence among the CGIL, the US relied on 
the anti-Communist American Federation of Labor (AFL) and its leader Luigi 
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Antonini272. An Italian émigré to the US, Antonini was one of the most influential 
leaders of the Italian-American community in New York. Since mid-1920s, he 
established close ties with anti-Fascist (non-Communist) Italian-Americans and 
European groups, creating a broad transatlantic network of communication. Most of 
his contacts were among the Italian exiled intelligentsia, as well as socialist and labour 
activists. He established close ties with right wing socialists as Giuseppe Emanuele 
Modigliani and Giuseppe Faravelli; with the socialist intellectual Ignazio Silone, but 
also with refugees to the US, most of them members of the anti-fascist Mazzini Society, 
such as Getano Salvemini, Leonello Venturi, Max Ascoli, Carlo Sforza, and Alberto 
Tarchiani, future Italian ambassador to Washington.  
When Antonini was sent to Italy in 1944 in the attempt to reorganize the labour 
movement, his opposition to Communism led him to wage his own crusade at a time 
when the State Department looked at the CGIL as a positive force of moderation to 
prevent social instabilities in the country. As he publicly stated, he considered his 
mission the prevention of a Communist takeover of the Italian labour movement 273. 
He constantly criticized the CGIL for being a political tool under the influence of the 
Italian Communist Party. The Italian confederation was, according to him, a 
“totalitarian political monstrosity”274 subdued to the USSR.  
Because the CGIL was considered a vehicle for political mobilization, it became 
necessary to challenge working class’ reliance on it as a political instrument. Therefore, 
                                                             
272 About the role of the AFL in Italy two important works are Filippelli’s American Labor and 
Postwar Italy, 1943-1953: A Study of Cold War Politics and Romero’s Stati Uniti e il 
sindicalismo europeo 1944-1951. 
273Romero, The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944-1951, 38. 
274Romero, 73. 
  
184 
 
the AFL began campaigning for the creation of a unitary and powerful non-political 
trade union moulded on the American model. However, this objective seemed hardly 
achievable especially considering the Italian context in which ideology and politics 
were so deeply interwoven and embedded in all strata of society. The problem was that 
with the fall of Mussolini, Italian leaders had to act with urgency to create an entirely 
new labour movement. The impossibility to do it from the ground-up, led the leading 
elite to reconstruct the confederation of labour from the top down with political parties 
exerting remarkable influence on it. Furthermore, due to the weak state-society relation, 
the CGIL was largely perceived among the population as a politicized body the 
working class could rely on for participating to the political and economic life of the 
country and for securing better labour conditions.  
The difficulty in de-politicising the Italian working class movement led the US to exert 
some pressures to create a secession within the CGIL. In particular, American labour 
unionists tried to convince right wing socialists and catholic trade unionist to establish 
a unitary but anti-communist labour organization independent from the Communist-
controlled one.  
When the State Department asked the AFL to lead trade unions to a definite choice for 
pro-Western support and the Western realignment around the Marshall plan, the 
communist majority among the CGIL denounce the European Recovery plan and its 
potential negative effects for Italian industry and eventually for the working class. 
Foreseeing a possible break within the CGIL, the State Department urged the embassy 
in Rome to take advantage of this unstable situation by pushing the minorities within 
the CGIL to stand up against the PCI faction. The US embassy in Rome immediately 
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organized a meeting between Irving Brown, the catholic and social democrat leaders 
in the CGIL, and AFL unionists to discuss the possibility of forming a unified, anti-
Communist trade union organization controlled by Christian and Social Democrats.  
When on July 14, 1948 the CGIL proclaimed a general strike in response to an attempt 
on the life of Palmiro Togliatti, the conservative factions within the union took distance 
from this demonstration, accusing the majority to using the organization as a political 
tool. The outcome was a split within the organization with the withdrawers 
establishing the LCGIL (Libera CGIL) that in May 1950 was renamed CISL 
(Confederazione Italiana Sindacati dei Lavoratori). Social democrats eventually 
seceded from the confederation after Communists’ protests against the signing of the 
North Atlantic Treaty and after violent clashes between police and Communist at 
Molinella (Bologna) on May 17, where a large number of demonstrators were 
wounded and a woman died. 275  They established the Federazione Italiana dei 
Lavoratori (FIL), eventually renamed UIL (Unione dei Lavoratori Italiani).  
Despite there is no doubt about the American contribution to the split, considering it 
only as a result of US intervention is an overstatement. Certainly the US’ anti-
communist policy influenced Italians’ decision to isolate communist forces, however, 
the secession was also due to the peculiarity of the Italian political and ideological 
context. Since the establishment, the CGIL had never abandoned the political and 
social dimensions of its activity 276 . Because the confederation of labour broadly 
reflected the political anti-fascist coalition in the government and its leaders were 
                                                             
275 Idem, 167. 
276 G Bedani, Politics and Ideology in the Italian Workers’ Movement: Union Development and 
the Changing Role of the Catholic and Communist Subcultures in Postwar Italy (Berg, 1995), 
20. 
186 
 
always under political parties’ pressure, its unity was always potentially exposed to 
the risk of a crisis between the main factions. When the governmental crisis opened in 
May 1947, the split within the CGIL was simply a matter of time.  
Nevertheless, the US was not fully satisfied. The main problem was that there were 
now two non-communist, pro-western labour unions, rather than one unified strong 
organization. Despite the AFL’s efforts to bring the two organizations together, the 
unification did not take place. The main obstacle rested in the anti-clerical tradition of 
Italian socialist and republican forces. As Filippelli observes, their hostility towards 
the Catholic Church proved much stronger than the lure of American dollars or the 
fear of communism.277 American subsidies and political support were not enough to 
overcome the ideological divide between Socialist and Catholic forces.   
Instead of creating an apolitical trade unions, the split established three competing 
organizations that where even more politicised. When non-communist labour unionists 
broke away from the confederation of labour, “the emergency was so compelling that 
the democratic labor leaders could not await a slow evolution of anti-Communist labor 
unions at the local level”278 and the process of creation of a labour movement from the 
top-down had to be repeated. While with the creation of the CGIL all political factions 
within the movement agreed to a pact of unity and each group could more or less 
efficiently check on the other factions, following the secession, the Communists were 
left alone and could gain even greater control of the CGIL.  
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The other two non-communist trade unions, instead, were too weak to challenge the 
Communist hegemony within the working class. 279  The US, therefore, suggested 
increasing discrimination against firms employing Communist labour organization 
when granting government contracts. Similarly, Confindustria was advised to pressure 
industries to adopt a tougher opposition towards Communist unions and support the 
Catholic trade union (CISL)280. US psychological experts deemed necessary to refuse 
“to negotiate with Communist union leaders in nationalized industries”.281 
In a few years, Italy experienced the restoration of the capitalist class and big 
businesses that certainly promoted the Italian miracle but at the detriment of the 
working class that ended up having weak trade unions and low wages. By the 1950s, 
Filippelli claims, the Italian labour movement was among the weakest in Europe282. 
American desire for promoting reforms and modernization clashed with the necessity 
to take control of the trade union away from communism. When anti-communism 
gained its primacy over reforms, those who carried the gravest burden were the Italians 
workers. This, according to American labour unionists, was “unfortunate, but 
preferable to the alternative”283 of Communist control of the working class. However, 
the U.S. support to industrialists and to the discredited capitalist class in Italy in order 
to achieve economic stability had the opposite result of isolating the workers and 
pushing them towards the PCI. 
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Conclusion. 
 
While the US managed to obtain a short-term success with the electoral defeat of the 
PCI in the 1948 election, from a long-term perspective Washington failed to transform 
the Italian political culture. Paradoxically, instead of Americanising the Italian 
populace, the American intervention in support of the Catholic party strengthen the 
DC, the Catholic Church became even more influent within the Italian society through 
the promotion of a sub-national collective identity. Last but not least, the US failure in 
creating a viable labour union had the consequence of increasing the working class 
reliance on the CGIL and, therefore, on the PCI. The lack of understanding of the 
Italian context and its political culture led the US to pursue hardly achievable 
objectives with the result that, in the mid-1950s, the Communist party was still a 
powerful and influential force within the Italian society. Instead of stabilising and 
uniting the country the US intervention created more antagonism and, therefore, 
instabilities.  
When the Americas stepped in, despite all their initiatives, they could reshape neither 
the state-society relationship nor the Italian identity. Furthermore, the problem with 
the US transnational intervention to change Italian political culture was based on a 
concept of anti-Communist identity beyond the nation state.  US intervention in the 
country would have to adapt to this peculiarity of the Italian political system. Because 
of political parties’ dominant role within the political system, any attempts by interest 
groups, movements, internal or external actors to access or influence the decision-
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making process could not take place without dealing with the political parties284 and 
their socialising agencies. The changing international context became the expedient 
for the local parties to exploit subnational divisions. Anti-Communism became the 
new legitimising ideology, and the US became part of the Italian subnational 
framework. 
Despite the short-term success that led the DC to access and maintain a dominant 
position in Italian political system, US State Department officials had eventually to 
realize that cultural diplomacy in Italy was not reaching the expected number of people 
and was not having the expected impact on the masses. In the early 1950s, Ambassador 
Clare Booth Luce observed how in Italy “we are definitely losing the ground in the 
propaganda field.”285 Italian distrust and hostility towards the United States increased 
and American anti-Communist rhetoric seemed unconvincing among the Italian 
population286. In particular, the propaganda overtly sponsored by the US government 
was largely disregarded. This was an indirect consequence of the weak state-society 
relations that characterised the Italian political culture. Generally speaking, the Italian 
population had always distrusted government institutions and even more so foreign 
governments. As a labour leader in Rome once observed: 
 
 “Italians are difficult to propagandize. They are suspicious if they do 
not see it for themselves or if a trusted friend does not tell them it is that 
way. [..]You should let the leaders of the Italians explain events to them, 
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or maybe an American of Italian ancestry whom they might trust and 
who can speak their language. […] They automatically discount the 
statements of a stranger. My advice on propaganda is to eliminate it 
entirely.”287  
 
Furthermore, distrust was also caused by the constant emphasis on how great America 
and its people were.   
 
The increasing electoral support to the PCI seemed to confirm their concerns. The local 
elections of 1951-52 soon became perceived as a crucial test. It was the first electoral 
test after the landslide victory of 1948, and it could give some indications of national 
vote in light of the general election of 1953. In the South, where the DC was stronger, 
there was an increase of monarchists ad neo-fascist supporters, and the DC appeal was 
decreasing. In the Sicilian regional election of 1951 the DC obtained a narrow victory, 
31.2 % votes compared to the PCI-PSI that obtained 30.2 %, which led the President 
of the Sicilian Council Franco Restino to form a government that included Monarchists 
and Sicilian independentists. The national election in 1953 was characterized by a 
change in the electoral law with the introduction of what detractors dubbed it Legge 
Truffa (Scam Law), a majority bonus system that would give 65% of the seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies to the party or coalition that would get an absolute majority. The 
DC, in a coalition with PRI, PLI, PSDI stopped at 49.99% of the national vote. Even 
though technically the DC won the election, there was a perceivable frustration among 
                                                             
287 J A Raffaele, “United States Propaganda Abroad: Notes on The USIS in Italy,” Social 
Research 27, no. 3 (1960): 289. 
191 
 
its members for the lack of the expected results. Fierce disagreement inside the party 
forced De Gasperi to resign and multiple weak governments followed.  
Due to the unsatisfying alliance with both the DC and the Catholic Church, the US 
began to look for a new, reliable actor with whom carried on a new anti-communist 
ideological fight. It was in this confused panorama that the creation of a non-
communist, leftist intellectual movement became necessary for the creation of an anti-
Communist cultural hegemony different from the conservative positions of Catholic 
groups. The US, therefore, relied on the so-called opinion moulders to establish a 
friendly environment and advance American interest among specific segments of the 
Italian society that previous propaganda has failed to attract but they could still be 
convinced by intelligent arguments.   
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-CH. VI- 
THE ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA PER LA LIBERTÀ DELLA CULTURA AND 
TEMPO PRESENTE. 
 
Up until the early 1951, the American foreign policy approach towards Italy was 
essentially planned on specific short-term and long-term initiatives meant to hamper 
the increasing electoral support to the Italian Communist party and its recruiting 
activity within the working class. To achieve these objectives, the US had not only 
been financing the conservative anti-Communist party, the DC, but also the Socialist 
party to provoke a split within the labour movement. Furthermore, Washington also 
sought to transform the Italian culture through the dissemination of American products, 
values, and the promotion of a US political and economic system as a model for Italy. 
While on a short-term perspective the US managed to obtain some success, especially 
the Communist party’s defeat in the 1948 election and the split of the Socialist 
movement in two, on a long-term Washington’s attempt to transform the Italian 
political and social culture faced various challenges. The Italian populace showed 
some level of resistance to the adoption of American cultural products and ideas and 
there were widespread stereotypes about the United States, often considered an 
arrogant, warmongering and uneducated country288.  
Furthermore, in the early 1950s there was a widespread belief within the US 
governmental officials that the propaganda techniques adopted in Italy were not as 
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successful as they had hoped for. According to a declassified document, the United 
States were definitely losing the ground on the propaganda field in Italy289.  
Due to this  perceived lack of success, in the early 1950s Washington chose to change 
its psychological warfare strategy by attracting those segments of the population that, 
due to their social and cultural role within society, could effectively operate a 
socialising action within the country. The US turned to the intellectuals. As previously 
discussed, Gramsci recognised how to build and maintain hegemony within a specific 
social stratum a leading elite should rely on the crucial role played by intellectuals in 
moulding the views of the people. This so-called opinion moulders came to be seen as 
a powerful ally that could lead to a transformation of Italian values and beliefs under 
the supervision of Washington.  
The establishment of a transnational intellectual community of influential anti-
Communist personalities seemed to offer the solution the US was looking for. The 
Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) was created as part of a broad US strategy of 
cultural warfare aiming at detaching the European intelligentsia from the appeal of 
Marxism and Communism by offering an alternative that better reconciled with the 
American Way of Life. Its political and cultural origin dated back to June 1950 when 
a group of intellectuals gathered together in Berlin to take part to a conference whose 
declared aim was the promotion of intellectual freedom and the opposition to any 
totalitarian system.  
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In line with this broad strategy of cultural warfare, Washington believed that the 
replication of this transnational project in the Italian context would greatly benefit the 
US and would allow the transformation of Italian political culture according to an 
American perspective. In 1951, therefore, the CCF’s headquarters authorised the 
creation of the Associazione Italiana per la Libertà della Cultura (AILC) under Silone 
and, five years later, the publication of the Italian journal Tempo Presente. The 
Americans, however, would soon realise that the Italian political culture was very hard 
to transform to the hegemonic power of the two main political parties and their overall 
objectives would be once again compromised. 
This chapter focuses on the particular outlook of the Associazione Italiana per la 
Libertà della Cultura (AILC) and the Italian review Tempo Presente as a peculiar case 
within the cultural products of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). Firstly, this 
was deeply connected to the particular status of the journal’s leading forces, Ignazio 
Silone and Nicola Chiaromonte, and their negotiations to transform and adapt the 
transnational dimension of the cultural Cold War to local ambitions and needs. Beside 
an analysis of the content of the Italian review Tempo Presente, it is important to look 
at the correspondence and the private communication between these intellectuals. This 
will allow to cast some light on the editorial choices as well as the different points of 
view these intellectual felt free to express in their letters. As Hunt wrote to Lansky in 
1960, “each magazine has a unique character of its own and is not simply a translation 
in the various languages of one basic magazine”290. Each journal autonomy depended 
therefore on the editors’ choices and their relations with the CCF headquarters in Paris.  
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There is no intention here to analyse the CIA involvement and the covert financial 
process. This has already been done by Francis Stonor Saunders, Peter Coleman, and 
others. My intention is therefore to take a step back from this perspective and to focus 
on uncovering editorial decisions and the review’s content to show the complexity of 
the Italian journal and the galaxy of intellectuals that gravitated around it.  
As their correspondence shows, as well as some of their editorial decisions, Silone and 
Chiaromonte were not passive players of US soft diplomacy; they chose, instead, to 
play along for specific reasons that went beyond mere Cold War dynamics. In spite of 
the invasiveness of Cold War discourses, one needs to consider the antebellum origins 
of Italian intellectual impegno and the demands to reform society and culture as a guide 
for understanding post-war anti-Communism. The need to avoid treating anti-
Communism as a monolithic ideology 291  requires an analysis of the galaxy of 
intellectuals that gravitated around this label and the set of values and ideas they 
carried with them. They were clearly opposing Soviet ideology, but what did they 
stand for? What kind of alternative were they proposing? 
Secondly, the peculiarity was strictly connected to the Italian context and the political 
culture of the country. Despite the CCF was established with a specific anti-
Communist intent, Italians always insisted against limiting their actions to a mere 
anti-Communism. The cultural and political hegemony of the Catholic Church and 
the appearance of neo-Fascist movements were considered issues of primary 
                                                             
291 R Pertici, “Il Vario Anticomunismo Italiano (1936-1960). Lineamenti Di Una Storia,” in 
Due Nazioni. Legittimazione e Delegittimazione Nella Storia Dell’Italia Contemporanea, ed. E 
Galli della Loggia and L Di Nucci (Bologna: Mulino, 2003), 263–334. 
196 
 
importance. Italian intellectuals, therefore, used the AILC and Tempo Presente to 
discuss what they considered the major issues of that time.  
Last but not least, the cultural impact of Tempo Presente and the tepid public response 
casts doubts on the interpretation of the CCF as a successful hegemonic instrument of 
US foreign policy questioning whether it effectively achieved to promote an 
alternative culture in Italy. Despite the CCF was created as a transnational project it 
was in the local context that the abstraction of transnational anti-Communism found 
its most concrete dimension.  
 
The Transnational Cultural Intervention and the Anti-systemic Italian 
Intellectuals. 
 
By the late 1940s, the status of US-Italian relations was still a matter of concern for 
Washington. The US lamented the unsatisfying alliance with Italian subnational 
networks such as the Church and the anti-Communist labour unions, blamed for their 
unwillingness to adapt their objectives to a transnational anti-Communist strategy. 
Furthermore, the US relations with the DC had been proving quite problematic due to 
the catholic party’s reluctance to follow the American guidance in the political and 
economic reconstruction of the country. Last but not least, Italians still displayed some 
level of distrust towards the US and had shown some resistance to the reception of 
American value. According to a declassified document, in the early 1950s US officials 
197 
 
observed how in Italy Americans were “definitely losing the ground in the propaganda 
field.”292  
This inability to attract consent among the masses and in manoeuvring Italian political 
forces fostered a series of new analyses on why the Italian communists were still 
maintaining a great influence within the country.  Despite Italy was receiving 
substantial financial and economic help from the USA, the PCI was still gaining 
remarkable electoral support.  It became clear that  popular support to the communist 
party could not be explained merely in terms of the economic backwardness of the 
country. Therefore, for winning the hearts and the minds of Italians focusing only on 
selling the American welfare as a reachable and desirable feature was not sufficient.  
The US began to look for new influential actors within the country that could 
effectively operate a change in the Italian political culture. The 1950s, therefore, saw 
a shift of some US cultural projects from targeting mass audience to attracting the so-
called opinion moulders with the result that the Italian cultural elite became the main 
target of cultural diplomacy. As part of a broader US anti-communist strategy, the 
cultural diplomacy promoted by the USA was mainly addressed towards those 
neutralist intellectuals in the attempt to convince them to side with the West.  As 
reported in the declassified document Lodge Project within the United Nation, US 
propaganda should primarily target the “uncertain “neutralists” or geopolitical “realists” 
who are already partially attracted through Marxism to communism but who are still 
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susceptible to intellectual challenges” 293. To do so, the Americans needed a project 
that did not sound like a bombastic propaganda attempt but more as a result of a 
voluntary effort to preserve intellectual freedom.  
The intellectuals, and in particular the so-called public opinion moulders, came to be 
seen as potential allies. The main objective was to attract those segments of the 
population that, due to their social and cultural role, could support the promotion of an 
alternative culture in line with American values and ideas. Their cultural influence 
would allow them to operate as socialising forces within the educated classes that 
would be fascinated by intelligent arguments, which would appear “to be objective, 
penetrating and forward-looking.”294 This group of intellectuals could provide “a sense 
of consensus around certain shared values and interests”295 the civil society could 
identify with. Concepts such as western democracy, intellectual freedom and liberal 
anti-communism were the crucial values of this cultural warfare. 
In post-war Italy, however, culture was the battleground for a clash between the PCI 
and DC, which sought to establish their own cultural hegemony. While the DC mainly 
relied on mass culture for the promotion of Catholic values, the PCI sought to establish 
its cultural hegemony within the academics and the anti-Fascist intelligentsia. Neither 
faction, however, could represent a valuable source for the USA. While Americans 
could not rely on the communist intelligentsia for self-evident reasons, the Catholic 
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intellectuals seemed too conservative to advance US ideological positions in Italy. 
Therefore, psychological warfare experts suggested to seek the support of other Italian 
anti-Communist intellectuals. The choice fell on a group of left-wing “anti-totalitarian” 
intellectuals who, since the fall of the Fascist regime, had been trying to negotiate their 
cultural space within the Italian context. By seeking to build a cultural hegemony 
alternative to Catholicism and Communism, these intellectuals sought to promote a 
new culture shaped by their exile experience and their connections with the European-
American intellectual network.  
This network, which had freely mobilized since mid-1920s, was really variegated and 
included numerous personalities with different political, cultural and social 
perspectives. Within the circle there were philosophers, writers, political scientists, 
European federalists, musicians and journalists. Among them there were influential 
members of the Mazzini Society, the anti-Fascist political organization created in the 
late 1930s, such as Gaetano Salvemini, Lionello Venturi and Max Ascoli; the 
European federalists Emilio Rossi and Altiero Spinelli; the Socialist politician and 
writer Ignazio Silone; the writer Nicola Chiaromonte and so on.  
Because of their opposition to the Fascist regime, most of them had been forced to 
leave their native country and move to France and Switzerland, while others chose the 
United States as their destination. During WWII, many of them cooperated with the 
Office of Strategic Service (OSS) in coordinating assistance to the anti-Fascist 
Resistance in Italy. They offered useful advice on how to conduct effective propaganda 
campaigns in the country, as well as crucial information on the anti-fascist movement.  
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Legitimised by their anti-Fascist cultural and political activities, they came to be seen 
as valuable assets for the US in waging its psychological warfare against the Soviets. 
Scarred by the Fascist drama, these intellectuals were living with a certain anxiety 
about the future course of post-war Italy. To prevent the country from going from 
Fascism to Communism, they freely mobilized and began discussing the political, 
economic, and social rehabilitation of Italy. As Holmes claimed, for these writers, 
“anticommunism was an indispensable complement to antifascism”296. Totalitarianism, 
as a common denominator for both Fascism and Communism, was at the core of their 
analyses.  
 
Ignazio Silone.   
 
Ignazio Silone was a leading figure of this movement. He was born in Pescina, 
Abruzzo, as Secondino Tranquilli (1900-1978). He derived his literary surname from 
Poppedius Silo, symbol of autonomy and leader of the Marsi who had led a successful 
revolt against the tyrannical Rome in 90 B.C. His first name Ignazio, instead, was 
taken from the Spanish Counter-reformation saint Loyola in the attempt to “baptize 
the pagan surname”.297 As Pugliese observes, this sacred-profane dichotomy was a 
characterising aspect of his complex personality both as a political and intellectual 
actor. According to Giulia Paola di Nicola and Attilio Danese, Silone was an 
emblematic character: countryman and revolutionary; committed socialist and 
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apparently detached from policy, novelist as well as political expert, believer and 
anticlerical. Communists liked him because of his rejection of Fascism; anti-
Communists because of his criticism towards the Soviet Union; clergymen for his faith 
in Christ; anticlerical leaders because of his struggle against all hypocrisies of the 
Church298. Considered by many as “a queer mixture of priest and communist”299 or, as 
Chiaromonte defined him, a “prete contadino”, a peasant priest300, he preferred to 
define himself as “a Christian without a Church, a socialist without a party”301.  His 
wife Darina once said about him: “ There is no single truth about Silone, only many 
truths”302.  
With the publication of his first novel Fontamara Silone gained international fame and 
intellectuals began to look at him as a symbol of the anti-fascist movement. 
Intellectuals like Thomas Mann, Albert Camus, Graham Greene, and Edmund Wilson 
talked about him with respect and admiration. 303  Howe referred to him as an 
extremely talented novelist; William Faulkner thought of him as Italian greatest living 
writer. Quite surprisingly, Silone was so appreciated abroad while neglected in Italy. 
As the American scholar Michael P. McDonald argues, it was a classic case of ‘Nemo 
propheta acceptus est patria sua’ (no prophet is accepted in his own country)304.  
From a political point of view, Silone was very active since his adolescence. He 
became a member of the Roman socialist movement when he was really young and in 
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1920 he was named editor of the socialist newspaper Avanguardia . When in January 
1921 the PCI was created by seceding from the PSI, he spoke in favour of the former 
and joined it. Together with Gramsci and Togliatti he can be considered as one of the 
founding fathers of the Italian Communist Party. In the late 1920s, however, he faced 
a political crisis that left him incapable of overcoming the disillusionment with 
Communism. He became more and more concerned about the increasing political 
intolerance and repression that was taking place in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the 
lack of intellectual freedom represented a matter of great concern for the Italian writer. 
After refusing to condemn Trotsky and due to his support to Italian dissidents Pietro 
Tresso, Alfonso Leonetti, and Paolo Ravazzoli he was expelled from the PCI in 1931. 
Disenchanted from politics, he became a fervent critic of Communism, which he 
would eventually define as a “narrow-minded and conservative ideology, opium for 
subdued proletarians.”305 Despite his departure from the Party, he never recanted his 
Marxist identity306. Silone long advocated for a new non-bureaucratic society; he 
strongly believed that only in a society where all the authoritarian and centralized 
institutions were abolished, people could achieve the purest form of freedom and 
equality.  
His opposition to the fascist regime forced him into exile first in Switzerland and then 
in France.  It is in this period that he was introduced to Allen Dulles of the OSS (Office 
of Strategic Service). Dulles had come to Zurich in November 1942 and he established 
an outpost of the OSS in Bern where he could monitor the precarious situation Italy 
was facing. Silone, while cooperating with Dulles in coordinating assistance to the 
                                                             
305 I. Silone ‘Ideologie e realtà sociale,’ Tempo Presente, 1956, 1/1, 4. 
306 I Silone, Emergency Exit (London: Gollancz, 1969), 49. 
203 
 
anti-Fascist Resistance in Italy, was receiving money, funnelled through the American 
Labour unions, to finance the socialist party and the anti-fascist movement.307 He 
offered some advice on how to deal with Italians and how to conduct an effective 
propaganda campaigns.308  It was essential, according to him, that the U.S intervened 
to secure the Italians against the ‘Communist psychosis”.309 In order to achieve his 
goals, Silone did not hesitate to criticize US initiatives in Italy. For instance, in a letter 
to Gerald Mayer, he criticized the Allied radio propaganda campaign. As he said, the 
allied broadcasts in Italy, supposedly created for the masses, was not listened by the 
masses but by individuals already politically matured. Therefore, these individuals  
“usually find Allied propaganda stupid, banal, pretentious, and frequently prepared by 
gentlemen who must have been slightly intoxicated at the time.”310 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, when anti-Communism was not a priority of US 
foreign policy towards Italy, Silone and his circle of anti-totalitarian intellectuals 
found themselves essentially isolated within the cultural environment. While the 
Italian cultural context had no space for these intellectuals, the US saw no reasons for 
financing their cultural-political activities. When international relations began to 
deteriorate and the confrontation between the Unites States and the Soviet Union 
became more intense, their cultural potential came to be seen as a valuable asset for 
US cultural warfare.  
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With the end of the world conflict and the deterioration of the relations between the 
US and the USSR, Silone’s reputation as an independent-minded intellectual and 
Communist opponent allowed him to become a leading figure of US cultural warfare. 
Together with André Gide, Richard Wright, Arthur Koestler, Louis Fisher and 
Stephen Spender, Silone contributed to the anti-communist The God that Failed 
(1949). This book was a six-essays volume based on these authors’ testimonies (all 
the six had been communists) with a focus on their disillusionment and subsequent 
rejection of Communism. It was distributed, thanks to the CIA, all around the world 
as an emblem of freedom as opposed to soviet totalitarianism.311 This analysis, based 
on their own personal experience as disillusioned ex-Communists, was meant to 
produce a more appealing and compelling effect on the intellectual community than 
other historical-political analyses might have. According to Silone, the final conflict 
would be between communists and ex-communists, since “one cannot fight 
communism without having assimilated all the good it contains.” 312  As a direct 
witness, he felt a duty to reveal “the tragic reality which lies behind the façade of 
Communism.”313  
 
The Congress for Cultural Freedom. 
 
The outlines of the Congress for Cultural Freedom story is well known. The inaugural 
Conference was held in West Berlin in June 26 1950 at the Titania Palace. It was 
                                                             
311 F Stonor Saunders, Gli intellettuali e la CIA, 62. 
312 Pugliese, Bitter Spring: A Life of Ignazio Silone, 222. 
313 Silone, Emergency Exit, 102.  
205 
 
organised by private individuals with the support of the CIA and US occupation 
authorities in West Germany. The choice of the location was crucial. It represented 
“an island of freedom in a Communist sea”314. As Scott-Smith observes, the catalyst 
for the creation of the Congress was “the efforts of the reinvigorated Cominform to 
influence European public opinion against the Marshal Plan and against American 
involvement in European affairs in general”315. The US deemed necessary to establish 
a transnational anti-communist culture that could operate as a bulwark against the 
propagandistic attempts of the Soviets. The organization should be constructed 
around well-known international intellectuals and it had to appear as a voluntary 
mobilization of individuals concerned about the lack of intellectual freedom within 
the communist  world.  
One hundred and twenty delegates316, mainly from Europe and America, and four 
thousands attendees participated to this conference317. Among the others invitees, at 
the conference participated Arthur Koestler, Karl Jaspers, Ignazio Silone, Bertrand 
Russell, John Dewey, Benedetto Croce, Melvin Lasky, Raymond Aron, Arthur 
Schlesinger, James Burnham, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Sidney Hook etc. 318 
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The Manifesto was a bold statement against totalitarianism and for the promotion of 
intellectual freedom. The invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops the day 
before the inauguration of the conference created a climate of tension and anxiety 
within the delegates. It was evident since the first day that there were two main 
factions within this organisation. One, led by Arthur Koestler, could count on the 
support of Sidney Hook, James Burnham, and Franz Borkenau. This group had a more 
radical approach and favoured a fanatical language against the Soviets 319 . The 
moderates, headed by Silone, preferred a more open approach.  As Hochgeschwender 
observes, the radical battle cry «No Freedom for the Enemies of Freedom» seemed to 
the moderates to doom the success of liberal anti-Communism from within”320. 
 
Koestler and Silone, therefore, “represented the two poles of opinion over the best way 
to oppose Communists.  Koestler favoured the rhetorical frontal assault, and his attacks 
sometimes spared neither foe nor friend. Silone was subtler, urging the West to 
promote social and political reforms in order to co-opt Communism’s still-influential 
moral appeal“ 321.  Koestler was interested in transforming the Congress into an anti-
Soviet movement. He believed it had to be less cultural and more political, “a 
Deminform to counter the Cominform”. 322 As reported by Enzo Forcella in an article 
published on Il Mondo, during his speech at the conference Koestler solemnly declared: 
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“The intellectuals need to realize that in today’s world there is no room for ifs or  buts 
[…] The choice is between two position: yes or no, das Ja or das Nein. No to Soviet 
Russia, yes to freedom. The rest is only fear”. 323  Such a cry out for militancy soon 
became a recognizable, and divisive, feature of Koestler’s anti-communist stance. 
Silone, instead, was an inevitable rallying point for those within the CCF who 
disagreed with Koestler's militant positions324. In a letter addressed to Melvin Lasky, 
who was one of the organizers of the conference in Berlin, Silone lamented the 
thematic focus proposed for the gathering. It was not an invite for intellectuals and 
scholar, he argued, but a mere call for political agitation. According to him, a congress 
convened on this basis was useless. “It’s my opinion” he wrote “that a certain political 
effect could be the outcome but not the premise for the gathering in Berlin” 325. He 
also suggested to remove from the call for application any suggestion to discuss the 
true nature of totalitarianism and the Soviets. According to him, it was not necessary 
to state that these themes would be treated when discussing about the defence of 
cultural freedom. According to Silone, the Conference had to be an encounter of free 
men and women, writers and artists, who were not willing to renounce to their 
“supreme duty of freely speaking the truth.”326  
 
Silone could not stand the militant anti-communism glorified by the Koestler’s faction. 
According to him, there were a great number of women and men that had chosen to 
join communist parties because they were sincerely hoping for a political, economic 
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and ideological transformation of the status quo. According to Silone, the non-
communist left intelligentsia should talk to these people, showing them that a possible 
alternative to communism was possible. He believed that a fierce criticism of the 
Soviet ideology would be counterproductive without offering any possible alternative.  
As a result of the success of the conference, a permanent organization was created 
with its headquarters in Paris. The international secretariat was led by Nicholas 
Nabokov, a Russian exile musician, and Michael Josselson, a CIA field-agent, fact 
unknown to most of the members327. The organization was covertly funded by the 
International Organizations Division  of the CIA, which subsidized it with nearly 
$800.000 a year328. Various national executive committees were also established over 
the years to come. From 1950 to 1967 the CCF established branches in thirty-five 
countries of the world.  
While the CIA, via philanthropic organizations such as Ford Foundation, the 
Fleishmann Foundation and the Rockefeller foundation, was instrumental in covertly 
funding the organization, the reliance on local actors made the whole cultural 
campaign appear as a voluntary mobilization of individuals against the Soviet system 
and in support of the American Way of Life. It included among its members 
philosophers, economists, political scientists, novelists, musicians, poets and 
academics. Among the others, Benedetto Croce, Ignazio Silone, Arthur Koestler, 
James Burnham, Raymond Aron, Nicolas Nabokov, Karl Jaspers, John Dewey, Hugh- 
Trevor-Roper. Broadly labelled as the “liberal intellectuals” or the Non-Communist 
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Left there was no political homogeneity among those personalities; anti-Communism 
was their shared interest.  
 
Part of its activities consisted in organising international conferences and cultural 
events, publishing important cultural and political journals, offering economic 
subsidies and support to intellectuals behind the Iron Curtain as well as books, travel 
grants and cultural exchanges to its own members. One of the most remarkable 
initiatives promoted by the organisation was the publication of over twenty journals. 
Among the others, its principal and well-known reviews were Encounter in UK, 
Preuves in France, Tempo Presente in Italy, Der Monat in Germany, Cuadernos in 
Latin America.  
 
 
Associazione italiana per la libertà della cultura. 
Soon after the CCF was created and its headquarters established in Paris, leading 
members of the cultural organization were sent to Italy to investigate on the possibility 
to establish an Italian branch of the CCF. Due to the increasing intellectual support to 
the Italian communist party and the enduring distrust towards the US and its foreign 
policy, the CCF leadership authorized the creation of the Associazione italiana per la 
libertà della cultura (AILC), which was formed in late 1951 under Silone. Due to his 
international recognition as a writer as well as his political outlook and anti-
Communist activism Silone was considered the condition sine qua non for 
establishing the Italian branch and eventually for running the CCF journal Tempo 
Presente. This acknowledgment allowed him to obtain a great margin of autonomy 
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and, as Daniela Muraca observes, his “unconditional leadership” led to a “directive 
centralism” that made any attempts of external interference barely possible.329  
Thanks to his efforts and negotiations to transform and adapt the transnational 
dimension of the cultural Cold War to local ambitions and needs, the organization 
was prevented from becoming a sic et simpliciter replication of US propaganda. 
Despite being conceived as a national replication of the transnational organization, 
the outcomes were unforeseen and controversies soon emerged over different 
objectives and strategies. In particular, between the CCF and the Italian network 
tensions emerged due to the discordant ways of interpreting the intellectual 
community and the overall goal of this transatlantic cultural mobilization. While for 
the Paris headquarters the CCF was initially conceived as part of a wider approach to 
create a transnational anti-Communist culture beyond national interests, in the Italian 
case intellectual saw this project as a chance for promoting a national culture 
alternative to the Communist and Christian Democratic ones. For those intellectuals 
who gravitated around the Italian organization, therefore, cultural warfare went 
beyond the anti-Communist intent promoted by the US.  
The main problem was that by shifting from a transnational to a national dimension, 
the US did not fully consider the possibility that these intellectuals could not perfectly 
fit within the Cold War framework. As Nicolas Nabokov confessed to Michael 
Josselson, the executive director of the CCF, major concerns were rising about the 
effectiveness of the Italian anti-Communist cultural campaign due to the fact that 
“most member of the Italian Association are so profoundly steeped in Croceism, and 
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besides, are drug-addicts of anti-Fascism, that it will be difficult to change anything 
there.”330 However, both Silone and Chiaromonte always insisted against limiting their 
actions to a mere anti-Communism.331 The CCF considered this tendency as part of a 
“grotesque” attitude of the Italian cultural elite to concentrate on “aspects of secondary 
importance.” 332  According to Josselson, Italians “should keep in mind that they 
belong to an international organization […] and every time they need to think not only 
to their point of view, egotistic and national, but also […] to the international point of 
view.”333 CCF leading forces tended to agree that Italian intellectuals were too reticent 
to embrace the anti-Communist fight and more interested in addressing other Italian 
issues.  
One major concern for the CCF was that Italians’ seemed more worried about the 
hegemonic power of the Catholic Church rather than the increasing popular and 
intellectual support to the Communist Party. As Bondy and Altman reported to 
Josselson:  
“liberal and socialist intellectuals feel that clericalism is more 
dangerous than communism. They are afraid of the consequences of 
an even-stronger Catholic monopoly […] We tried to tell these 
people that, in the present world context, Soviet imperialism and the 
communist danger present specific problems, far more disturbing 
than the traditional, century-old struggle between clericalism and 
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anti-clericalism in Italy. But our remarks were greeted with many 
reservations”334.  
 
The CCF headquarters tried to intervene and smooth the anti-Clerical rhetoric of the 
Italian affiliate. Nabokov, for instance, fiercely criticised the “arrogant, bellicose, and 
quixotic” attitude of the AILC towards the Church. The Congress considered necessary 
to avoid any diplomatic incident with the Vatican, which was recognized as an 
influential and powerful ally for the US anti-Communist campaign. It was fundamental 
to preserve a cordial relation with the Catholic community since the Congress was 
seeking to include it in their own orbit. 335  However, the CCF could not directly 
intervene in the AILC’s decisional line.  While Communists and left-wing Socialists 
were prevented from joining the association, it was the exclusion of Christian 
Democrats that became a matter of great concern for the Secretariat in Paris who feared 
a possible backlash from the Vatican.336 Further concern arose due to the presence in 
the Italian Association of anti-clerical intellectuals such as Salvemini, “who eats the 
Pope the way Levitas used to eat Uncle Joe”.337 Both Nabokov and Josselson tried to 
convince Silone to tone down the AILC’s polemic with the Church but with no results. 
In a letter to Josselson, Nabokov also suggested that a “prominent catholic from 
outside of Italy should intervene to and through  the top authority of the Vatican in 
                                                             
334  D Muraca, “L’Associazione Italiana per La Liberta  Della Cultura: Il Caso Italiano E Il 
Congress for Cultural Freedom,” Storiografia XI (2007): 157. 
335 Idem, 154. 
336 M Mastrogregori, “Libertà Della Cultura e ‘Guerra Fredda Culturale’. Bobbio, Gli 
Intellettuali ‘Atlantici’ e i Comunisti: Alle Origini Di ‘Politica e Cultura’, 1955,” Storiografia XI 
(2007): 21. 
337 N. Nabokov to M. Josselson, 1 June 1954, Box No. 251, Folder 12, IACF. 
213 
 
order to persuade them to make a distinction between our international and national 
societies.”338 
Despite the CCF’s insistence, the hegemonic role of the Catholic Church was of greater 
concern for the Italian intellectuals. Their anti-clericalism could not be simply 
removed with the beginning of the Cold War and the American insistence. No matter 
how much emphasis the CCF put on letting the Italians know that Communism 
represented the major threat to freedom and how necessary the collaboration of all 
cultural anti-Communist forces were, the hegemonic cultural role of the Church did 
not represented an issue of secondary importance in the Italian context. Furthermore, 
since these intellectuals chose to mobilise in name of cultural freedom, the fact they 
could not criticise the DC and the Catholic networks exploitation of culture for 
political reasons was unacceptable.    
 
Tempo Presente and the Challenges of Transnational anti-Communism.  
 
Even though tensions between the CCF and the Italian branch would never be eased, 
the urgency to deal with the Italian case led the Paris Secretariat to authorize the 
publication of the Italian journal of the CCF Tempo Presente, which would be 
published monthly from 1956 to 1968. Despite Silone was the conditio sine qua non 
for establishing the Italian branch of the CCF and running Tempo Presente, it was 
Nicola Chiaromonte who was the foremost editor of the two.  Both editors agreed to 
                                                             
338 N. Nabokov to M. Josselson, 9 June 1954, Box No. 251, Folder 12, IACF. 
214 
 
bring forth a high-quality review, an alternative to those cultural projects proposed by 
Communist organizations and conservative movements. They played a fundamental 
role in adapting the transnational dimension of the cultural Cold War to local 
ambitions and needs making clear from the beginning that they would have not 
tolerated any sort of external interference in the Italian cultural experiment. 
 
Before Tempo Presente was founded in 1956, during a meeting of the executive 
committee (4 Dec. 1955) the editors strongly asked to leave out any mention about 
the connection between the journal and CCF. According to them such revelation 
would have possibly caused a wave of distrust among readers and collaborators.339 
Despite an initial refusal, Silone and Chiaromonte obtained the permission and Tempo 
Presente was the only journal in which there was no indication of the affiliation with 
the CCF.  
 
Most of the collaborators of the review were members of the non-communist left, as 
well as well-known writers. Among them: Italo Calvino, Vasco Pratolini, Libero de 
Libero, Albert Camus, Alberto Moravia, Leonardo Scascia, Enzo Forcella, Nelo Risi, 
Elsa Morante, Altiero Spinelli, Giulio Guderzo, Giuliano Piccoli, Luciano Codignola. 
Furthermore, the prestige of the review was also incremented by the presence of 
influential foreign collaborators such as: Dwight Macdonald, Hannah Arendt 
(founders of Politics); Melvin Lasky, Richard Lowenthal (collaborators of 
Encounters, the former was also the chief editor of Der Monat and later of Encounter) 
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Mary McCarty (collaborator of Partisan Review) Daniel Bell (Collaborator of 
Fortune) Lewis Coser, Joseph Buttinger, Michael Harrington, Irving Howe 
(collaborator of Dissident), and Theodore Draper. The journal was characterised by a 
wide range of articles; from socio-political analyses to literary reviews, from essays 
about European federalism to philosophical writings as well as letters from 
intellectuals from all around the world.  
 
Since the first publication, the editors claimed they had no ideology or line to propose; 
“the point of view we share is that, nowadays, no one can offer global and systematic 
truths”340 . Their stated aim was basically to inform and discuss about important 
national and international topics. As stated in the first issue in April 1956 “Tempo 
Presente is an international review of information and discussion based on freedom of 
criticism. It intends to promote the reconsideration of the ordinary ways of thinking 
confronting them with the reality of the existing world”341.  
Even though with the publication of TP the anti-clerical rhetoric would be smooth, 
probably because of Nicola Chiaromonte’s editorial line, another controversy 
emerged. In particular, tensions emerged over the Italian intellectuals’ notion of anti-
Communism and the different ways of interpreting the cultural opposition from a 
transnational and national perspective. Even though they were key members of the 
Congress, both Silone and Chiaromonte constantly opposed the fierce anti-Communist 
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crusade promoted by a faction led by Arthur Koestler and James Burnham. While for 
Koestler the CCF should have functioned as a political instrument to defeat 
Communism thanks to the recourse to a specular replication of the Soviet 
propagandistic fight; Silone preferred a more subtle approach. As he claimed, he 
wanted to “oppose to the hysteric cries of the communist propaganda a superior 
language”342 , fearing that a fierce anti-Communism would eventually push the so-
called “neutralist” intellectuals towards the Soviet Union. In Silone’s perception, a 
fierce criticism of the Soviet ideology would be counterproductive without really 
proposing any possible alternative.  
 
As the editors soon realised, a specular replication of US anti-Communist efforts 
would not only have been ineffective but also detrimental to the Italian cultural project.  
As Moravia, a declared non-Communist and anti-Stalinist intellectual, once stated in 
a letter addressed to Chiaromonte: “Politics is not an absolute matter. What is bad for 
America could be good here, what is good now is not going to be good in ten years. 
Nowadays, the communism in Italy is not in an anti-liberal position, maybe for 
Machiavellian reasons, but it doesn’t matter.”343 The impossibility to embrace a US 
oriented anti-Communism in the early Cold War was due to a series of reasons. First 
of all, a large part of the population was supporting the Italian Communist Party not 
simply for a political identification with the party’s agenda but also because it was the 
only party that represented an alternative to the Catholic hegemonic position in the 
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country. Secondly, within the intellectual circles, the romantic idea of “Resistance”, 
and the role communists played in it, was highly emphasised, even amongst non-
Communists sympathizers. As Moravia argued “[…] I do not feel like being anti-
Communist today, in Italy, for the main reason that this country has produced Fascism, 
and it is ready to do it again. I am afraid that American people do not understand what 
it means to live in a country that has been Fascist.”344 As Chiaromonte expressed in an 
extremely simple but effective way “some questions look different when seen from 
Europe […] Stalinism […] cannot be considered the main danger.” 345  The anti-
communist strategy planned by the US needed, therefore, to be adapted to the Italian 
context. 
The editors’ anti-communism was therefore meant to be different, in defence of 
democracy, social justice, individual liberty and fundamental rights, but also in 
defence of intellectual freedom. They conceived the CCF as an opportunity to foster a 
transnational intellectual debate moulded on their exile experiences but, above all, its 
creation was an occasion to overcome the cultural stagnation of the Fascist era and to 
promote an anti-communist leftist intellectual alternative to the cultural monopoly of 
the Italian Communist party and Christian Democracy.  
Despite refusing to follow any dogma, the Italian project was never meant to be 
apolitical. For Silone and Chiaromonte the intent “was not disengagement from 
politics […]but an intellectual clarification necessary to restore the conditions for a 
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culture that was neither apolitical, nor politicized.”346 . According to them, major 
social and political changes were essentially played out on the cultural terrain. What 
Silone rejected was the abuse of culture for political purposes. In a speech at the 
Société Européenne de Culture in Venice in March 1956, Silone declared: “the writer 
belongs to society and not to the state.”347 True leftist writers, therefore, should “tell 
the truth to everyone, at all times, to enemies and to friends, even when friends do not 
want to hear disagreeable truths.”348 
Both editors were opposing intellectual dishonesty of those that “willing to be 
interpreters of the common interest, ended up being supporter of the reasons of an 
apparatus or of a State: bureaucrat amongst the others”.349 As Silone wrote in an 
editorial piece published on Tempo Presente titled Invito ad un esame di coscienza:  
“No intellectual who seriously feel the sense of personal and social 
responsibility will ever accept, despite suffering frustration, to be 
confined to an ivory tower. The mistake is to accept the dilemma: 
either isolation or servitude. You can commit neck-deep to political 
and social struggle, and remain free, reserving bitter truths to your 
friends."350  
 
The Italian editors were criticizing intellectual dishonesty of those who “willing to be 
interpreters of the common interest, ended up being supporter of the reasons of an 
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apparatus or of a State: bureaucrats amongst the others”.351 Criticism was implicitly, 
as well as explicitly, addressed towards Communist intellectuals in Italy, but also 
towards the conservative anti-Communist crusade promoted by Christian Democrats.  
 
The Italian Anti-Systemic Intellectuals and America.  
 
Relations between the Italians of Tempo Presente and the United States were rarely 
smooth. In spite of his anti-communism, Silone was an unpredictable ally. He refused 
to entirely embrace the American cause, often characterising “America” as a moral 
and cultural menace. While part of the European intelligentsia welcomed the American 
Way of Life, Hollywood and US mass culture as a symbol of modernity, many still 
looked at the US with a sort of snobbish, aristocratic attitude. 352  There was a 
widespread stereotyped vision of America amongst Italians who, as a US report 
showed, “liked to emphasize our materialistic attitude and our lack of cultural 
refinement, mainly to soothe their own acute sense of inferiority at Italy’s present 
status in the international scene.”353  
Tempo Presente did not back away from similar criticism, especially on race relations, 
US foreign policy in Vietnam and Latin America, McCarthyism, and the aberrations 
of capitalism and consumerism. American intellectuals were becoming increasingly 
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worried about the spread of anti-Americanism within the European intellectual circles. 
In a letter to Chiaromonte, Macdonald stated:   
“Lionel [Abel] told me something I keep hearing on all sides, from 
people back from abroad […]: that the USA is becoming more and 
more unpopular abroad. It is frightening, really. (Get some tales from 
Jean in Mexico- all intellectuals hate USA) People are not FOR 
Soviet Russia, but they just fear and dislike USA- and think Senator 
McCarthy runs the country and there is a reign of terror here […] in 
short, Europeans are coming to think of this country as a 
homogeneous mass of atom-bomb-makers and ‘red-baiters’ and 
dollar-imperialists.”354 
 
Even Chiaromonte, largely sympathetic to the US, used to refer to the US by 
underlying the “incredible lack of quality in everything.” He was extremely critical of 
the US, its policy and its culture. He harshly wrote to Dwight Macdonald: “There is 
something quite especially nauseating about American brutality. Not only because it 
is accompanied by so much double talk about democracy liberty and peace, but 
because it is so naked, so crude, so much a kind of end in itself, a sport, a technical 
affair” 355. And he went on, “[…] the only thing America seems to be capable of doing 
in foreign policy is to put her force, financial and military, at the disposal of somebody 
else’s policy.”356  The US, according to many Italians, could not lead the world, not 
from a political neither from a cultural point of view.  
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However, the relation between the Italian intellectuals and the US was not an easy one. 
Criticism towards the hegemonic and paternalistic US intervention in the Italian 
cultural, political, and economic domains was widespread. During the Korean War the 
intensification of covert actions and the psychological anti-Communist crusade 
comported an increasing opposition among left-wing social democratic circles, which 
became more and more convinced that the real purpose of the NATO was to drag 
European countries into America’s wars357.  
One of the regular collaborators of the review, specialized in US issues, was Mauro 
Calamandrei. He was an Italian writer and journalist and, in 1949, became one of the 
very first Italians to be awarded a Fulbright scholarship to study in the US. He was 
particularly known for being the American correspondent of the Italian review 
L’Espresso. In Tempo Presente he produced a series of analysis on US politics and 
society. He wrote an article on the Western diplomatic crisis in the Middle East, 
highlighting US foreign policy’s limits. He blamed the US for its "lack of strategic and 
diplomatic planning, and long-term programs” 358 in dealing with the USSR. Mauro 
Calamandrei was not the only author who criticized US foreign policy. Other authors 
blamed the United States for its ambiguity during the Hungarian Revolution. Raymond 
Aron, for example, declared, "the policy of the United States was twofold: to comply 
with the requirements of the atomic age, it respected the division of the world into 
spheres of influence and did not think to intervene effectively beyond the line of 
demarcation; consistent with the requirements of the missionary spirit and of 
democratic prophecy, it protested to the United Nations, prohibited the use of force 
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and set out to free the enslaved peoples.” 359  Similarly, François Fejtö accused 
Washington’s hypocrisy for not having intervened in favor of the Hungarians "After 
ten years of inciting the satellites to claim freedom, the United States did not take the 
slightest serious initiative in view of a peaceful solution of a wider framework structure. 
The heroes were acclaimed and abandoned to their fate. It was a hard awakening for 
the Hungarians.”360  
US Foreign policy was not the only topic that arouse criticism. American culture was 
also blamed for the general deterioration of artistic products. Referring to mass culture, 
Ernest van den Haag especially criticized the “industrialization of arts”, which was 
largely seen as a threat to high European culture.  “In the climate of mass culture, a 
second coming of Christ would be only a sensational show to follow on TV, while 
waiting for Milton Berle’s program”361. Generally speaking, the European authors 
seemed to analyze US culture through a European perspective, bringing forth 
prejudices and stereotypes typical of conservative realities.  
But one of the most interesting publications is Dwight Macdonald’s article  “America! 
America!” It was originally written as a New York letter to Encounter in the early 
1958. However, the British journal decided not to publish the article. According to 
Macdonald, this editorial decision “reflected the attitude of Encounter’s ‘front office’, 
the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Paris, which published the magazine with funds 
supplied by several American foundations.” He felt obliged to add his point of view 
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on the matter when “America! America!” was published in Dissent, in October 1958. 
According to Macdonald, “the readers have a right to know when a magazine makes 
an editorial decision for extraneous reasons, especially this kind of reason.”362 
While Encounters rejected the article, Tempo Presente decided to publish it. “America! 
America!” appeared with the title “Letter from New York” on Tempo Presente in April 
1958, before it was published on Dissent.  In this article MacDonald defined 
Americans as “an unhappy people, a people without style, without a sense of what is 
humanly satisfying”363. “Americans appear to other nations to be somehow at once 
gross and sentimental, immature and tough, uncultivated and hypocritical, shrewd 
about small things and stupid about big things.” According to him, “in Europe exists 
a sense of community, in the US we live in a jungle. US motto should be “I got mine 
and screw you, Jack!”364 
The articles published in the IACF Bulletin or in Tempo Presente were not simply the 
result of top-down impositions, but they followed a more complex and incessant 
scheme of suggestions.  Josselson, for instance, was constantly suggesting possible 
publications. However, these articles could, or could not, be accepted or rejected by 
the editors. Even when tensions over publications of contestable pieces raised, for 
instance Guido Piovene’s article on Charles De Gaulle365, that, according to Josselson, 
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was too critical and damaging to international cultural relations, the Italian editors 
decided to pursue along the path of cultural autonomy and publish it. 
Since the beginning, Silone considered this review as a personal challenge, a challenge 
to cultural imperialism and an attempt to demonstrate Italian cultural autonomy. The 
outcome of his negotiations was to consider a European alternative to both American 
Capitalism and Soviet Communism moving beyond the specificity of the CCF. His 
criticism towards capitalist society and politics pushed him to embrace a third way 
position, critical of conservatism as well as communism. He rejected the rigid 
framework of the Cold War; an alternative to capitalism and communism was possible 
and, in his perspective, it was the European socialism366. As he claimed, “I think of 
socialism as an element from now on indispensable to a regime of real freedom- that 
is to say, of liberties that are concrete and actual, not formal and ‘constitutional’.”367  
Silone, and Chiaromonte, intended to influence the Congress from a more leftist 
position.  
In another article by Spinelli, the author summed up the Italian political excursus from 
Italian Renaissance to the present status quo.  He admitted that "the Italian democracy 
was born and lived under American protection, the Christian Democrats have agreed 
to become the American party, as well as the Communists are the Russian party in 
Italy [...] For this reason the Christian Democrats have worked without pretensions or 
farsighted visions, reconstructing and administering, good or badly, the State which 
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was dropped on their arms. Today that current has no longer or clearly visible stream, 
American leadership is no longer sufficient, and the boat needs an effective guide. "368 
They could find their own guide in the European community, a community free from 
ideologies, imperialist tendency and deeply democratic.  
Through Tempo Presente, Silone praised the Hungarian intellectuals for the role they 
played in the 1956 insurrection. "They were craving more «for truth and freedom» 
than for bread, the Hungarians, and they demonstrated this."369 They represented the 
epitome of those values Silone and Chiaromonte considered fundamental. As Silone 
wrote, "When it was time to choose, they have not hesitated between the party and 
the people, between ideology and truth. It may seem almost unbelievable. What an 
example and teaching for their Western comrades.” 370  And he continued: "By 
rejecting the dilemma «communism or fascism» the Hungarians Masses have 
introduced […] a real alternative of freedom and have forged a new historical 
perspective. The so-called «third way», which miserably failed along the corridors of 
the lost-steps of Western Parliaments, resurrects in revolutionary forms where no one 
expected it."371  
 
The End of Tempo Presente. 
In 1966 a series of articles were published on The New York Times detailing a series 
of organizations that had been secretly funded by the CIA. Among the others, the 
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newspaper revealed that the CCF and its English journal Encounter had been  one of 
those organizations that had been receiving money from the agency through a series 
of philanthropic foundations. In 1967, the US magazine Ramparts also reported these 
claims by publishing a long and detailed expose on the CIA’s cultural organizations.  
These claims were confirmed by other reviews and two months later Thomas Braden, 
the former head of the CIA’s International Organization Division, went public with 
an article published in the Saturday Evening Post entitled “I’m Glad the CIA is 
Immoral”. In this article Braden confirmed that the CIA had been secretly financing 
the Congress for Cultural Freedom as well as other organizations372. 
Following these revelations a big scandal erupted, even though rumors of the CIA 
support to the organization had been circulating since the beginning373.  The future of 
the CCF and its journals was in jeopardy.  In Italy, however, these revelations did not 
provoke a massive outrage as elsewhere. In October 1967, for instance, Chiaromonte 
wrote a letter to his friend Dwight MacDonald where he stated that in Italy nobody 
publicly mentioned the journal connection with the CIA, not even the communist 
press. He reported, however, an occasion where Mary McCarthy was confronted by 
the publisher Feltrinelli who defined TP as “a magazine which in the past had been 
financed by the CIA.”374 The event, quoted in a letter sent by her agent, happened 
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during a meeting with Feltrinelli to discuss the publication in Italian of one of her 
essays on Vietnam.   
As soon as the news about the CIA involvement went public, both Silone and 
Chiaromonte discussed the possibility of publishing a short statement on their journal 
commenting about the CIA covertly financing TP and their lack of knowledge. 
Eventually, they decided not to proceed with it. Because nothing had been published 
in the Italian press, “a statement like ours would seem to come out of a clear sky, 
unconnected with anything the general public had read, and finally prove gratuitously 
damaging, in addition to being journalistically bad”, Chiaromonte wrote. 375 
However, in 1968 the editors decided to halt publication. Despite the prestige of the 
review and its collaborators, the readers’ response was tepid and sales remained 
limited. Poor distribution of the journal had always been a concern for the CCF 
Secretariat. In 1966 Chiaromonte informed MacDonald that their journal was still 
having distribution problems and they were wanted in Paris to discuss the issue with 
Josselson.376 As Paola Carlucci stated, from 1956 to 1958 about 3300 copies were 
printed each month with less than 500 active subscriptions. The average percentage 
of returned copies of the journal from dealers and bookshops was about 30 percent. 
In November 1967 approximate circulation figures of other CCF journals were Der 
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Monat: print run 17.000 and total sales (including subscriptions) 13600; Preuves 
5900/2800; Survey 4750/3050; Tempo Presente 3000/2600.377  
The difficulties of the journal were mainly linked to the peculiarity of this journal. It 
was anti-communist in a country with the strongest communist party in Western 
Europe, it was critical of the Catholic Church and the Christian Democracy. Its 
ideological position also contributed to a series of difficulties in finding Italian 
funds378. Beside distribution problems and personal and administrative disagreements 
between the two editors, the lack of funding represented the main hindrance to carry 
on with the publication.  As Chiaromonte revealed in a letter addressed to Sławomir 
Mrożek, following the revelation of the CIA’s financial backup, the journal faced 
financial shortage. Nevertheless, Chiaromonte excluded the possibility of receiving 
Italian subsidies, which according to him were not only more difficult to obtain but 
also “far more political than the American one.”379 On the last number of TP it was 
stated: “for a cultural review, in Italy, there is no other alternative than relying on a 
political party or an economic group. For this reason, we are forced to halt 
publication.”380 Neither Silone nor Chiaromonte were willing to compromise and give 
up their intellectual freedom to other politic and economic powers. With these few 
words it was the end Tempo Presente as well as a failed attempt by the US to create a 
new hegemonic culture in Italy through the Congress for Cultural Freedom. 
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Seeking to maintain some sort of intellectual autonomy, these individuals never linked 
themselves organically to the political system 381 . Despite exercising authority, 
intellectuals did not have any direct power. Their influence over civic society had 
always to be filtered by the party, which legitimated their role. At the same time, it had 
to be mediated by society.382 By refusing to follow any dogma this network became 
more and more unpopular in Italy. Outside their own intellectual circle, their words 
almost fall on deaf ears failing to address the needs and aspirations of the nation as a 
whole. The main problem with this liberal-socialist intelligentsia was that they 
remained a compact elitist group that did not fit in a society in which mass political 
parties were becoming the major agents (referents) for changes.  Due to the dominant 
role of political parties in post-war Italy, their influence over civil society had to be 
filtered by the party, which could legitimate their social role through political 
recognition. The creation of a strong and influential leftist non-Communist intellectual 
network was impeded by the lumbering presence of a strong Communist left and a 
Christian Democracy party that, in policy as well as on the cultural front, caused the 
marginalization of the new anti-communist left383.  
 
 
                                                             
381 G Verrucci, “Il Contributo Culturale e Politico Delle Riviste e Degli Intellettuali Laici Nell’ 
Italia Del Secondo Dopoguerra (1945-1963),” Studi Storici 31, no. 4 (1990): 890. 
382 Pasquinelli, “From Organic to Neo-Corporatist Intellectuals: The Changing Relations 
between Italian Intellectuals and Political Power,” 416.  
383 Capozzi, “L’opposizione All’antiamericanismo: Il Congress for Cultural Freedom e 
l’Associazione Italiana per La Liberta  Della Cultura,” 341.  
230 
 
Conclusion.  
 
The story of Tempo Presente is another example of the complexity of Italian efforts to 
adjust to external pressures and position itself somewhere in between the two 
Superpowers, while constantly emphasizing its adherence to the Atlantic community. 
On the cultural front, the CIA’s financial subsidies384 transformed this domestic fight 
into an international struggle opening up a space for intellectual debates. European 
anti-Communism, however, was not a product of the Cold War but a spontaneous 
movement that had been embraced by many intellectuals since the Thirties. The CIA 
found a fertile ground in which to sow its own anti-communist seed. The agency help 
those intellectuals in reaching a bigger audience; in financing a project that had already 
been in motion, and that would have possibly been with or without the Agency's money.  
Despite the international status of the two intellectuals gave them autonomy and they 
succeeded in promoting a peculiar Italian experiment, the Italian political culture and 
its domestic structure impeded the success of it. The emergence of a leftist anti-
communist intellectual network in Italy was impeded by the lumbering presence of 
both a strong Communist left and the Christian Democrats, the dominance of which 
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politically and culturally ensured Tempo Presente’s marginalization.385 Following the 
end of the conflict, political elite soon extended its influence over society by imposing 
a clear political direction on cultural activities. Both parties had their own intellectual 
networks for the construction and maintenance of hegemony. As Chiaromonte claimed: 
 “In Italy all (or nearly all) the advantage of opposing Communism 
was left to the Christian Democrats, and this had extended the 
duration of their power. Because, certainly, having left to the 
communists the title of defender of democracy and the pride of being 
the only stable foothold for a possible opposition, it means that now 
that communism is collapsing the democratic and socialist 
opposition is partially discredited and partially defeated, 
disorganised and lost.”386 
 
While the Cold War gave them some sort of international recognition, on the domestic 
front their positions were still neglected or misunderstood. That is to say, the long-
lasting expectation for a change in the relationship between intellectuals and people 
never happened mainly because they were not able to overcome the intellectual 
classism. Their reluctance to ally themselves with the political parties and because of 
the traditional allegiance to high culture that has been characteristic of Italian 
intellectuals produced a sort of indifference among the readers. Despite the remarkable 
initiatives, these intellectuals were not able to fill the gap between civic society and 
power. 
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The peculiarity of Italian political, social, and cultural structures operated as a filtering 
factor for determining both the success and failure of cultural diplomacy. The story 
of Tempo Presente, its inefficacy in establishing a Non-Communist Left cultural 
hegemony, the review’s marginalization within the Italian literary establishment, and 
the intellectuals’ reluctance to follow the Secretariat’s guidance demonstrate how in 
transnational networks national interests, culture and context still play a decisive role. 
Despite their international status and influence, these intellectuals did not fit within 
the Italian context failing in establishing an effective cultural hegemony. 
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CONCLUSION. 
 
Despite the fact that with the beginning of the Cold War transnationalism has become a 
central aspect of US cultural diplomacy, this research has sought to demonstrate how a 
mere transnational approach to the Cold War is not enough to understand the complexity 
of the conflict, its local repercussion and the series of negotiations that took place within 
the country. Despite the attempt to operate beyond the boundaries of the nation, the 
nation-state still represent a cultural and political force of power in determining the 
evolution of transnational relations. When analysing transnational organisations such as 
the Congress for Cultural Freedom it important to analyse the relations between political 
institution and other non-governmental actors with a socialising function as well as 
those sets of values, ideas, and norms that are part of a country’s political culture. These 
can determine the impact and the outcome of those relations beyond the governmental 
apparatus. 
Internal and external actors can try to intervene and modify the national context, but 
they can only do it within the narrative framework of the domestic structure. Since they 
represent the variables under which specific ideas and values are selected, modify, 
adapted, or rejected, domestic structures can determine the success or failure of 
transnational relations. They work as a filter that mediate the impact of transnational 
efforts to influence policy in the various targeted areas387. Because the outcomes of 
transnational networks depend so much on domestic structures, the impacts and effects 
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of these exchanged ideas across the boundaries vary greatly from state to state. 
Therefore, a generalising approach cannot help us to determine the success or the failure 
of these networks.  
While transnational actors and organizations can challenge the power of the state, the 
organs and institutions of that specific nation-state still represent the fundamental centre 
of power where policy decisions are made and acted upon. However, transnational 
actors and ideas can still have a deep impact within the nation-state. As Risse-Kappen 
explains, transnational actors can influence national policy but only if they get access to 
the political system of the target state. But simply gaining access is not sufficient to have 
an impact on national policy. These actors also have to “generate and/or contribute to 
‘winning’ policy coalitions in order to change decisions in the desired directions”388.  
Even though external actors can try to intervene in other contexts and to modify the 
political culture of a specific population through a process of transfer or dissemination 
of political and ideological values, these actors could only operate within the narrative 
framework of the domestic structure. If the specific structure allows them to have a 
precise long-term impact on the country, their objectives can be partially or fully 
achieved. But this requires a complex process of negotiations and interactions with the 
social, political and economic elite of that specific country that would facilitate the 
promotion and reception of these external values or norms. On the other hand, in the 
absence of a favourable structure the achievement of specific objectives of cultural 
diplomacy would be very unlikely.     
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America’s attempt to establish in Italy a transnational anti-Communist identity failed 
due to the unfavourable structure and the creation of strong antagonising collective 
identities that represented a challenge to the adoption of external norms and values the 
US tried to export. While with its intervention Washington obtained some short-term 
success, from a long-term perspective its intervention exacerbated divisions within the 
country and strengthened the authority of both the DC and its socialising network with 
Catholicism becoming a new form of sub-national identity. Paradoxically, it also 
secured the Communist hegemony among the anti-Clerical forces within the country. 
This demonstrates the limits of Soft Power strategy and the difficulties in transforming 
the political culture and the identity of a foreign country.    
Furthermore, this research sought to demonstrate the challenges in forming a socialising 
agency from above. By relying on anti-systemic intellectuals the US sought to change 
the structure of the country through the creation of new socialising forces that could 
exert influence on both the Italian government and on social groups. This proved 
unsuccessful. The main factor that led to a failure of a long-term process of 
transformation of the political culture was due to the fact that socialising forces required 
to be organically connected with the political establishment. The intellectual reluctance 
in linking themselves to political forces and their refusal to establish organic relations 
with them led to a cultural marginalisation of this group.  
The main problem with a socialising agency is that its influence among the population 
cannot be obtained through imposition but required a long-lasting strategy of trust 
building and the identification of the population with these forces. Washington therefore 
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could no simply impose a socialising force from above. To effectively influence the 
population and its way of thinking these forces have to be built from the bottom-up.  
The transformation of the political culture of another country is a very complex process. 
It first requires a thorough understanding of the context and the domestic structure in 
which the external power seeks to intervene. The US lack of understanding of the Italian 
system and its political culture led psychological warfare experts to plan an ineffective 
strategy of intervention. As planned, the transformation of the population according to 
the American point of views could not take place.  
To understand the complexity of the Cold War it is also indispensable to expand the 
notion of power and the relations between nations by moving beyond the definition of 
strong and weak states. Previous scholarship tended to look at the Cold War from a 
unidirectional perspective with the US playing a determinant role while other countries, 
such as Italy for example, simply considered as passive players of this unbalanced 
relation. As I sought to demonstrate, local actors played a central role in the evolution 
of the relations and in the process of negotiation with the US. Cold War dynamics and 
the priority given to anti-Communism, for instance, allowed De Gasperi to become a 
pivotal actor in the negotiating process eventually giving him leverage to set the terms 
of this relationship. The starting point for US-Italian relationship, therefore, is not 
American Foreign policy or the transatlantic dimension of the Cold War but it is the 
local context and the negotiations of powers within Italy. Local dynamics played a huge 
role in modifying and adapting the international Cold War structure on the micro level.  
Therefore, a success intervention always depends on local actors, local structure and 
culture. Since they represented the variables under which specific ideas and values are 
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selected, modify, adapted, or rejected, domestic structures can determine the success or 
failure of transnational relations. When approaching the analysis of transnational 
relations, the “national” dimension of it cannot simply be removed; it is “inherent” to 
the concept.   
As this research sought to demonstrate, the Cold War was never bipolar in a strict sense; 
there were instead multiplicities of histories that went beyond the Cold War. Despite 
regional developments became intersected with the dynamics of the US-USSR conflict, 
these developments should not be read as naturally responding to the bipolar climate. 
The objective of this research is therefore to encourage a full reconsideration of our 
understanding of Cold War relations moving beyond the mainstream narrative that 
depicts them as cohesive. Undoubtedly, the clash of interests between the two Super 
Powers generated a series of conflicts that dominated international affairs for decades, 
but this instability of the international system was also caused by national and local 
aspects that through its intersection with the Cold War dramatically changed the course 
of history for many European and Non-European countries, Italy included.  
The same misreading of events that affected Italian historiography characterizes also 
other regional contexts of the world where conflicts came to be seen as merely generated 
by the bipolar confrontation. It is worth considering that in many cases, however, the 
Cold War frame was merely imposed from above by foreign actors. Through strategic 
attempts or by simply misreading events essentially local and national issues soon 
became Cold War cases. This is what happened in all corners of the world, from Latin 
America to Africa, from the Middle East to Asia. In Europe as well scholars often tend 
to oversimplify events presenting them as products of the Cold War.  One of the main 
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limits of previous narratives is that by looking at Italian negotiations and national efforts 
only through a narrow Cold War prism many anomalies in the political as well as 
cultural and social context could only be explained as a temporary deviation from the 
American leading direction, or as an external concession to the new Republic. However, 
it was not a matter of loose guidance or of benevolent concessions from the outside that 
shaped Italian post-war history, but it was the result of national efforts and negotiations 
in moving beyond the strict boundaries of the Cold War. The peculiar responses of 
Italian actors, their choices and individual efforts revealed the limitation of mere 
international analyses. 
This research did not aim to offer an exhaustive analysis of US-Italian relations but only 
to present a new perspective of analysis that tends to be underestimated. Further works 
with a focus on the local dimension are required for taking further the investigation of 
the Cold War. This analysis is only applicable to the Italian case but the importance of 
being local is central for understanding the evolution of the Cold War conflict and the 
national negotiations in other contexts as well. Because the outcomes of transnational 
networks depend so much on domestic structures, the impacts and effects of these 
exchanged ideas across the boundaries vary greatly from state to state. Therefore, a 
generalising approach cannot help us to determine the success or the failure of these 
networks. To further our understanding of transnational organizations and cultural 
diplomacy, we should not look at how the Cold War made these transnational projects 
possible but how national issues made them fragile.  
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